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Abstract 
This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the design of the capital adequacy 
assessment framework for Islamic banks. The proposed capital regulation is aimed at 
enhancing the Islamic banks' operational sustainability. 
The first analytical section in the thesis discusses the nature of sharing contracts. The 
analysis helps to explain the current reluctance to use sharing contracts by the players in 
the Islamic banking system. Each individual will always try to optimise his utility, 
monetarily as well as religiously, as a form of compliance with religious rules. 
However, in an adverse condition, religious and risk-averse customers will compromise 
the two utility objectives (i. e. adopting hybrid types of contract that, to some extent, 
deliver his minimum required financial return besides also complying with religious 
norms). 
The second analytical section in the thesis discusses possible improvements to the 
capital regulation of Islamic banks. This includes the possibility of enhancing the 
fiduciary as well as the agency roles performed by the Islamic banks. The analysis 
produces a number of propositions. The first proposition is to require the banks to have 
prudent assets-liabilities (capital) structures and to have adequate financial cushions. 
The second proposition is to require the shareholders of Islamic banks to observe a 
minimum level of financial participation; and to require the banks to disclose crucial 
financial information to investors. Theoretically, the higher the level of financial 
participation and the higher the quality of information provided, the better the quality of 
the contract entered into by the banks and 'their customers. 
The last part of the discussion, embracing empirical analysis, shows the important role 
played by capital in absorbing temporary financial shocks (especially when debt-based 
deposits are dominant). The discussion. also covers the possibility of using statistical 
techniques for assessing the soundness of Islamic banks' operational activities. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Islamic Banking 
The need for alternative banking services by Muslim societies has sparked fierce debate 
in the last few decades. For a Muslim society, a western type banking system is un- 
Islamic since it involves activities which are not in accordance with their religious 
rulings. In order to fulfil their needs, there have been a vast number of Islamic banks 
(financial institutions) established. The first modem Islamic bank, the Mit Ghamr 
Saving Bank of Egypt, was established and came into operation in 1963. In 1971, the 
Nasir Social Bank of Egypt was declared an interest-free commercial bank although its 
charter made no reference to Islamic law (sharia). Then, in 1974, an inter-governmental 
Islamic bank, the Islamic Development Bank (1DB), was established to provide 
religiously-approved financial assistance to member countries. These developments 
have inspired Muslim societies in other countries to take similar steps. There have been 
many Islamic banking institutions established to deliver religiously-approved financial 
services to the Muslim society in many countries. In Indonesia, the desire of Muslim 
society to have Islamic financial institutions started well before the government legally 
supported the existence of Islamic banks'. Such financial institutions are established by 
non-governmental-organisations. 
Islamic banking is distinct from western banking in some major areas: the prohibition of 
usury in economic transactions; the prohibition of gambling (excessive speculative 
activities); and the prohibition of conducting investment activities in morally 
disapproved projects. Conceptually, Islamic banks should have a different basis of 
transaction and a different nature of contract because of the prohibition of usury in 
business transactions. The Islamic banks should be dominated by equity-based funds in 
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their capital bases (Khan and Chapra, 2000). The value of depositors' funds represents 
the real assets value of the banks. Therefore, the Islamic banks conduct an agency role 
since the depositors are facing financial risks directly as a result of the banks' business 
activities. In practice, not all depositors are willing to take risks. Some of the depositors 
require the banks to guarantee the repayment of the principal amount when it is called. 
In Indonesia, hybrid-based transactions (a mix between profit-and-loss sharing contracts 
and fixed claim contracts) are even more popular than the pure profit and loss sharing 
contracts). The Islamic banks are thus also conducting fiduciary roles. On the assets 
side, Islamic banks offer a wide range of products based on pure profit and loss sharing 
(or revenue), mark-up and a mix of the two products. The current development of 
Islamic banking can, however, be interpreted as making Islamic finance more relevant 
to the daily business operations of its customers. 
1.2. Systemic Stability and Capital Regulation 
The customers of Islamic banks expect to have safe and sound financial services. The 
religious aspect is, thus, not the only factor to consider. They need a sound financial 
environment, which enables them to conduct ethical business without being afraid of 
facing financial crises as a result of fraudulent practices. At the macro level, systemic 
stability has become a central theme. Islamic banking is an integral part of the financial 
system in many countries. The soundness of the banking system is essential to a robust 
economy. Experience in many countries shows that there is a strong relationship 
between banking system soundness and macroeconomic policy implementation and 
performance (Goodhart et. al. (1998)). Effective prudential supervision of the banking 
system is a key element of financial system surveillance. Sustainable banking 
supervision, which relates to the assessment and monitoring of banks' financial 
performance and position, should be carried out through an effective regulatory 
1 The Act of the Republic of Indonesia number 7 of 1992, concerning banking, as amended by The Act of 
The Republic of Indonesia number 10 of 1998. 
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framework aimed at reinforcing banks' operating environment, internal governance and 
market discipline. 
According to Errico and Farahbaksh (1998), an appropriate regulatory framework for 
Islamic banking supervision should ensure that the legal foundations for Islamic 
banking supervision are in place, investment and other risks are adequately dealt with 
and that adequate information is disclosed. An Islamic banking system needs prudential 
supervision to reduce risks to the soundness of the banking system and to enhance the 
banks' roles as active players in the development of the economy. From the supervisory 
point of view, an Islamic banking system should be a financially sound banking system 
besides ensuring compliance with Islamic rules (Khan and Chapra, 2000). 
The establishment of an Islamic banking system is relatively new, when compared to 
western banking systems. The latter have long had established frameworks for 
regulation and supervision, which have been internationally recognised as satisfying 
minimum supervisory standards, as summarised in the Basel Committee's "Core 
principles for effective banking supervision". Islamic banking experts, as a matter of 
fact, can benefit from current developments in the western banking supervisory 
framework since there are some fundamental principles that should also be adopted by 
Islamic banking supervisors as minimum requirements for effective banking 
supervision. For example, the most recent capital adequacy proposals (Basle 
Committee, 2001a), which are designed to better align regulatory capital requirements 
to underlying risk, and to recognise the improvements recently made in risk 
measurement management and control, are relevant to Islamic banking. The Basle 
Committee's proposals of January 2001 consist of three pillars: minimum capital 
requirements; supervisory review; and market discipline. However, although most 
western regulatory standards are still relevant as indicators of best practice for Islamic 
banks, the regulations set for Islamic banks should also reflect the basic operational 
differences between Islamic and western banks. 
3 
Islamic financial experts have long been aware of the need for International 
convergence in Islamic banking operations. An institution called the Accounting and 
Auditing Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) has been established. 
The purpose of the AAOIFI is to review the standards for Islamic-banking operations 
internationally so that Islamic banks from different countries can have the same 
operating guidelines. As a first stage, the AAOIFI has been successful in producing a 
set of sharia-based accounting standards that incorporates religious norms and products, 
which do not exist in western systems. Operationally, many banking systems have 
started to adopt the international accounting standards set by the AAOIFI. Currently, the 
AAOIFI has also started reviewing issues relating to the prudential regulation of Islamic 
banks. One of the central aspects which is being reviewed is a proper design of capital 
adequacy regulations for Islamic banks. 
The rapid development of Islamic banking poses a challenge for the local banking 
authorities seeking to properly regulate Islamic banks. However, most national banking 
authorities still adopt the prudential standards outlined by the Basel Committee since an 
adequate regulatory framework designed for Islamic banks has not yet been devised. 
The Indonesian banking regulatory authority, for example, has also adopted the 
prudential standards outlined by the Basel Committee. The regulations set for Islamic 
banks, including capital adequacy requirements, heavily correspond with the regulations 
set for western banks. 
A number of research institutes continuously review the set of prudential regulations 
applied to Islamic banks in order to improve the soundness of Islamic banking 
operations. Capital adequacy regulation has been one of its central preoccupations 
because of its important role in maintaining operational sustainability. As mentioned 
earlier, Muslim society should emphasise the profit-and-loss sharing concept in all 
economic activities. This includes loan financing, trading activities, etc. In practice, the 
adoption of profit-and-loss sharing transactions requires some preconditions, which 
cannot be met in most developing countries. The lack of adequate accounting standards 
4 
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and poor information systems, for example, lead to informational problems. Hence, the 
concept of profit-and-loss-sharing has never been fully applied, except in a few 
countries. The current operation of Islamic banks shows how fixed-claim products 
dominate the liabilities of the Islamic banks since the depositors are not willing to fully 
share the losses with the banks (i. e. they want a guarantee on the principal amount). 
Therefore, the financial structure of Islamic banks is closer to the financial structure of 
western banks. This evidence shows the importance of having an appropriate capital 
adequacy regulation that can accommodate variability in business operations. Having 
taken account of these operational distinctions, the banking regulator should be able to 
enhance the soundness of the Islamic banking system, so that it can make a significant 
contribution to economic development. The regulations designed should also be able to 
improve stability in the long run. 
The existence of Islamic banks should not place excessive burdens on the economy. As 
in western banking systems, financial crises in Islamic banking systems can potentially 
generate huge systemic costs. Further analysis regarding systemic regulation should 
therefore be elaborated, such as safety-net schemes (deposit insurance) and exit policy. 
1.3. Objectives of the Research 
The assessment of bank capital adequacy plays an important role in banking 
supervision. An adequate level of capital improves the capacity of a bank to absorb 
temporal shocks. For the regulator, capital adequacy has become one of the most 
important measures indicating the soundness of banking operations. In an extreme case, 
capital adequacy may become the determining factor in the liquidation process since 
insolvency may result in systemic instability and a high systemic cost to the government 
as the ultimate guarantor. Capital adequacy requirements should be designed to achieve 
two different objectives simultaneously. First, capital should be sufficient to maintain 
operational sustainability. Since the composition of their capital is different, Islamic 
banks should face different capital adequacy requirements than western banks. The 
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capital adequacy regulations for Islamic banks should take their capital structure into 
account. Second, the capital adequacy requirements should also encourage prudent 
behaviour by the banks. 
This study is designed to do two things. First, to devise a regime of capital adequacy 
requirements that takes account of the characteristics of Islamic banks. Second, to 
identify building blocks that can be beneficial for further risk assessment techniques in 
Islamic banks. 
1.4. Methodology of the Research 
The research starts with the theoretical/literature review of the current development of 
western banking (financial) regulations. The review explores the rationale for and the 
objectives of the western financial regulations. The review also explores how statistical 
techniques can be used to support a supervisory process. The literature review then 
examines the current development of Islamic banking, in theory and practice, as well as 
the current development of a regulatory framework for Islamic banking. 
The research continues with a basic analysis of the theory of contracts and information. 
The analysis leads to an understanding of the variability of the contracts and their 
applicability. The analysis explores the informational problems that may explain the 
diversion of Islamic banking operations from the paradigm version (i. e. why the 
depositors and the Islamic banks are, in practice, reluctant to engage in pure profit-and- 
loss sharing contracts). 
These reviews and analysis support further analysis of the proper design of capital 
regulation for Islamic banks. The capital regulation should achieve two ultimate 
objectives. First, protecting risk-averse depositors from future losses (i. e. enhancing the 
banks' fiduciary role). And second, improving the quality of behaviour of the banks. 
The analysis includes a consideration of the attitude of shareholders toward financial 
6 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
risk using a stochastic analysis, and analysis of the extent of `financial participation' by 
shareholders in the principal-agent relationship (i. e. to enhance the agency role of 
banks). The analysis undertaken addresses the pivotal position of the shareholders of a 
bank because of their power to control the bank's management. 
The analysis also assesses the relevance of the current risk assessment techniques 
implemented in western banking to Islamic banking practice. It also involves an 
empirical analysis of the risk assessment carried out by an Islamic bank in Indonesia. 
The analysis shows how the capital adequacy standards outlined by the Basel 
Committee are, to some extent, still relevant to Islamic banking. 
1.5. Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis proceeds as follows: 
Chapter 1 outlines the scope and contribution of the thesis. The thesis makes, mainly, a 
theoretical contribution to the debate about the appropriate design of capital regulation 
for Islamic banks. The thesis also demonstrates the relevance of the western banking 
regulatory framework to Islamic banking. 
Chapter 2 discusses the current development of western banking regulation, referring in 
particular, to the Basel regulatory standards. An Islamic bank is, basically, an 
intermediary financial institution that needs financial stability to perform its functions. 
Islamic banks, to some extent, can benefit from the development of the western 
regulatory framework since they, financially, perform similar functions. The purpose of 
this review is to extract the essence of the western banking regulation and show how 
this knowledge may contribute to the development of an Islamic banking regulatory 
framework. 
Chapter 3 discusses the background to the needs of Muslim society for a religiously- 
approved financial system since Islamic teaching has its own principles concerning the 
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permissibility of financial activities. This chapter also describes the recent development 
of Islamic banking in general, including the current banking regulatory framework. This 
chapter demonstrates how current regulations, which are specially designed as a 
standard for prudent Islamic banking activities, are inadequate, with most banking 
regulators (including the Indonesian banking authorities) in Islamic countries simply 
adopting the western banking regulatory standards. Although some of the principles of 
the western banking regulatory framework may be relevant to Islamic banking, it is 
important to design a dedicated set of banking regulations that takes into account the 
characteristics of Islamic banks. 
Chapter 4 examines the factors affecting the applicability of the profit-and-loss sharing 
contracts as compared with other types of contracts, like fixed-return contracts and 
revenue-sharing contracts. This chapter analyses the informational problems preventing 
full application of profit-and-loss-sharing contracts. 
Chapter 5 explains the nature of the contracts used in Islamic banking operations. The 
analysis recognises the differences between the paradigm version and current Islamic 
banking practices. The formulation of capital adequacy requirements should be capable 
of supporting a sound financial structure and inducing prudent behaviour by 
shareholders. This chapter also analyses the interaction between the capital adequacy 
requirements, a possible safety net arrangement, and stochastic behaviour in the banking 
system. 
Chapter 6 shows, empirically, the role of a bank's capital adequacy in sustaining 
operational soundness. This chapter also shows how conventional risk assessment 
techniques are still relevant to Islamic banking operations. 
Chapter 7 concludes the research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2.1. Introduction 
FINANCIAL REGULATION: 
THE WESTERN FRAMEWORK 
In the theory of industrial organisation, an intermediary can be viewed as an agent who 
buys certain goods or services from producers and sells them to final consumers. 
Similarly, banks can be seen as financial securities retailers who buy securities issued 
by borrowers and sell them to lenders. Gurley and Shaw (1960), Benston and Smith 
(1976) and Fama (1980) state that banks exist to transform financial contracts and 
securities. Different desires of borrowers and lenders may be the most reasonable cause 
of the existence of the traditional banks. Summarising the arguments in western 
economics, Freixas and Rochet (1998) highlight important aspects relating to the 
existence of banks as intermediary institutions. 
Transaction costs 
One of a bank's main roles is transforming deposits to non-marketable loans. A bank 
can be viewed as providing services of divisibility, term and risk transformation. Gurley 
and Shaw (1960) emphasise the transformation process of the credit portfolio demanded 
by borrowers into a deposit portfolio desired by lenders. A bank has two advantages in 
the transformation process. First, banks engage in term transformation. Surplus income 
units (household) prefer short-term deposits for liquidity reason while deficit spending 
units (firms) like to finance their projects with long term credit. Banks are able to 
facilitate those two different preferences though the firms could issue short term saving 
contracts. Second, banks are able to exploit efficiency gained from the payment system. 
A bank has to exceed a minimum level of efficiency and profitability to survive in the 
business. A bank may benefit from two economic efficiencies: economies of scale and 
economies of scope. The idea of economies of scope is that a bank may be more 
9 
CHAPTER 2F IN. AANCIAL REGULATION 
efficient in providing wider varieties of financial products rather than narrower 
varieties. Although this idea does not apply to all financial intermediaries, it may be 
reasonable as an explanation for the existence of universal banking. A bank can also 
operate more efficiently after it exceeds a minimum scale of operation. The problem of 
large fixed transaction costs can be overcome by an increase in the volume of 
transactions. 
Liquidity insurance 
Banks can also be viewed as providing pools of liquidity that provide households with 
insurance against idiosyncratic shocks that affect their consumption needs. The idea of 
investment fund allocation starts from the concept of the use of some fractional deposits 
to finance profitable and illiquid investments. The banks should have an ability to 
maintain their liquidity against idiosyncratic shocks (as long as these shocks are not 
perfectly correlated) that might exceed the total cash reserve. Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) show that the market economy does not provide perfect insurance against 
liquidity shocks and therefore it does not lead to an efficient allocation of resources'. In 
their model, it is proven that in the condition in which agents are individually subject to 
independent liquidity shocks, the market allocation can be improved by a deposit 
contract offered by financial intermediaries. 
Information-sharing coalition 
In business activities, entrepreneurs usually have better information than the investors 
do. This `hidden information' may lead to adverse selection for investors in choosing 
prospective projects. Banks can be viewed as information sharing coalitions that 
generate economies of scale in borrowing-lending activities. Campbell and Kracaw 
(1980) mention the natural monopoly aspect of information provision as the main 
competitive aspect. In their studies, Leland and Pyle (1977) have also shown that if 
Bryant (1980) models the first notion of liquidity insurance. It captures the simplest model of fractional 
reserve system. The model optimizes the utility of the consumers in facing the possible liquidity shocks. 
If the return of the long run investment cannot guarantee the higher return of the short run investment, the 
consumer tend to maintain higher level of liquidity. In fact, the market cannot provide perfect insurance 
against liquidity shocks. 
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borrowers form partnerships, they are able to obtain better financing condition than by 
borrowing individually. It can be shown that the unit cost of capital decreases with the 
size of the coalition of borrowers. 
Banks as delegated monitors 
According to Diamond (1984), banks have comparative advantages to do monitoring 
activities due to efficiency. A bank can be viewed as a pool of funds that collect 
dispersed small financial resources to finance larger scale projects. When the banks can 
achieve economies of scale, they can deliver lower costs of delegations. The term 
`monitoring' itself has a broad meaning (Hellwig, 1991). This includes screening 
projects (to avoid adverse selection), preventing moral hazard by the borrowers in 
realising the projects, and auditing the project (including punishment for contractual 
breaches). 
Exhibit 2.1 
A comparison of the objective of Islamic and western banking system 
c bank 
Government/ 
banking 
regulator 
Financial intermediaries that 
are capable of accelerating 
economic development 
through saving-investment 
Financial intermediaries that 
are capable of accelerating 
economic development 
through saving-investment 
Depositors 
Delivering financial services 
that: 
- safe 
- efficient 
- religiously approved 
Delivering financial services 
that: 
- safe 
- efficient 
Requirements 
Stability and sustainability 
Compliance to the sharia 
rules 
Financially, Islamic banks exist for almost the same reasons. Exhibit 2.1 shows the 
comparison of the objectives of the existence of the two banking systems. At the macro 
level, the banking systems should be capable of sustaining economic development. At 
the micro level, the banking system should be capable of delivering safe and efficient 
financial services. The difference between the two lies only on the compliance to the 
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sharia rules. The question to answer is how should Islamic banking regulation be 
different from the western banking supervisory framework. 
The establishment of Islamic banking is relatively new as compared to the western 
banking. The Islamic banking experts are in a search for an appropriate framework for 
banking supervision. The framework designed should incorporate financial and 
religious aspects simultaneously. The western banking has already had an established 
regulatory framework, which has been continuously reviewed in the last decades. 
Islamic banking experts, to some extent, can benefit from current development of 
western supervisory (and regulatory) framework. This chapter reviews the rationale 
behind financial regulations and current development of banking regulations in the 
western world. 
2.2. The Rationale for Financial Regulation 
Nowadays, the financial system plays very important roles in the activities of every 
community. The development in modern information technology has made the financial 
system integrated, not only regionally but also globally. There are a lot of benefits that 
can be gained from these developments, such as low transaction costs and reduced 
transactions time. Various financial instruments have also been developed to fit the 
needs of portfolio investment activities. On the other hand, financial integration has also 
concealed a lot of potential problems when the system is not ready for such 
developments. The financial system is becoming more vulnerable as a large amount of 
money, involving many depositors' interests, shifts easily from one instrument of 
portfolio investment to another; whilst at the same time, depositors do not have full 
information about the investment activities undertaken by financial agents. 
Over the past decade, the banking system has changed radically. Entry barriers to the 
banking industry have eroded as competition has increased domestically as well as 
internationally. The challenge for competition does not only come from other banking 
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institutions but also from non-bank competitors that have begun to provide various 
alternative financial services. Moreover, recent technological and financial innovations 
have served to reduce information costs and to increase competition. The developments 
are eroding the market imperfections, which gave commercial banks their advantages 
over inter-mediation in direct credit markets. According to Eisenbeis (1990), important 
developments in the financial markets have been: the explosive growth of asset 
securitisation and contingent claims, and the internationalisation of financial markets. 
Following these developments in the financial markets, there have been two subsequent 
results. First, there has been a shift in the institutions who are participating in these 
markets away from traditional intermediaries towards securities firms and investment 
bankers skilled in the creation, design and distribution of these new derivative 
securities. Traditional banking activities will share a limited portion in the future, 
however, the banking industry with a more advanced characteristic will still exist. 
Second, it has been increasingly difficult for individual countries to maintain regulatory 
structures or regulations different from those in the rest of the world. The adoption of 
the standard banking supervisory and regulatory framework developed by the Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS) by most countries in the world is one example of the 
attempt for regulatory convergence. 
Llewellyn (1997a) states that sound economic development2 requires two essential 
ingredients: an efficient financial system and a stable and robust financial system. An 
efficient financial system requires substantial liberalisation, that is a general policy that 
increases the market's role and allows for autonomous financial institution decision- 
making. A robust financial system requires three additional properties: proper decision- 
making and control within financial institutions with effective risk analysis, 
management and control systems; an efficient regulatory and supervisory regime for 
financial institutions; and sound incentive structures for all parties in the financial 
system. Setting the scene to address the economic rationale for the regulation of 
2 In an economic system in which the capital market has not developed sufficiently to sustain the required 
level of savings/investment, the banking system seems to be a very important channel for developing the 
savings/investment process. 
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financial services, regulators should understand some general perspectives (Goodhart 
et. al. (1998)). Regulators should recognise the needs of regulation, monitoring and 
supervision since they supply regulatory, monitoring and supervisory services to various 
stake-holders that might have different needs to fulfil; hence, the system might even be 
over-regulated. Over-regulation based upon inappropriate objectives might increase the 
economic costs, and also increase the price of financial services. The following three 
arguments can be considered as the main reasons why regulations are needed to shape a 
financial/banking system. 
To protect the customer against monopolistic exploitation 
Since banking and financial services are widely used by the public, the regulator must 
prevent monopoly practices by a private sector that allows them to exploit their own 
interests instead of providing appropriate financial services3. Those who command 
access to the use of markets or to the information that they generate may be in a position 
to monopolise the services and to exert unfair pressure favouring their own interests; 
hence, their action will distort the market. To some extent, the regulator must also exert 
some control over those activities that cover a broader area, including support facilities, 
such as financial information services and other areas that provide access to the market. 
To provide retail (assume less informed) clients with protection 
In the absence of prudential regulations, depositors are not sufficiently protected. They 
are not supplied with adequate information on how their funds are being used and they 
do not even know about the actual value of banks4. Nowadays, the finance industry as 
3 As an industry, the banking system depends on suppliers in providing services. Suppliers in the banking 
system are not only the hardware providers (e. g. computers, furniture) but also the subcontractors of some 
parts of banking activities. The subcontracting of some part of banking activities, like information 
processing, is done in order to achieve a higher level of efficiency and ultimately greater competitiveness. 
4 Depositors are indirectly facing double moral hazard. First, banks usually behave as sleeping partners in 
their relationship with borrowers. The banks are usually unconcerned about the actions taken by the 
borrowers in obtaining the highest possible returns; the lenders, in fact, have no control over the actions 
that are not observable. A more useful review about the determination of the optimal repayment function 
can be found in Innes (1990). Second, the depositors are also facing moral hazard taken by the bank. 
Depositors (usually unsophisticated and dispersed) are not capable of observing the actions taken by the 
banks whilst the banks have their own utility maximization process. These two moral hazard problems 
might adversely affect the value of banks' assets and, in fact, the real claims value of the depositors. 
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well as the banking industry has become a technology intensive based industry. 
Through the application of a minimum disclosure standard, dispersed and sophisticated 
depositors will have a higher level of protection. As reviewed in some studies, including 
those of Holmstrom (1979) and Laffont and Tirole (1986), a higher level of information 
disclosure is able to reduce the moral hazard for two contracting parties5. 
To ensure systemic stability 
Due to its very important roles, Papadimitriou (1996) states that banking regulation 
should seek to foster two critical structural objectives. First, ensuring the long-term 
stability of the financial system. Second, promoting the financing of the capital 
development of the economy. In conducting intermediary activities, a bank fully relies 
on public confidence6. Once the banking system starts to loose confidence, their 
intermediary activities cannot be performed. Hence, without adequate systemic 
regulation, the banking system is very vulnerable to disturbance. Systemic regulation is 
needed when the social cost of a financial institution failure exceeds the private cost. 
Systemic hazard is triggered by a deterioration in public confidence that subjects banks 
to runs while a large proportion of the assets of banks are not easily marketable. In fact, 
systemic hazard can throw solvent banks into insolvency because panic can drive down 
the actual market value of their assets. Even in the presence of deposit insurance 
arrangements, the sum of claims covered by the safety net scheme might not be 
sufficient to cover losses arising from banks' speculative activities. Therefore, deposit 
insurance schemes in some countries do not cover a hundred percent of depositor funds 
to dissuade banks from investing depositors' funds in speculative investments and to 
encourage depositors to select and assess the soundness of the bank. 
Holmstrom (1979) has theoretically proven that any additional information exhibited by the principal 
before the realization of the contract may reduce moral hazard. In Laffont and Tirole (1986), it is shown 
that additional information regarding hidden action taken by the agent can reduce moral hazard. 
6 According to Llewellyn (1999a), in the absence of financial regulations, the depositors will most 
probably assume the `first come first served' basis in having their funds repaid. Therefore, once the 
banking system starts loosing public confidence, withdrawals by some depositors may trigger chain 
reactions by other depositors (bank runs). 
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Systemic danger in the banking system, in fact, is a logical consequence of the 
application of debt-based liabilities. The real value of the banks' liabilities is determined 
by the value of the banks' assets, whilst the contractual value of the banks' liabilities is 
invariant to the real assets' value. The failure of any financial institution, especially in 
the banking system, may affect adversely the stability of the whole banking system. On 
the contrary, financial institutions which have equity based liabilities will not create 
systemic danger in the financial system since the value of the banks' liabilities is not 
invariant to the real assets' value. 
The regulations set by the government have to be capable of maintaining the safety and 
soundness of financial institutions and should also prevent any adverse behaviour by 
bankers. The banking regulatory authority and banks' management should have close 
co-operation to build a robust financial system. Generally, the prudential regulation 
implemented should cover a range of financial aspects, including liquidity, solvency, 
risk exposure and the soundness of individual institutions and the whole market. 
Prudential regulation is needed to deal with imperfect consumer information and agency 
problems where they exist. In fact, prudential regulation is needed not only by the 
customers, but also by the institutions that provide the safety net scheme, especially in 
determining the appropriate levels of premium levied. Llewellyn (1999a) mentions three 
particular elements for robustness while referring to the ability of the financial system to 
remain stable and efficient under a wide range of market condition and shocks. First, the 
financial system should be able to accommodate any change in the system as the market 
alters (flexible). Second, the financial system should have a capability to overcome any 
financial turbulence caused by external shocks, including macroeconomic instability 
(resilient). Third, the financial system should also have internal stability. He also 
mentions some factors causing instability in financial markets, such as macroeconomic 
instability, the financial system's poor infrastructure, market indiscipline and the poor 
quality of regulation and supervision. Different countries with different levels of 
macroeconomic stability face different levels of systemic risk. Therefore, countries 
having undeveloped and unstable macroeconomic environments should consider a more 
16 
CHAPTER 2 FI\ANCI: I\L REGI'L. ATION 
stringent prudential standard for banking operations compared with developed 
countries. 
Information disclosure supported by sound legal arrangements and a sound auditing 
system in the financial system are also crucial concerns that should receive attention 
from all the players in the system. Information disclosure should include ex-ante risk 
assessment and ex post asset valuation, so that the related parties, especially the 
depositors, will be fairly informed. It has been evident that financial crises were 
initiated by inadequate internal risks analysis and control systems (Greuning and 
Bratanovic, 1999). Moreover, poor financial risk analysis can possibly introduce 
disincentives to conduct prudent practices within the financial system. Financial 
institutions, depositors and banks (managers and owners) are all involved in the process 
of financial intermediation, hence their actions affect the incidence of systemic risk 
(Stanton, 1995). The regulator, on behalf of depositors, acts to limit excessive risk- 
taking by banks. Regulations set must be optimal in shaping the responsive behaviour of 
every agent within the regulatory framework. In the condition where the social cost of 
systemic risk is very high (e. g. large deposit insurance fund losses), a financial system 
cannot fully rely on pure market forces. 
In implementing regulation, there are some informational problems faced by regulators 
(Goodhart et. al. (1998)). First, they do not know exactly the quality of a bank's internal 
risk management. Second, once they have put regulations in place, they cannot fully 
observe the compliance of banks with the rules imposed. Finally, there is no perfect 
model to measure risk precisely. There must be some residual risks. The managers of 
the banks have to make adequate effort to keep portfolio risks under control. 
Appropriate regulation allows banks to operate within their risk-taking capacity that 
accords with its portfolio investments. Since banks have various portfolio investments, 
the supervisor can solve this problem either by examining its risk management systems 
or by letting the banks choose their own examination methods. If the incentives are 
right, the banks will self-select into the appropriate category of the regulation set. On 
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the contrary, if the incentives are not right, the banks will be forced to adversely select 
the options (Kupiec and O'Brien (1997))7. In some extreme cases, the incentives set 
should be able to limit moral hazard problems that arise when banks are tempted to 
make risky investments in order to recover any initial losses. In the case of Barings, the 
downfall of the whole bank in February 1995 was caused by a single trader who decided 
to `gamble for resurrection' by hiding the losses and by taking on positions more 
aggressively in order to recover initial losses. The absence of adequate internal control 
mechanisms also rendered the bank unable to control its risky investments (A complete 
review about the collapse of the Baring, the chronology and analysis, can be found in 
Hall, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1996a and 1996b). As a matter of fact, the behaviour of 
every employee in banks is mostly shaped by incentive schemes set by the institutions. 
If the management is given a significant reward for risk-taking, they tend to behave 
more aggressively. Contrariwise, they tend to be risk averse if the schemes discourage 
risky actions. 
There are a number of reasons why banking regulation should be put in place. First, the 
customers need a degree of comfort and confidence that can be provided by regulation. 
The customers face a potential adverse selection problem in a situation where they 
know there are good and bad products, but, because of insufficient credible information, 
they are unable to distinguish them at the point of purchase. In an imperfect financial 
market, the costs of intermediation are also high. Second, there is a possibility of the 
bank being tempted to adopt short-term strategies to maximise return. In this situation, 
other firms might be driven out of business because they cannot compete (adverse 
selection). Another possibility is that other firms are induced to behave badly when they 
either see bad behaviour in others, or have no assurance that the competitors will behave 
well (moral hazard). Therefore, there is a need for continuous monitoring of the 
behaviour of financial firms. The existence of deposit insurance arrangements and a 
7 Using the assumption that the management of a bank will always seek to maximize shareholder value, 
Merton (1977) discusses the option value effect of the bank as the main reason for the `gamble for 
resurrection' strategy adopted by banks as the result of the application of flat rate premium deposit 
insurance arrangements. 
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lender of last resort facility might create more intense moral hazard problems for both 
consumers and financial firms. Third, the failure of an individual bank may have 
contagious effects on other banks8. 
According to Llewellyn (1999a), regulatory agencies generally apply two types of 
regulation: prudential regulation and conduct of business regulation. Prudential 
regulation is applied to assist the customers when facing asymmetrical information 
problems where customers are not in a position to judge the safety and soundness of 
banks. The banks perform fiduciary roles for depositors. After a long-term contract has 
been taken out, no one can guarantee the post-contract behaviour of the bank. Besides 
prudential regulation, regulators may also apply conduct of business regulation that 
focuses upon how financial firms conduct business with their customers. It includes 
information disclosure, the honesty and integrity of firms and their employees, the level 
of competence of firms, fair business practices etc. This kind of regulation will induce 
financial institutions to behave appropriately in dealing with their customers. 
Considering the amount of money at risk and that the opportunities for principal-agent 
conflicts of interest are generally high, problems of customer protection within the 
financial service area are more severe than in other businesses. Several attempts have 
been made to reduce the probability of principal-agent conflict of interest, like setting 
standard entry qualifications and standard good behaviour requirements and ethics to 
avoid moral hazard. 
2.3. Banking Regulation 
The soundness of banking systems in every country depends on the establishment of 
appropriate banking regulation. Banking regulations can be viewed as a set of incentives 
to shape the behaviour of banks' managers and the specific characteristics of the 
8 In the money market, a bank interacts with other banks to optimize its portfolio management. In a very 
liquid money market, the volume of inter-bank transactions may reach a big amount; therefore banks may 
have intensive connected liabilities. The collapse of a bank may adversely affect other banks in the 
system. 
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banking industry. As a matter of fact, the government and the public have the same 
interest to the establishment of an efficient and sound banking system. The government 
needs the participation of the public for savings mobilisation, and at the same time, the 
public needs safe financial services (see exhibit 2.2). 
Exhibit 2.2 
A regulatory framework for the banking system 
Banking Regulatory 
Regulator 
(Government) framework 
Financial 
assurance 
Surplus Banks 
Income Units Savin s (Intermediary 
(Depositors) Institutions) 
2.3.1. Regulation and governance 
Deficit 
Spending IJiits 
(Entrepreneurs) 
As discussed earlier, the banks are faced with new risks and challenges. The 
globalisation process, the volatility of financial markets and competition among 
financial institutions has forced the banks to be market oriented in order to remain 
competitive. The regulators and supervisors also have to change their approaches to 
regulation and supervision; however, they have to realise that they are not the only 
parties involved in maintaining banking soundness. As the complexity of banking 
activities increases from day to day, the risk management process has become very 
important. There are several key players who should be involved in the risk 
management process in ensuring the safety and stability of both individual banks and 
the banking system as a whole (see Exhibit 2.3). All the players in the financial system 
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should have the right incentives to motivate them in supporting good governance in the 
banking system. Financial regulations can be viewed as a tool that involves creating 
incentive-compatible constraints, directing prudent financial operations and shaping 
responsible behaviour of the players. 
Exhibit 2.3 
Key players supporting good governance in a banking system 
Regulatory environment 
that supports the 
enhancement of every 
party's role it the 
banking system 
Day-to-day control on 
the policy 
implementation process 
Internal auditors 
Voice, 
Increasing rep Iacement & 
shareholders' exit 
value 
Board of directors 
Policy 
implemen nbon 
Replacement 
Independent opinion on 
the fainiess of bank's 
financial statements 
Executive management 
Public, including 
financial analysts, rating agencies 
and stock brokers 
External auditors 
The roles of the regulatory and supervisory authorities 
As mentioned earlier, the banks face a broad spectrum of risks in their operations. The 
traditional prescriptive regulatory approach seems to be incapable of coping with 
modern banking operations because of its limited scope. On the other hand, the 
regulatory and supervisory authorities have to realise that they cannot solely prevent 
bank failures. The main role of the regulatory and supervisory authorities is to facilitate 
the risk management process and to monitor its compliance with the statutory 
`' Every economic individual will always maximize his utility (monetary) subject to some constraints, 
including regulatory constraints. Those regulation constraints should be able to harmonize the different 
21 
CHAPTER FINANCIAL REGULATION 
framework in which the risk management process is undertaken. Llewellyn (1999b) 
states that there should be incentives for the regulatory and supervisory authorities that 
ensure the regulators/supervisors supervise the banks' risk analysis and ensure that the 
banks' risks do not move outside the range which can effectively be covered by banks' 
internal insurance funds. According to Greuning and Bratanovic (1999), a more 
appropriate mission for the regulatory and supervisory authorities today would be: 
`To create a regulatory and legal environment in which the quality and 
effectiveness of bank risk management can be optimised in order to contribute to 
a sound and reliable banking system' 
A market oriented regulatory approach emphasises risk assessment and risk 
management without unnecessarily applying detailed rules and recommendations on the 
banks. Moreover, the regulatory and supervisory authorities should be capable of 
influencing the other key players in the banking system to establish a free market 
attitude towards bank supervision and professional supervisory functions, as well as to 
facilitate public understanding of the bank management's responsibility in the risk 
management process. In order to achieve an optimal result, the regulator should also 
maintain its consistency in regulating the system by sending consistent signals to the 
market. These arguments show the pivotal position of the regulatory and supervisory 
authorities; hence, they play important roles as the main initiators to optimise and 
monitor risk management within the banking system. 
The role of shareholders 
Shareholders play a very important role in shaping good governance in bank operations 
since they have a right to appoint the board of directors. The board of directors, in turn, 
determines the direction of a bank. Entry regulation may be the first checkpoint in 
establishing a sound and prudential banking system. If the regulator succeeds in the 
screening process, a half way shaping of responsible behaviour by the banking system 
objectives of the players in the system. 
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has been achieved since entry regulations are also aimed at preventing `bad' players 
from entering the banking system. Besides behavioural aspects, entry regulation is also 
important for determining a favourable/optimal level of competition in the banking 
industry. In some countries, major shareholders of a bank must fulfil `fit and proper' 
requirements requested by the banking authority as an entry barrier to the banking 
system. According to Kendal et. al. (1998), there are at least four benefits gained from 
the implementation of good governance at the corporate level, such as: competitive 
advantage in the market place, improving efficiency and effectiveness, increasing 
shareholder value and, subsequently, increasing market value. A similar opinion is 
voiced by Llewellyn and Holmes (1997). 
Generally, the shareholders have three options to control the company, i. e. making their 
voices heard, management replacement and exit. Making their voices heard is the way 
to approach management directly and to inform them about their opinions on the 
appropriate way to run the business. The shareholders can also replace the management 
committee if they think that the management is not able to fulfil their requirements. If 
the shareholders, especially the major shareholders, do not agree with the way the 
company is run, they can simply sell the company's shares on the stock market. The 
selling of the shares will initiate a share price fall in the stock market and acts as a 
signal to managers to improve their performance. A modern market oriented approach 
to bank regulation emphasises the fiduciary responsibility of shareholders, which has 
increased significantly. Shareholders will suffer monetary loss if the bank neglects 
general guidance for prudent banking operations; therefore, the shareholders have to be 
assured of the appointment of proper persons for good governance in the bank. The 
shareholders should suffer from any costs resulting from any restructuring process taken 
by the supervisory authority before levying those costs on the government and 
ultimately the taxpayers. In the United States banking system, the shareholders are very 
diffused since almost all companies have been listed on the capital market. The most 
preferable option for the shareholders to express their disagreement in such a system is 
exit. To overcome the lack capability of controlling diffused shareholders, the US 
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banking authority applies `prompt corrective action' to immediately discipline any 
banking institution that neglects its fiduciary roles and prevent unnecessary damage 
public confidence in the banking system (Fries et. al., 1997). 
The role of the board of directors 
Ultimate responsibility for the success of banking operations is typically placed with the 
board of directors. It has been evident that 60% of failed banks in US had board 
members who were incapable of dealing with the banking affairs (Greuning and 
Bratanovic, 1999). The boards of directors can be viewed as contracting parties who 
will carry out the business on behalf of shareholders and will increase shareholder value 
in the future. Therefore, the board of directors should have a sound understanding of the 
nature of the bank's business activities and associated risks. The shareholders (through 
votes) hold control rights in the internal management of the bank. Through the 
implementation of the right incentives, the management of the bank is expected to 
always increase the value of shareholder claims. On the contrary, if the incentive 
schemes do not effectively drive the management to perform well, poor management 
performance might result in decreasing shareholder value. At the policy level, the board 
of directors should clearly define the direction of the bank, monitor and assess the risk- 
based policy, and assure that the implementation of the policy is working effectively. 
Although the daily activities of the bank are delegated to the officers and employees, the 
ultimate responsibility for survivability lies fully with the board of directors. 
The role of executive management 
It is worth noting that not all banks in a depressed environment fail; in fact, the banks 
with weak management are the ones that give up when times become difficult. The 
survivability of a bank depends also on the quality, experience and integrity of the 
individuals in the management team. The management of the bank receives monetary 
incentives as well as non-monetary incentives (such as esteem) in order to motivate 
higher achievement. 
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Llewellyn (1999b) mentions the importance of the implementation of the right 
incentives in shaping prudent behaviour by the banks' management. The management 
should loose if the bank fails due to a lack of professionalism in managing banking 
businesses' °. Consequently, the managerial incentive scheme should put strong 
emphasis on effective risk analysis, management and control systems (ex-ante risk 
assessment and ex post asset valuation). This issue also emphasises the need for the 
control units be fully equipped with effective risk assessment tools and auditing and 
accounting standard. The presence of internal audit procedures, internal audit 
committees and effective supervision (by banking supervisor) can build up effective 
internal control mechanisms. As reviewed earlier, effective banking supervision may 
create a higher level of risk-aversion, since the bank and the management are under the 
threat of loosing their future cash inflows. 
Poor performance by the banks' management will finally trigger outside intervention 
because of high gearing levels and their fiduciary role. The regulators usually determine 
a minimum solvency ratio (i. e. a minimum capital adequacy ratio) as a trigger point for 
intervention that may result in transferring management control from shareholders to 
creditors. Garber and Weisbrod (1992) mention the importance of implementation of 
`cease and desist' powers in order to prevent asset deterioration that might impact on 
systemic stability. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) also discuss about the `optimal 
stopping time' for intervention in the case of poor management performance" 
Management performance of a bank is normally assessed through asset performance. In 
fact, not all assets can be assessed accurately. Bank assets are generally classified into 
verifiable assets and unverifiable assets. Verifiable assets consist of short-term debt- 
based assets that can be accurately assessed. Unverifiable assets consist of long-term 
assets that can only be assessed through the assessment of market signals. 
10 The application of the fixed and variable salary mix has been a common practice in the finance 
industry. The higher the performance of the managers, the higher the total salary will be. 
" In their model, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) assume that the manager only cares about his private 
benefit. If the controlling party chooses `being passive', the manager will receive benefit. On the contrary, 
if the controlling party chooses to `interfere', the manager receives nothing. The optimal incentive 
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The regulators, acting on behalf of depositors, are in a position to evaluate management 
performance and to decide the next action to take. Often, regulators need to make a 
decision before the realisation of unverifiable assets. There are two possible actions to 
be taken by regulators i. e. stopping/intervening or continuing/being passive. This 
approach basically combines the traditional concept of supervision and sophisticated 
asset valuation techniques12. Modem banking supervision, as a matter of fact, has 
implemented this approach by adopting various sophisticated risk assessment 
techniques (such as Value at Risk for assessing market risk, and credit risk metrics for 
assessing credit risk) as fundamental in determining capital adequacy requirements. If 
the result of the risk assessment process (through the assessment of market signals) says 
a bank has a high level of market risk, the shareholders should increase the 
capitalisation level in order to maintain its solvency sound; otherwise, the insolvency of 
the bank may result in interference from the outside. 
The management team needs also to be supported by adequate systems to monitor and 
control the bank's material risks. Bank supervisors also typically include management 
quality in components of bank early warning systems to determine the soundness of a 
bank's operations. 
The role of auditors (internal and external) 
Internal as well as external auditors can be regarded as an extension of the board's risk 
management function. The auditors, on a regular basis, report the level of compliance 
of the technical implementation with the policy set as a form of feedback to the board of 
directors (see exhibit 2.4). 
scheme in the general case is obtained by minimising the ex-post inefficiency while preserving 
managerial incentives. 
12 Traditional banking operations involve mainly saving and lending activities. The assessment of the 
asset is normally conducted through a creditworthiness assessment process. Recent banking operations 
involve more sophisticated operations, like trading activities, which need more sophisticated techniques 
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Exhibit 2.4 
Feedback by auditors 
Policy set by Bank Implementation 
board of management of the policy directors 
Auditor 
Internal auditors 
! ON 
Internal audit is a valuable tool for the board of directors to identify and handle risks. It 
provides independent appraisal on the effectiveness of policy implementation, and 
compliance with laws, policies and operating instructions. 
External auditors 
The main task of external auditors is to give an opinion on whether or not the bank's 
financial statements fairly reflect its financial condition, and to state the results of the 
bank's operations for a given period. Apart from its externality, external auditors have 
to be considered as an integral part of the risk management partnership since they have 
a specific role to fulfil in the risk management process. Greuning and Bratanovic (1999) 
examine the responsibilities of external auditors. These include reviewing 
management's adherence to board policies and procedures, reviewing the information 
supplied to the board, shareholders and regulators, reviewing adherence to statutory 
requirements and reporting to the board, shareholders and regulators on the fair 
presentation of information submitted to them. 
The role of Customers/the general public 
The customers are the parties who will ultimately be concerned about the safety of their 
investments. The customers are simply investors acting as principals who invest their 
funds with the financial intermediaries acting as agents. If the customers (public) can 
clearly understand about the risk that investment entails (through an adequate 
for asset valuation. The assessment of unverifiable assets (such as the assets assessment for trading 
activities) is conducted through assessing market signals. 
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information disclosure process), they will always require the financial intermediaries to 
conduct prudent behaviour in order to assure financial safety. The financial 
intermediaries, in turn, are given less chance to abuse their fiduciary roles. Recent 
definition of the public has become broader to include the financial media and analysts, 
such as stockbrokers, other advisers and rating agencies. 
2.3.2. International convergence of banking regulation 
Due to the globalisation process in the financial system, it seems to be unavoidable for 
the banks to expand their operational exposures internationally. However, the banks 
operate business across countries with different standards of regulations. Besides the 
benefits that can be gained from the globalisation process, a wider systemic problem 
may also occur as a result of the contagion effect of bank failures in a particular region; 
therefore, global financial stability depends on regional financial stability. Financial 
turbulence in one region can spread rapidly to other parts of the global financial system 
(Basle Committee, 2000c). As a matter of fact, the needs for international regulatory 
convergence have been recognised since the mid-seventies. The Basle Committee was 
set up in the crisis atmosphere of the 1974 bank failures, including the Herstatt Bank in 
Germany, The Franklin National Bank of New York and the British-Israel Bank of 
London. The committee was established by the group of ten countries as the Committee 
on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, at the end of 1974. It focused its 
early attention on the prudential supervision of the internationally operating banks. 
According to Kapstein (1991), the main purpose of the committee is to close gaps in the 
supervisory net and to improve supervisory understanding and the quality of global 
banking supervision. The committee recognised that the supervisory responsibilities of 
host and parent authorities were both complementary and overlapping. The committee 
tried to achieve the main purposes in three principal ways: by exchanging information 
on national supervisory arrangements; by improving the effectiveness of techniques for 
supervising international banking business; and by setting minimum supervisory 
standards in areas where they are considered desirable. 
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The first Basle concordat was introduced in 1975 with the establishment of five 
principles that emphasise the importance of international standards of supervision13. The 
host and parent authorities should co-operate in promoting the soundness of the 
internationally operating banks. In 1981, the Basle committee developed the concept of 
`consolidated supervision as a means of giving practical effect to the principle of 
parental responsibility' to remedy the complementary and overlapping problem. In 
1983, the revised-version of the original concordat was finalised in a document, entitled 
`Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments'. The document 
covers two basic principles: that no foreign banking establishment should escape 
supervision; and that supervision should be adequate. The guidelines for the 
consolidated supervision of international banks have been revised several times and the 
principles of the concordat were reformulated as minimum standards in 1992 after the 
enforced closure of BCCI (see Hall, 1993a and 1993b). 
The Committee released a consultative paper about the core principles for effective 
banking supervision that comprise twenty-five basic principles (Basle Committee, 
1997). Those principles include preconditions for effective banking supervision, 
licensing and structure, prudential regulation and requirements, methods of ongoing 
banking supervision, information requirements, formal powers of supervisors and cross- 
border banking. The Basle Committee believes that achieving consistency with the core 
principles by every country will be a significant step in the process of improving 
financial stability domestically and internationally. Until recently, the principles agreed 
by the Basle Committee have been widely disseminated by many countries. The agreed 
principles are designed to increase the level of supervisors' consciousness of their 
mutual interdependence where the international active banks within their jurisdictions 
are concerned. As the 1988 Accord (Basle Committee, 1988) has been a corner stone of 
the current financial structure, it has helped to strengthen the soundness and stability of 
13 The five principles include joint responsibility for adequate supervision, liquidity, solvency and 
practical co-operation that would facilitate transfer of information between host and parent authorities. 
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the international banking system and enhanced competitive equality among 
internationally- active banks. 
2.3.2.1. Supervisory review and market discipline 
The supervisory review process 
The supervisory review process, in fact, is a continuous process that minimises the 
difference between the actual financial conditions and the preferred financial condition 
(regulatory standards). The supervisory standard was, firstly, released in 1997 (Basle 
Committee, 1997a). Supervisors should always ensure that the bank management 
develops an internal capital assessment process, setting capital targets that are 
commensurate with the bank's risk profile and control environment. The supervisors 
should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent the capital of the bank from falling 
below the minimum required level through an evaluation of the banks' internal capital 
adequacy assessment and strategies, and their ability to monitor and ensure their 
compliance with regulatory capital ratios. (see Basle Committee 1999g, 2000b and 
2001f). It has been evident that poor performance of supervisory function led to some 
financial crises (Basle Committee, 1999d). 
Market discipline 
Transparency is very important in the banking supervision process. Banking supervisory 
and regulatory authorities have used information disclosure to increase systemic 
stability in the banking systems. Adequate information disclosure would enable market 
participants to comprehensively evaluate banks' financial risks, especially in the 
increasingly volatile financial markets. Any negative information or misleading 
information to a public may possibly damage a bank and even cause systemic instability 
in the banking system. A proper disclosure process may moderate the responses of 
market participants to bad news by helping market participants assess negative 
information and mitigate panic; hence, improved transparency through better disclosure 
may reduce the chance of systemic banking crises. The information disclosed usually 
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involves qualitative and quantitative information in annual financial reports, 
supplemented by biannual or quarterly financial statements and other important 
information. Through the high quality of information provided, banks will be able to 
always improve their reputation. Information disclosure involves not only providing the 
financial information, but also reporting the decision-making process through a timely 
reporting system. Information disclosure, as a matter of fact, would improve 
accountability in conducting fiduciary roles. Market participants, including banking 
supervisory and regulatory authorities, have wider opportunities to justify actions taken 
by the banks and accept responsibility for both decisions and results. Information 
disclosure would improve the predictability and subsequently the efficiency of policy 
decisions. Moreover, it would improve internal discipline and better governance (Basle 
Committee 1998d). According to Greuning and Bratanovic (1999), transparency and 
accountability are mutually reinforcing. Transparency emphasises a proper monitoring 
process that will enhance accountability. Contrariwise, accountability that is represented 
in a reporting process will give an incentive to other market participants ensuring that 
their actions are properly disclosed and understood. 
One important aspect in the information disclosure process is a realistic asset valuation 
process, including sensitivities to future events and adverse developments. This issue 
addresses the importance of the evaluation of a bank's entire risk profile, including 
future solvency risks since all regulatory requirements are normally prepared under the 
assumption that the banks will continue to operate as a going concern. Insufficient 
information provided will potentially mislead other key players in the banking system 
and, more importantly, banks may not be aware of the true financial conditions. 
Through the on going process, the banking supervisory and regulatory authorities will 
always minimise risks in the banking system14. The banking supervisory and regulatory 
authorities, as a matter of fact, should be fully equipped by skilled staff and have 
14 The supervisory process is usually conducted via the following particular actions: issuance and 
withdrawal of banking licenses; issuance and enforcement of prudential regulations and standards; 
prescribing covenant reports such as establishing off-site and on-site inspections; assessing penalties and 
initiating emergency actions; and, liquidations. 
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adequate financial backup and technology so that they will be able to always deal with 
recent developments in the financial system. The financial risks faced by the banks will 
be different from time to time. Bank supervisors cannot guarantee (nor should they) that 
banks will not fail, the potential for banking failure is an inherent part of risk-taking 
process. The main objective of the supervisory and regulatory process is to maintain 
stability and confidence in the banking system that could facilitate the exit of problem 
banks without causing contagion effect to other banks i. e. minimising disruption to the 
system. The supervisors as well as the banks should be able to recognise, monitor and 
control risks inherent in the banking operations. To address this issue and through the 
prudential guidelines, most banking regulators regulate some financial risks resulting 
from a particular type of banking risk exposure. Sophisticated statistical models have 
even been implemented widely by banking supervisors to fairly assess asset quality in a 
dynamic approach (Value at Risk (VaR)). Ultimately, effective financial risk 
management, close monitoring of risk exposures, and compliance with prudential 
guidelines set by effective banking regulations are essential ingredients in forming an 
effective banking supervision process. The standards for minimum market discipline 
has, recently, been formalised in the third pillar of the New Capital Accord (Basle 
Committee, 2001g). 
2.3.2.2. Risk-based capital regulation 
A. The role of bank capital 
One of the important issues included in the core principles for effective banking 
supervision is the capital adequacy framework. However, during the considerable 
economic turbulence, the Accord's capital ratio, sometimes, does not represent the 
bank's actual financial condition. The Committee has always been trying to design a 
new framework to better align regulatory capital requirement to underlying risks, and to 
recognise the improvements in risk measurement and control (Basle Committee 1999a 
and 2001 a). Introducing the proposal of the new capital accord, McDonough, Chairman 
of the Basle Committee, notes: 
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`This new capital framework consists of three pillars: minimum capital adequacy, 
which seek to develop and expand on the standardised rules set forth in the 1998 
accord; supervisory review of an institution 's capital adequacy and internal 
assessment process; and effective use of market discipline as a lever to strengthen 
disclosure and encourage safe and sound banking practices. The Committee that, 
taken together, these three elements are the essential pillars of an effective capital 
framework. ' 
Capital has been a source of great concern since the large increase in the number of 
bank failures during the mid-1980s and in the 1990s. Wesson (1985) states the capital 
role is related to capital resources and the maturity structure of assets and liabilities. 
Viability depends not only on depositors being confident that the maturity 
transformation in bank balance sheets is not excessive in relation to capital resources 
but also that this confidence extends to all risk exposures which exist in banking assets. 
Risk-based capital formulas have been used in the past by rating agencies and by 
insurers themselves for internal management purposes and now, under the Basle capital 
accord, risk-based capital provides a uniform regulatory standard for the banking 
industry (Weinberger, 1992). Most regulators want banks to hold higher capital levels to 
give more protection to depositors of individual banks and reduce potential systemic 
risk in the banking industry. Since the banking industry plays a very important role in 
fostering economic activity, a crisis in this industry will potentially affect adversely 
every economic sector. Regulators do not have many options besides making efforts to 
shape a sound banking system by imposing an appropriate set of prudential regulations, 
including demands that the level of capital is capable of absorbing losses without 
reducing efficiency and competitiveness. 
Levitt states that there are four salient functions of bank capital 15. First, capital protects 
uninsured depositors in the event of insolvency and liquidation. Second, it absorbs 
15 Reported by Alex J. Pollock in: Gradual changes become fundamental changes: The evolution of the 
American banking system in Global Risk-based Capital Regulation: Management and Funding Strategies, 
edited by Charles A. Stone and Anne Zissu. IRWIN. 
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unanticipated losses with enough margin to enable the bank to continue as a viable 
entity. Third, it allows for infrastructure development and service expansion. Fourth, it 
functions as a regulatory constraint on unjustified asset expansion. 
According to Llewellyn (1997b), the role of capital covers internal as well as external 
factors. First, the capital absorbs operating losses (risks and shocks). The banking 
industry is not quite the same as any other industry. Most of its assets are financed by 
very short-term liabilities. The bank has to keep to its promise to repay all of its 
liabilities at the due dates. Hence, the bank has to keep its net-worth position sound by 
holding a level of capital that is sufficient to absorb possible losses generated by market 
shocks or by any market distortions (especially its availability to cover risks within the 
business that cannot be insured in the external insurance market). Nevertheless, holding 
an adequate level of capital in this sense does not guarantee that the bank will not fail. 
The bank still needs good management to assure internal governance works well. 
Second, bank capital maintains the confidence of depositors. A well-capitalised bank 
gives a signal to depositors that the bank has a capability to repay all its liabilities when 
they are called. Even in the absence of deposit insurance arrangements, the depositors 
will have confidence to put their money in the bank if the bank is adequately capitalised. 
Depositors have to be assured that there is a group of specialist risk-takers prepared to 
underwrite the risk inherent in the nature of banking business. Third, bank capital can 
support long-term funding (supporting infrastructure). Ideally, capital has unlimited 
maturity. It is usually used to finance fixed assets, like the infrastructure of the bank 
(such as buildings and office equipment) and service expansion. Finally, bank capital 
may prevent deterioration in asset quality. An adequate level of capital is able to 
potentially reduce the danger that a bank becomes a captive of its bad debtors. 
Naturally, the capital holders will act to prevent losses generated by excessive risk- 
taking because they are also exposed to possible losses. Subsequently, an adequate level 
of capital is capable of alleviating the danger that potentially good future loans are 
crowded out by bad loans. 
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Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) discuss how the insolvency condition is used as a trigger 
point for transferring management control from equity holders to debt holders when the 
bank's performance is not satisfactory. Depositors and shareholders, basically, have 
different attitudes towards risks for several reasons. If a bank is adequately capitalised, 
the shareholders enjoy any monetary surplus from any increase (solvent region) or 
suffer from any decrease in the bank's asset value. For this reason, shareholders have a 
control right over the bank management. But, if a bank is undercapitalised (insolvent 
region), the shareholders will make money if, in the future, the income is high enough 
to cover the insolvency and to give them additional monetary surplus. This condition 
will induce them to gamble since the shareholders, in this position, have nothing to 
loose. On the contrary, depositors become almost like shareholders when the bank is 
undercapitalised since the value of the liabilities is not buffered by the equity. 
Fluctuation in asset value will directly determine the value of liabilities; hence, the 
depositors are directly facing the risks. In the presence of deposit insurance 
arrangements, the governments/banking regulators are, in fact, the ultimate guarantors 
for any insolvency events; therefore, it is a logical consequence that the regulators 
should be in a position to control the banks' management. In order to assess fairly the 
net asset value of the bank, the bank supervisors should be adequately equipped with 
appropriate tools for asset valuation and risk assessment. 
The idea of risk based capital is illustrated in Exhibit 2.5. As illustrated below, the 
present value (PV) of the future return of a bank is assumed normally distributed 
(N(, u, 6) ). However, every bank will have its own distribution, with a different mean 
and variance, depending on its own portfolio. Under the normality assumption, we can 
calculate the loss expectation of the bank by multiplying the probability of a negative 
return by the total value of the portfolio. In the illustration below the probability of a 
negative return is represented by the area under the normal distribution curve between 
- oo and 0 (x percent). 
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Exhibit 2.5 
Statistical assumptions underlying risk 
based capital adequacy assessment 
Source: Weinberger (1992) 
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The regulators have their own reference cut-off number that is considered sufficient to 
maintain banks' solvency in daily operations. If a bank has excessive risky assets (in 
this case, the probability of a negative return exceeds the number required by the 
regulator) the owner should provide a greater amount of capital in order to maintain the 
expected loss within the limit (Weinberger, 1995). One of the advantages of risk based 
capital requirements is correcting the disincentive to hold capital. Risk-based capital 
requirements are implemented in order to force risky banks to hold more capital without 
forcing safe banks to hold excessive capital. There have been several attempts to 
measure the precise amount of risk relating to the quality of assets. The riskier the asset, 
the more capital has to be allocated by the owner. 
Shareholder value and capital adequacy in a dynamic analysis 
As reviewed earlier, banks' shareholders play a very important role in conducting good 
governance in banking operations; hence they have to have the right incentives so that 
they will be encouraged to be positively involved in monitoring activities. The 
shareholders are basically concerned with their monetary incentives (net worth value 
and future/expected monetary surplus). As a matter of fact, there have been several 
concepts explaining shareholder value. A traditional approach towards the cost of 
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capital and optimal capital structure assumes that the objective of the firm is to 
maximise the market value of the firm and there exists a perfect capital market. The 
total market value of the firm is the sum of the market value of debt and the market 
value of equity. In the traditional approach, it is assumed that the value of the firm is 
maximised when the weighted-average-cost of capital (WACC) is minimised. This 
value maximisation produces a U-shape for the WACC; hence, the optimal capital 
structure corresponds to the minimum cost of capital. Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
deliver a different view towards an optimal capital structure. They argue that, assuming 
a perfect capital market and no taxes, both the value of the firm and the capital cost are 
constant since they are independent of the firm's capital structure. However, Modigliani 
and Miller's theory assumed that all firms have similar risk, which is not practically 
accepted. When firms have limited liability, shareholders would prefer the firm to be 
more highly geared since they do not have to bear the negative cash flows in those 
states where the firms goes bankrupt (Eichberger and Harper, 1997). Similar opinions 
have also stated in Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Park (1997), Calera and Rob (1999), 
Blum (1999) and Basle Committee (1999e). 
Milne and Whalley (1999,2001) address the basic analysis of moral hazard within a 
dynamic setting in which there are constraints on the issue of equity capital and a 
random regulatory audit 16. Bank capital is considered as a form of self-insurance against 
16 Milne and Whalley (1999,2001) build a dynamic model of charter value of a bank. They assume t is a 
continuous variable and the bank holds a fixed amount of non-tradable assets valued at an amount ANAV. 
As the assets are invested in portfolio investments, the assets generate a perpetual but uncertain cash flow 
at a constant expected rate of return RA per unit of time and with variance of cash flow of 1/262 per unit 
of time. Shareholder value depends on future dividends paid out and historical cash flow that is assumed 
to follow Brownian motion with drift. The dynamic condition for ANAV is given by: 
dANAV = (RA-d)dt+6dz 
where (RA-d) is a drift parameter, 6 is a variance parameter and the bank pays dividend at rate d. It is 
assumed that d >_ 0. If, in the audit that is held randomly, it is found that the net asset value of the bank 
falls to a negative value, the bank might face a take-over or even liquidation by the regulator/supervisor. 
In the liquidation, the savings account and current account holders are paid in full (D), the remaining asset 
value (A-D) is paid to investment deposit holders while shareholders get nothing. Let us assume that the 
audit process directly applies a Poisson specification with parameter q, indicating that in each period St, 
there is a probability of q8t of an audit being carried out as modelled in Merton (1978). The bank must 
balance two conflicting objectives: (i) keeping sufficient resources inside the firm to reduce the 
probability of future liquidation, (ii) paying out resources to satisfy shareholders. The firm is also facing 
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poor asset returns. Critically-under-capitalised banks under immediate threat of closure 
are concerned only with survival, leading to a short-sighted risk-loving behaviour. In 
contrast, a moderately-under-capitalised bank performs risk-averse behaviour to protect 
future profit (charter value). Campbell, Chan and Marino (1992) formalise the notion of 
substitutability between capital requirements and monitoring in controlling the 
behaviour of bank managers. In the condition where the monitoring of banks' assets is 
not efficient, the regulator may use capital requirements to prevent excessive risk-taking 
by the banks. At a high level of capital, the shareholders face the threat of loosing 
higher monetary benefits, therefore they will be more risk averse. In a condition where 
asymmetric information is less likely between banks and the regulator, monitoring 
activities are feasible. The regulator in that condition may apply less stringent capital 
requirements since the regulator is able to observe a more `real-time' condition of asset 
quality of the banks. In different regulatory regimes, the regulator might even place 
some part of regulatory monitoring responsibility on the bank. 
The basic assumption of the analysis is that shareholder value (as an option value) can 
always be increased by a widening of the distribution of returns. Hence, if the variance 
can be increased without reducing expected returns, the bank increases this variance to 
the maximum degree possible. If a bank always maintains its profitability and solvency, 
its future earnings (charter value), represented by positive present discounted value, act 
as a self-insurance. If the charter value is significant, the shareholder will have 
incentives to avoid asset deterioration that may result in liquidation. Marcus (1984) 
states that charter value is capable of restraining moral hazard in banking. Keely (1990) 
states that new entry and other erosions of charter value are reasonable explanations of 
the increased level of bank failures in the United States during the 1980s. 
an exogenously imposed liquidation trigger. The value of the bank to shareholders satisfies the ordinary 
differential equations: 
(p+q)V = max [d +(RA-d)VN +1 62VNN], d, UE[61, Q2l 2 
pV = max [d + (RA -d)VN +162VNN ], d. QE[QI1021 2 
ANA 
V< 
ANA 
V 
ANAV > ANAV 
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Apart from a desire to preserve the charter value of the bank, effective monitoring by 
banking supervisors will affect the attitudes of shareholders toward risks. From the 
simulation shown below, it can be seen that the higher the probability the supervisor 
will detect the asset deterioration, the lower the asset value expected by shareholders 
(see Exhibit 2.6). The dotted line refers to the case where there is a higher probability of 
the regulator detecting undercapitalised banks and promoting the take-over or 
liquidation process. 
Exhibit 2.6 
The value of the firm 
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Intuitively, the higher the probability of the regulator detecting undercapitalised banks, 
the lower the incentive for excessive risk taking. If the bank is well capitalised, 
shareholders are more risk neutral since there is only a small probability of liquidation. 
Therefore, the shareholders seek to self-insure against the possibility of liquidation 
triggered by asset deterioration since they do not want to loose the expected future cash 
in-flows. In Milne and Whalley's work, the mean-variance trade-off is determined by 
17 
- 
Vxx/Vi 
17 Milne and Whalley (1999) assume that the portfolio decision impacts both on expected return and on 
the variance of returns where Vxx and Vx are the second derivative and first derivatives of the value of 
the firm respectively. 
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Exhibit 2.7 shows different levels of risk aversion as a result of different probabilities of 
liquidation. The dotted line implies higher probabilities of liquidation that result in a 
higher level of risk aversion. This analysis addresses some important issues in shaping 
proper risk taking behaviour. Besides prescribing an adequate level of capitalisation, the 
regulator has to be capable of detecting undercapitalised banks at an early stage. 
Exhibit 2.7 
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The regulators (government) set up safety net schemes (deposit insurance) to maintain 
systemic stability. However, the implementation of deposit insurance may create moral 
hazard since the systemic cost will fall, ultimately, on the tax-payers. Often, the bank 
supervisors and regulators are in a difficult position to make a decision whether to close 
the ailing banks early or to be more `patient' in order to give chances to the banks to 
improve their financial positions'8. In the early closing approach, bank supervisor may 
require a bank to reorganise itself or even to liquidate a bank while it still has a positive 
net asset value. This, intuitively, will create incentives for the banks' shareholders to 
inject more capital to prevent the loss of future cash-inflow; therefore, the willingness of 
18 Fries et. al. (1997) report a different approaches taken by the US banking supervisory authority that 
apply `a prompt corrective action' and the Japanese bank regulator that has opted for a more patient 
approach towards banks weakened by the collapse of the asset price bubble, allowing them the chance to 
earn their way out of difficulty. 
40 
LL LATION 
the shareholders to inject more capital to avoid insolvency constrains banking policy. 
On the contrary, in the late closing approach, shareholders may be reluctant to inject 
more capital to the bank since there is not a threat of prompt liquidation in the case of 
insolvency (the shareholders can still expect future cash-inflow). In the late closing 
approach, the regulatory authority is always prepared to subsidise the banking system 
and even to face a huge systemic bankruptcy cost. In order to reduce moral hazard, it is 
suggested that the banking supervisory authority shoul introduce risk-sensitive deposit 
insurance premium. Fries et. al. (1997) study a series of different possible closure rules 
and subsidy policies that bank regulators may apply' 9. The actuarially fair premium rate 
has to make shareholders feel indifferent between applying the deposit insurance 
scheme in the banking operation and holding unlimited liability claim to the bank's net 
cash flow with a zero premium rate. The banking regulator, acting as social planner, 
should minimise the discounted, expected lump-sum bankruptcy and monitoring costs, 
ignoring the additional cost to the insurance corporation of taking on the bank's 
portfolio of deposits and loans. 
B. Risk spectrum of banking operations 
As an intermediary institution, risk management is a major activity of the bank. Any 
financial institution, including a bank, has to control and select the risks inherent in the 
management of deposits, loan portfolio and off balance sheet contracts. Risk itself can 
be defined as the uncertainty of outcomes of the business. The idea of not putting all the 
eggs in one basket is the earliest basic understanding of portfolio risk analysis and 
diversification. This idea was firstly formalised and applied to financial instruments by 
Markowitz (1959)20. There are a number of classification systems used by economists 
19 The model explores the potential response by a bank's shareholders in anticipating banking policy 
implemented by the banking regulators. The higher the subsidy given by the regulator, the higher the 
option value experienced by the shareholder (the late closing approach). Contrariwise, the more stringent 
the closing procedure that has been applied, the lower the option value experienced by the shareholders. 
The basic assumption for the models is the same as the assumption for the shareholder value model by 
Milne and Whalley (1999). The expected cash-inflow for the shareholder is assumed to follow geometric 
Brownian motion as the expression of the stochastic process in determining the shareholder value from 
time to time. 
20 Based on the assumption that each portfolio construction can be structured as a function of expected 
mean and standard deviation of the portfolio return, he concludes some basic ideas. First, portfolio risk 
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relating to the activities engaged in by banks. An early definition of risk is given by 
Mullin (1977) who classified risk into management and operations risks. The definition 
and classification evolved as the complexity of bank operations increased from day to 
day. Gardener (1986) states that banks face general risk, international risk and solvency 
risk. General risk is also known as fundamental risk, comprising liquidity risk, interest- 
rate risk and credit risk. More generally, Jorion (1997) states that banks are exposed to 
three types of risks i. e. business, strategic and financial risks. Business risk is associated 
with corporate competitiveness and value added for shareholders. This includes product 
innovation, product design, and marketing that improves the possibility of meeting 
customer needs among similar products or other substitute products. Strategic risk 
results from the shifting economic or political environment. As a matter of fact, the 
fundamental economy of a country depends on other factors, like the political 
environment and radical technological inventions. Since external factors, like the 
political environment and technological inventions, are not easily predicted, it is very 
difficult to hedge this kind of risk. The only way to limit strategic risk is to diversify the 
business. Financial risks relate to possible losses in financial markets. 
The possibility of experiencing losses arises because of movements in financial market 
variables, such as interest rates and exchange rates. If financial managers understand 
about financial risks, then exposure can be controlled. Risk management is needed to 
identify, measure and control various risk exposures, therefore it has become an 
essential tool for the survival of businesses. Generally, financial risks are classified into 
market risks, credit risks, liquidity risk, operational risk and legal risk. Greuning and 
Bratanovic (1999) describe the risk exposures of a bank that can be classified generally 
into four categories i. e. financial risks, operational risks, business risks and event risks, 
as illustrated in Exhibit 2.8. 
will typically be less than the weighted-average of the individual assets' risks. Second, the lower the 
correlation between asset returns, the lower the portfolio risk. Third, assets risks can be divided into 
diversifiable risks (risk that can be eliminated/reduced through a judicious combination of this asset with 
other assets) and undiversifiable risks (risk that cannot be eliminated/reduced through a judicious 
combination of this asset with other assets). 
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Exhibit 2.8 
Banking risk spectrum 
Balance sheet stnicture 
Profitability 
Capital adequacy 
Credit risk 
- Liquidity risk 
Interest rate risk 
Market risk 
Currency risk 
Business strategy 
Internal systems 
Technology 
Mism aria gemen dfraud 
Source: Greuning and Bratanovic (1999) 
Market risk 
Legal risk 
Policy 
Financial infrastructure 
Systemic risk 
Political risk 
Contagion risk 
Banking crises risk 
Other exogenous risk 
Along with the rapid development of the financial system, trading activities have 
become dominant in banking operations. International trading activities have become 
more intense and various financial instruments have enhanced financial market 
efficiency. The intention by the Committee has been formalised in various papers (Basle 
Committee 1993,1995 and 1997b). Those phenomena have attracted banks to involve 
in such activities and require the banks to pay more attention to the market mechanism. 
By definition, market risk is the risk of losses in on and off-balance sheet positions 
arising from movements in market variables, such as interest rates, equity prices, 
exchange rates and commodity prices. Market risk is not only reflected in the trading 
book position, which is intentionally held for short-term resale, but also in banks' total 
trading and non-trading positions. Market risk can be measured in terms of currencies 
(absolute risk) or by comparing the loss potential to the benchmarks that are usually 
denoted by financial indexes (relative risk). II 
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Until recently, various techniques have been developed in order to obtain more realistic 
models that are able to represent market behaviour more precisely. To have an easy-to- 
understand method for calculating and controlling market risk, they are turning to Value 
at Risk (VaR). The main purpose of a VaR system is to quantify market risk in a way 
that enables management to take prompt remedial action in case of losses or unusual 
exposures. Kupiec and O'Brien (1997), as called for by the Basle Committee (1996) 
break down market risk into two components: general market risk and specific market 
risk. General market risk relates the fluctuations in asset value to broad-based 
movements in securities prices and to changes in exchanges rates and commodity 
prices. Specific market risk relates the fluctuation in asset value to idiosyncratic 
developments. So far, development in market risk assessments has been impressive. 
Banks have implemented various sophisticated techniques to assess their exposures 
more precisely. Through the application of advanced statistical (econometrics) 
techniques, such as ARCH/GARCH, the volatility (variance) of the market can be 
predicted more precisely21. 
Market value at risk modelling allows us to predict expected return gained from various 
investments in financial markets. The maximum expected loss (or worst loss) over a 
target horizon is calculated within a given confidence interval. For example, the Basle 
Committee requires banks to observe a 99 percent confidence interval (1-a) over 10 
days that presumably reflects the trade-off between the desire of regulators to ensure a 
safe and sound financial system and the adverse effect of capital requirements on bank 
returns22 (Basle Committee, 1996). Value-at-risk valuations depend on the predictability 
of the volatility of market variables, like interest and exchange rates. An increase in 
2' The (General) Auto-regressive Conditional Heteroscedastic ((G)ARCH) model is a time-series 
econometric model that is generally used to model the pattern of the volatility of market variables (i. e. 
exchange rates, interest rates, commodity prices etc. ) in a particular time period. For example, the general 
form of GARCH (l, l) is given by: GARCH(1,1) : ht = ao + a1 rt21 + ßht_I ; where ao is a constant 
coefficient of market volatility and al, )3 are the historical effects (lag 1 period) from market value and 
market disturbance respectively. 
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their volatility will affect the valuation because the values of assets are directly 
dependent on the volatility. Finally, in a rational market, equilibrium asset prices will be 
affected by changes in volatility. Investors who can reliably predict changes in volatility 
should be able to better control financial market risks. A number of time-varying risk 
models have been developed to capture parametric time series information. Besides time 
varying models, there are also other methods available to forecast risk, like stress testing 
and Monte Carlo Analysis that are known as scenario analysis. The main objective of 
these methods is to obtain the most relevant model that is able to represent the `real' 
Value at Risk of the portfolio. Through the advance knowledge about the market 
dynamics, one can estimate the frequency distribution of an event (e. g. Sterling against 
the US Dollar or behaviour of interest rates). The value at risk is then computed as a 
product of profit distribution schemes and the probability derived from empirical 
frequency distributions. 
The value at risk approach gives some benefits to the establishment of a robust risk 
management system. It gives the risk managers more information about normal market 
dynamics that leads to better risk management. It also provides more transparency in 
risk management, which could prevent fraudulent practices and human error from going 
undetected since value at risk provides a consistent and integrated treatment of risk 
across the institution. However, value at risk is not everything since the managers 
should avoid two big traps in implementing this approach within the risk management 
process. Econometric models are sometimes very biased since they are backward 
looking. Assumptions are necessarily made about the approximations of some 
parameters of a chosen time series period. Based on those assumptions, the managers 
predict the market dynamics. If the risk managers rely heavily on this approach, they 
may become targets for speculative attacks by speculators who may shake the market to 
gain profits from arbitrage. Moreover, econometric models only respond to small 
changes in the normal market mechanism whilst it has been evident that most banking 
crises were caused by economic turbulence. Despite these advantages and 
22 This means that we believe that there is a probability of (a) the portfolio will result in negative cash 
45 
CHAPTER 2 FINANCIAL REGULATION 
disadvantages, value at risk is still an important complementary tool in promoting a 
sound risk management process although it can never substitute for market information. 
Moreover, value at risk will be very powerful if combined with a good audit and control 
system and well trained risk managers. 
Credit risk 
Credit risk is related to the capacity of the counterparties to fulfil their financial 
contractual obligations in accordance with the agreed terms. Recently, credit risk 
assessment has been one area to be developed since a lot of evidence shows that 
underestimating credit risk can be very dangerous for financial businesses. Since credit 
risk is inherent in the entire portfolio, the bank should always maximise risk-adjusted 
rate of return by maintaining credit risk exposures within acceptable limits. A sound 
credit risk management is essential to support sustainability in the banking operations in 
the long run. Therefore, the importance of having a sound credit risk management has 
attracted international organisations, such as the Basle Committee and the International 
Monetary Fund, to pay attention to this matter by issuing documents in order to 
encourage banking supervisors globally to promote sound practices for managing credit 
risk. These documents also promote good co-operation between banks and their 
supervisors so that they will be able to draw useful lessons from past experiences. 
In July 1999, the Basle Committee issued a consultative paper on the principles for 
credit-risk management. The paper emphasises four important areas: the importance of 
establishing an appropriate credit risk environment; the importance of a sound credit 
granting process; the importance of maintaining an appropriate credit administration, 
measurement and monitoring process; and, the importance of adequate control over 
credit risk. Sound credit risk management is closely related to the assessment of asset 
quality, the adequacy of provisions and reserves, and the disclosure of credit risk, as 
also suggested in other Basle Committee documents23 (Basle Committee 1998c). In a 
flow. 
23 See also Sound Practices for Loan Accounting (July 1999) and Best Practices for Credit Risk 
Disclosure (July 1999). 
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traditional bank, the extension of loans is the prime activity. Lending activities require 
banks to make judgements relating to the credit worthiness of borrowers; however, 
these judgements do not always prove to be accurate and the credit worthiness of a 
borrower may decline over time due to various factors. Therefore, in a traditional bank, 
a major risk is the failure of counter-parties to perform according to contractual 
arrangements. Traditional approaches took the probability of losses into account, based 
on the likelihood of default by more rigorous enforcement of traditional credit 
processes, such as stringent underwriting standards, strict enforcement and counter- 
party monitoring24. 
Along with the rapid development of financial markets, asset securitisation is a really 
new phenomenon for the banking industry since the banks have opportunities to 
enhance their liquidity positions by securitising their illiquid assets into marketable 
securities. Therefore, the argument stating that the role of banks is to transform the 
terms of contracts is no longer valid. The understanding of credit risk has gradually 
shifted from traditional loan assessment to the market oriented credit risk assessment25. 
24 An accounting analytic approach is used by most rating agencies. This method uses financial ratios to 
estimate firm specific credit quality as a fundamental analysis and puts emphasis on leverage and 
coverage measures, connected with quality and stability of earnings and cash flow. The result of this 
approach is a list of discrete ordinal groups that label firms by credit quality. The difference between an 
accounting analytic approach and a statistical approach relates only to the determination of financial 
variables to analyse. An accounting analytic approach usually uses financial ratios only (such as Return 
on Investment, Return on Assets, leverage ratio, sales, etc) in predicting default, while a statistical 
approach may use other non-financial information. Through the development of statistical models, future 
defaults are predicted. As noted earlier, statistical models may use other non-financial information in 
developing the model. Altman and Narayanan (1997) summarise the efforts to identify significant factors 
that affect default rates in many countries. They use also qualitative information (such as quality of 
management, leadership, etc) as their significant factors. In regression analysis, the dependent variable is 
often influenced by variables that are essentially qualitative in nature besides variables that can be readily 
quantified on some well-defined scale. Since such qualitative variables usually indicate the presence or 
absence of a quality, one method of qualifying such attributes is by constructing a dummy variable that 
takes on the value of 1 or 0. The dummy variable so constructed represents two different conditions, like 
a bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy condition; and this approach can be extended to multilevel dummy 
variables to estimate multilevel conditions. There are four basic statistical approaches to building credit 
quality estimation models that seek to predict future default: linear probability models, linear 
`discriminant' models, and the `probit' and `logfit' models (JP Morgan, 1997). 
25 Duffie (1994) and Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) proposed an option theoretic approach to predicting the 
default of a company. This method assumes that a firm has a market value that evolves randomly through 
time as new information about the future prospects of the firm becomes known. A particular firm is 
considered not to have the capacity to fulfil its financial obligations when the value of the firm falls so 
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In order to cope with a more dynamic market environment, risk managers are 
increasingly seeking to quantify and integrate the overall credit risk assessment within a 
value at risk statement which captures market variables, such as price movements, 
rating changes, and default risk. JP Morgan (1997), for example, has introduced a new 
methodology for market-based credit risk assessment. Market-based credit risk is 
generally assessed on three factors: probability density functions; correlation between 
variables; and individual exposures to market volatility. The probability density 
functions are derived by obtaining the probability of credit instruments migrating from 
one rating level to other rating levels and the forward market values for each rating 
empirically. Portfolio VaR is then obtained by combining the probability density 
function with correlations between variables and market volatility (expected values) 
(see also Basle Committee, 1999e for current practices and applications of credit 
modelling). Like value at risk applied in market risk assessment, risk managers should 
not fully rely on statistical models, since econometric models just use approximated 
parameters derived from some assumptions in a particular time series period. 
Liquidity risk 
Liquidity risk management is one of the most important activities conducted by the 
banks since the ability to fund increases in assets and to fulfil financial obligations 
promptly is crucial to the ongoing viability of any banking organisation. Moreover, the 
liquidity failure of a bank may adversely affect the system. The banks are required to 
have the ability to manage their liquidity positions not only on an ongoing basis but also 
to examine how funding requirements are likely to evolve under various scenarios. The 
level of sophistication of the process, in fact, depends on the size and sophistication of 
the bank as well as the nature and complexity of its activities. 
Liquidity risk generally takes two forms: market/product liquidity risk; and cash 
flow/funding risk. Market/product liquidity risk arises when a cash transformation 
low that the firm's assets cannot cover all its liabilities. This approach is considered richer since the 
probability of failure is not exogenous; it depends, in particular, on the indebtedness of the firm. The 
market pricing of risk is also taken into account; and the liquidation value of the firm is not zero. 
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cannot be conducted at prevailing market prices due to insufficient market activities, 
like illiquid over-the-counter contracts and when dynamic hedging is applied. Cash 
flow/funding risk arises when a bank is unable to meet cash flow obligations, which 
may force early liquidation, thus transforming `paper' losses into realised losses. The 
Basle Committee, in February 2000, issued a paper that focuses on developing a greater 
understanding of the way in which banks manage their liquidity on a global 
consolidated basis. The paper emphasises several fundamental pillars required for a 
sound liquidity risk management. First, the bank has to have a well-defined structure for 
measuring, monitoring and controlling liquidity risk. The strategy should be maintained 
daily and relayed to senior management and appropriate personnel whose decisions may 
impact on liquidity positions. The liquidity monitoring should be arranged to cover all 
possibilities, including funding requirements for off-balance sheet commitments and 
exposures in foreign currencies. The responsibility for maintaining a sound liquidity 
position does not fall only on the treasury function since new products can also have a 
substantial impact on liquidity risk. One basic aspect that is needed in managing 
liquidity risk is an assessment of all possible future funding needs. Therefore, all bank 
staff that are responsible for maintaining sufficient liquidity have to be aware of any 
information that could have an impact on market and public perceptions about the 
soundness of the institution. Theoretically, liquidity risk can be managed by setting 
limits on cash flow gaps and by diversification. By constructing maturity ladders, banks 
allocate each cash-inflow or outflow to a given calendar date from a particular starting 
point. However, the funding position is sometimes difficult to keep matched as a result 
of the presence of uncontrollable variables. Second, the banks have to be able to 
maintain `good access' to various sources of funds so that they are able to obtain 
alternative sources of funds to overcome liquidity mismatches. Alternative funds 
sources may include trading counterparties, correspondent banks, corporate customers 
and financial markets. The banks should measure the level of readiness of expected 
financial access and compose the most efficient alternative funds sources in both normal 
conditions as well as adverse conditions. Reliable contingency plans are required to 
assure the viability of the banks in the long run. Third, the banks should also have 
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effective internal control systems to assure that all policies and strategies are fully 
implemented. Supervisors also have significant roles as external controllers to measure 
the level of compliance by the management with prudential regulations stipulated by the 
supervisory authority. 
Operational risk 
The finance industry, including banking, has become a technology-based industry. 
Informational advantage is managed using very sophisticated hardware as well as 
software to deliver more varied and more efficient financial services to customers. On 
the other hand, the banking industry continues to show an increasing dependence on the 
reliability and continuity of their electronic data processing (EDP) system. Although a 
lot of benefits have been gained, the banking system is facing a big potential problem 
caused by the heavy dependence on those electronic appliances. A systemic problem 
caused by errors and fraudulent practices may rapidly spread in the computerised 
settlement system and inter-bank lending relations that have been established fully in a 
global computing network. The Basle Committee has issued a paper (July 1989) to alert 
the supervisors to this potential risk. Besides the hardware problem, operational risk is 
also arising from the failure of internal systems. This highlights the importance of good 
corporate governance in managing banking business. Other aspects of operational risk 
may also come from uncontrollable factors, such as major fires or other disasters. The 
Committee has, recently, formalised a document as a supporting document to the New 
Basle Accord (Basle Committee, 1998b and 2001h). 
Legal risk 
Banks are subject to various forms of legal risk. This can include the risk that assets will 
turn out to be worth less or liabilities to be greater than expected because of inadequate 
or incorrect legal advice or documentation. In addition, existing laws may fail to resolve 
legal issues involving a bank; a court case involving a particular bank may have wider 
implications for banking business and impose costs on it and many or all other banks; 
and, laws affecting banks or other commercial enterprises may change. Banks are 
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particularly susceptible to legal risks when entering new types of transactions and when 
the legal right of a counter-party to enter into a transaction is not established. 
C. Current approach to capital adequacy assessment 
One of the topics that has been developed by the Basle Committee is capital adequacy 
assessment, which has been a concern since the early 1980s. The differences in national 
capital requirements between member countries pushed the Committee to work towards 
greater convergence in the measurement of capital adequacy. In 1988, the member 
countries approved the Basle Capital Accord, which implements the framework with a 
minimum capital standard of eight percent of risk-weighted assets by end-1992. Most 
international active banks adopted the capital framework. 
The capital adequacy framework of 1988 has evolved over time to adapt to 
developments in the market (see Hall, 2001). There have been two amendments to the 
capital accord. First, in 1995, an amendment recognised the effect of bilateral netting of 
banks' credit exposures in derivative products and expanded the matrix of `add-on' 
factors. Second, in 1997, an amendment incorporated within the accord the market risk 
arising from banks' open positions in foreign exchange, traded debt securities, equities, 
commodities and options. Since the Basle Accord has been internationally accepted by 
numerous countries outside the G-10 region, it helps to stabilise the international 
banking system and to minimise the competitive anomalies that arise as a result of the 
differential application of capital requirements (Hall, 1997). This method was primarily 
concerned with the credit risk that arose from banking book activities. Based on the 
agreement among the G- 10 central bank governors, an eight-percent minimum risk asset 
ratio (RAR) was prescribed. It was believed that the minimum RAR chosen would 
reflect levels of capital maintained by better capitalised banks at that time and should be 
attained by the end of 1992. The capital of a conventional bank was divided into two 
tiers - Tier 1 and Tier 226. In accordance with the amendment to the capital accord to 
26 Tier 1 (a). Ordinary paid up share capital/common stock 
(b). Disclosed reserves 
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incorporate market risks (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 1996) banks are 
entitled to use Tier 3 capital solely to support market risks. Tier 3 capital consists of 
appropriate short-term subordinated debt. Tier 3 capital is only appropriate to meet 
market risks, and the sum of Tier 2, added with Tier 3 capital should not exceed total 
Tier 127 (see also Basle Committee, 1998a). 
A new capital adequacy framework was proposed in June 1999 to replace the 1988 
Accord (Basle Committee, 1999a). The new capital adequacy framework set forth three 
fundamental pillars. First, It restates the need for a minimum capital requirement. 
Second, it proposes a supervisory review of an institution's capital adequacy and 
internal assessment process. Third, it promotes the effective use of market discipline as 
a lever to strengthen disclosure and encourage safe and sound banking practices. 
A more definitive proposal was issued in January 2001, which covers the three pillars 
(Basle Committee 2001a and Hall, 2001). Under Pillar 1, the new proposal recommends 
Tier 2 (a). Undisclosed reserved 
(b). Asset revaluation reserves 
(c). General provision/general loan loss reserves 
(d). Hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments 
(e). Subordinated loan 
The sum of these capital elements will be eligible for inclusion in the capital base, subject to limits and 
restrictions as follows: 
(i). The total of Tier 2 elements will be limited to a maximum of 100 per cent of the total of Tier 1 
elements. 
(ii) Subordinated term debt will be limited to a maximum of 50 per cent of Tier 1 elements. 
(iii) Where general provision/general loan loss reserves include amounts reflecting lower valuation of 
assets or latent unidentified losses present in the balance sheet, the amount of such provisions will 
be limited to a maximum of 1.25 percentage point of risk assets. 
(iv) Asset revaluation reserves, which take the form of latent gains on unrealised securities, will be 
subject to a discount of 55 per cent. 
Further deductions are also made under the BIS proposal for calculating the risk asset ratio: 
From Tier 1 (a) Goodwill 
From total capital (a) Investments in unconsolidated banking and financial subsidiary companies, 
and 
(b) Investments in the capital of other banks and financial institutions. 
27 To be capable of becoming part of a bank's permanent capital Tier 3 must be available to absorb losses 
in the event of insolvency. Tier 3 capital must have at least the following characteristics: subordinated and 
fully paid-up, have an original maturity of at least two years, not be repayable before the agreed 
repayment date and be subject to a lock-in clause which stipulates that neither interest nor principal may 
be paid (even at maturity) if such payment means that the bank falls below the minimum capital 
requirement. 
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the adoption of a more risk-sensitive standardised approach and its operational 
requirements, credit mitigation in the standardised approach, the treatment of 
operational risk, and an Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach for banks with more 
advanced risk management capability. Pillar 2 expects the supervisors to consider a 
range of options if the banks do not meet the requirements set. Those options include: 
intensifying the monitoring of the banks; restricting the payments of dividends; 
requiring the bank to prepare and implement a satisfactory capital adequacy restoration 
plan; and requiring the banks to raise additional capital immediately. However, the 
option to increase bank capital sometimes is not the only interim measure. The 
supervisors should also pay attention to the quality of systems and controls to improve 
the banks' positions. Pillar 3 sets out more specific qualitative and quantitative aspects 
of disclosure that cover: scope of application, composition of capital, risk exposures 
assessment and management processes, and capital adequacy. 
Standardised approach for the capital adequacy measure 
The first step toward risk based capital adequacy measurement is to tie the banks' 
capital requirements to their estimated credit risks. The assets and off-balance-sheet 
credit exposures are classified into four different types of credit risk. Each item is 
weighted by the risk weight for its category (0,20,50 or 100 percent). The risk adjusted 
ratio (RAR) is defined as the ratio of the adjusted capital base (ACB) to the total of 
weighted risk assets (TOWRA) (Hall, 1992)28. The equity capital formed by the banks 
will reflect the financial risk experienced by the banks. Operationally, the banks are also 
required to classify their loan quality into four categories. The classification is based on 
the repayment capacity. The lower the capacity of the borrower to repay the loan, the 
higher the allowance should be allocated. This allowance for earning asset losses will 
reduce the profitability of the banks. An excessive expected loss (low quality of earning 
28 Under the implementation of the amended capital accord on 1 January 1998 to incorporate market risk, 
the risk adjusted ratio RAR is determined as follows: 
o 
ACB 
RAR(%) =, (MRC: Market Risk Capital Charge) TOWRA+[12.5*MRC] 
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assets) may erode the capital of banks. If the bank capital is insufficient, the 
shareholders will be required to inject more equity capital to avoid insolvency. 
In 1996, the Basle Committee extended the 1988 Basle Accord to include risk-based 
capital requirements for the market risk in banking activities. There are two alternative 
approaches for setting regulatory capital requirements for the market risks in bank 
trading accounts: the standardised measurement method and the use of internal models 
to measure market risk. Under the standardised method, a set of rules assign risk 
charges to specific instruments and specify how these charges are to be aggregated into 
an overall market risk capital requirement (Amendment to the Capital Accord to 
Incorporate Market Risk, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, (1996)) (see also 
Basle Committee, 2001b and Basle Committee 1999f for its performance). The 
standardised measurement method covers interest rate risk, equity position risk, foreign 
exchange risk, commodities risk and treatment for options. The standard measurement 
method expresses the market risk more statically than the internal model does. The 
standard method uses a `building-block' approach in which specific risk and general 
market risk arising from debt and equity position are calculated separately. The specific 
risk is calculated to anticipate an adverse movement in the price of an individual 
security owing to factors related to the individual issuer, whilst the general market risk 
is calculated to capture the risk of loss arising from changes in market variables. In 
calculating general market risk, long and short position of different instruments can be 
off-set, although it is not allowed to off-set long and short positions in calculating the 
specific risk since it reflects the individual risk of the instruments inherently. Under the 
new proposals, the risk weighting process uses the rating system more intensively 
(External Credit Assessment Institutions [ECAIs]). (see Basle Committee, 2001c) 
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IRB approach for the capital adequacy measure 
Under strict requirements29, a bank can use its own estimates of the advanced IRB 
approach - i. e. in respect of loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and 
the treatment of guarantees and credit derivatives (Basle Committee, 2000a and 2001d). 
The banks are first required to categorise banking book exposures into six broad classes 
of assets with different underlying credit risk characteristics (i. e. corporate exposures, 
bank exposures, sovereign exposures, retail exposures, project finance exposures, and 
equity exposures). The calculation of risk weighted assets involves three components: 
LGDs, EADs, and assessment of default probabilities (PDs). The banks are allowed to 
input the values of PDs, but estimates of additional risk factors (LGDs and EADs) have 
to be derived through the application of standardised supervisory estimates. Basically, 
the banks are given a chance to estimate the risk components internally. 
The use of internal models to assess market risk internally by the banks is subject to the 
explicit approval by the banking supervisory authority and the approval is only given if 
the banks fulfil some minimum requirements. The banks have to prove that they have 
implemented sound risk management systems with integrity and showed accuracy in 
measuring risks. The implementation has to also involve a sufficient number of skilled 
risk management staff. In order to assure accuracy in market risk measurement, the 
supervisory authority will also insist on periodical monitoring and live testing of a 
bank's internal model before the model can be used for supervisory capital purposes. 
The measurement of the soundness of the risk management system is outlined in 
qualitative and quantitative standards. The qualitative standard includes requirements 
for the existence of an independent risk control unit that produces an independent 
review of the risk management process, regular back-testing and stress testing to ensure 
the financial capability of the bank to face adverse conditions, and the existence of an 
efficient management structure. The controlling and monitoring process should be 
29 Banks must satisfy the following minimum requirements, both at the outset and an on-going basis. 
Those requirements are: a meaningful differentiation of risk; completeness and integrity of rating 
assignments; oversight of the rating system and processes; criteria and orientation of the rating system; 
estimation of the probability of default, data collection and IT systems; use of internal ratings, internal 
validations, and disclosure requirements. 
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closely integrated with the day-to-day risk management process. The quantitative 
standard still gives flexibility to the banks to construct their models to fit the precise 
nature of the trading activities in the market. However, some minimum standards have 
to be followed for the purposes of calculating the capital charge. If it is considered 
necessary, the supervisory authority has discretion to apply stricter standards. The value 
at risk has to be computed on a daily basis; hence, a capital requirement is also 
expressed on a daily basis30. The banks have the freedom to determine the most 
appropriate model to be used as long as it can fairly represent the actual risks faced by 
the banks since no particular type of model is prescribed31. The supervisory authority 
will require the banks to conduct `back-testing' to assess the quality of the banks' risk 
management system. If the predictive quality is not satisfactory, the supervisory 
authority will add a `multiplicative factor' that will raise the capitalisation required. In 
this way, the introduction of a multiplicative factor provides a positive incentive to 
maintain the predictive quality of the model. As a matter of fact, econometric models 
are constructed on the assumptions of normal market conditions with small changes in 
market variables, but big market shocks that will create big losses may happen at any 
time. The banks using internal models for meeting market risk capital requirements still 
need to conduct stress testing to assure their capability to survive in such adverse 
market conditions. 
Recently, the Basle Committee has been studying the state of industry practice in credit 
modelling and assessing the potential uses of credit risk models for regulatory purposes, 
including the proper setting for regulatory capital requirements. To match developments 
in the credit market, a new approach for credit risk modelling can reduce the incentive 
for a bank to conduct regulatory capital arbitrage since a model-based approach may 
bring capital requirements into closer alignment with the perceived riskiness of 
underlying assets. The credit risk model may also produce estimates of credit risk that 
30 Value at Risk will be computed based on uniform inputs (10 trading days or two calendar week time 
horizon, 99 percent confidence level, observation period is based on at least one year of historical data 
and updated at least once a quarter). 
31 The banks may choose variance-covariance matrices, historical simulation or a Monte Carlo simulation 
process. 
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reflect the actual composition of each bank's portfolio. As with the implementation of 
market risk modelling, the implementation of credit risk modelling must also be 
concerned with other supporting factors. The regulator has to be confident that the credit 
risk models are not only well integrated with the day-to-day risk management system, 
but also conceptually sound and empirically validated. However, the supervisory 
recognition of portfolio credit risk models in the near future seems to be unlikely due to 
two significant hurdles i. e. data limitation and weakness in model validation. 
D. A possible alternative approach 
Although the use of internal models was designed to improve upon the accuracy of the 
standardised approach, Kupiec and O'Brien (1996) claim that internal models have so 
far failed to measure accurately market risk in the trading account because of different 
time frames. Internal models extrapolate a long-horizon exposure estimate from a 
bank's internally generated 1-day market risk exposure estimate. Moreover, the 
accuracy of an internal model needs to be validated case by case while assessing the 
precision and merits of the model is very difficult. They claim that there is a significant 
probability that regulators will be unable to detect poorly performing risk management 
models. 
A different approach, named the Pre-Commitment Approach (PCA) and developed by 
research economists of the US Federal Reserve, would shift the responsibility for setting 
market risk capital charges to the banks themselves. Kupiec and O'Brien introduced the 
concept of PCA in 1997. The behaviour of a bank that focuses on the interaction 
between the incentives created by fixed rate deposit insurance and a bank's choice of its 
loan portfolio and its portfolio of market-traded financial assets is modelled. Under 
PCA, the regulator allows a bank to set its own market risk capital requirement. If the 
bank generates subsequent losses that exceed its market risk capital `pre-commitment', 
regulatory penalties will be imposed. Hence, PCA attempts to supplant regulatory 
capital requirements that are based on ex ante estimates of bank risk. In PCA, it is 
assumed that in making investments and deciding financial options, a bank will always 
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maximise the net present value (NPV) of its shareholders' claims on future bank cash 
flow. The NPV of initial shareholders' claims is determined by several components: the 
bank's loan portfolio; the bank's end-of-period franchise value; deposit generated fee 
income; the value of the net deposit insurance guarantee of premium paid; the initial 
value of contingent-liability generated by end-of-period distress cost; and the outside 
funds raised. The bank management is assumed to always try to maximise the NPV of 
the initial shareholders' claims. Since the market risk in trading accounts is equivalent 
to the risk in the bank's risky market traded securities portfolio, the banks should pre- 
commit to maximum losses in trading activities determined by their own capacity. 
Therefore, the bank is assumed to pay an ex post deposit insurance premium for every 
excess loss. Through this approach, the bank's supervisor expects that the banks will 
carefully assess their own risk taking capability in their operations. It is clearly seen that 
the supervisor wants to give the responsibility back to the banks instead of the 
supervisors. In fact, in order to maximise the NPV of shareholder value, the manager 
will maximise every factor mentioned above. If one portfolio (the loan portfolio for 
example) cannot be expected to give positive returns, the management might possibly 
maximise the returns from other portfolios (non-loan portfolios). If the NPV of the 
loans is negative, the bank will maximise its non-loan portfolio investment either by 
choosing risk free securities or by undertaking a `go-for-broke' high-risk strategy. Since 
all of its deposits are guaranteed, an optimal go-for-broke strategy under a negative 
NPV of the loan portfolio will entail using only risky market-traded securities to 
maximise the value of deposit insurance. This is the main reason why PCA is only 
effective for a bank that has a positive NPV for its loan portfolio. If the NPV of the loan 
portfolio is positive, a bank will avoid excessive holding of high-risk securities to avoid 
monetary penalties that will finally reduce shareholder value. 
2.4. Summary 
A sound financial system is essential in supporting sustainable economic development 
because of its massive contribution to both microeconomic as well as macroeconomic 
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levels of activities. Instability in the financial system will adversely affect the whole 
economic development process, possibly imposing very high social costs as a result of 
economic turmoil. For these reasons, the financial system, including the banking 
system, has to be efficient, stable and robust so that it has the capability to overcome 
any economic disturbances. As we have noticed, economic disturbances may come from 
various factors, including macroeconomic instability, inefficient financial system 
infrastructure, distortions in market discipline and a lack of quality in regulation and 
supervision. 
The financial regulators cannot fully rely on market forces and let the system regulate 
itself due to the social costs that could result. The successful implementation of 
financial regulation has to address some important issues. First, due to the importance of 
the financial system to everyone, regulators should avoid any monopolistic exploitation. 
Second, the financial system has to be able to give a minimum level of financial 
protection to dispersed and unsophisticated depositors. The existence of a banking 
system is very important to the dispersed and unsophisticated depositors for a number of 
reasons, including reduced transaction costs, liquidity insurance, information-sharing 
and delegated monitoring advantages. Ultimately, regulators have to assure systemic 
stability in the long run. 
Financial regulations employed should address not only prudential financial regulation 
but also business conduct regulation to shape good behaviour by key players. Therefore, 
financial (banking) regulation should provide the right incentives to promote good 
governance in the banking system. Nowadays, banking regulations have moved to risk- 
based banking regulations that are believed to create the right incentives within the 
banking system. One of the central preoccupations in risk-based banking regulations is 
capital regulation for banks. It is clear that bank capital should not only provide a static 
financial cushion, but also be able to create prudent behaviour by the shareholders. 
Dynamic analysis of shareholder value has been developed to explain the relation 
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between moral hazard and uncertainty when implementing banking regulation including 
in the analysis of deposit insurance arrangements and closure policy. 
Risk-based capital regulation requires the operation of both a sophisticated risk 
assessment process (ex-ante) and asset valuation process (ex post) so that the capital 
level required reflects the potential losses faced by the banks. The attempt to improve 
the capital adequacy assessment has never stopped. The possibility of incorporating 
portfolio credit risk model within capital adequacy assessment is being considered. The 
more accurate the risk assessment, the more reliable the capital adequacy assessment 
will be. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ISLAMIC BANKING: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 
3.1. Introduction 
Financial systems play an important role in sustaining every business activity, whether 
the business operates in the West, Middle East or in any particular community. Every 
community is faced with the same set of financial challenges. Productive assets, such as 
natural resources, labour forces and economic development programs must be financed 
to maintain and improve the quality of living; hence, the financial system becomes one 
of the most important elements to support sustainable development in the community. 
Every community, in fact, has its own values, which are different from the values of the 
other communities. These values, which are generally affected by various factors, such 
as culture, demography and religion, determine the types of needs, which arise. Muslim 
society, conceptually, has a typical set of financial needs which are derived from 
Islamic values. According to Islamic teaching, the existing western banking activities 
are not Islamic because they accommodate certain financial activities which are 
prohibited. One of the central preoccupations in examining Islamic finance is to 
understand how Islamic religious rulings affect business operations in a commercial 
setting (Ahmed, Iqbal and Khan, 1983). The recent development of Islamic banking 
indicates the awareness of Muslims to have their own financial system that incorporates 
religious rulings in their financial activities. Islamic banking has been growing rapidly 
in the last two decades. It has been developing not only in the Middle East region but 
also in many other parts of the world. 
However, the religious aspect is not the only factor to be considered in building a sound 
and efficient economic base in a commercial setting. The Islamic financial institutions 
must still be able to meet with reasonable economic efficiency the basic requirements of 
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both the commercial enterprises and the investors who supply its financial resources. 
Market players, including investors and depositors, need an advanced financial 
environment that allows them to conduct economic activities efficiently. Moreover, 
stability of the financial system is required to support the soundness of the economic 
environment. This poses a challenge to the financial regulators that allow Islamic banks 
to operate under their supervision since they have to assure the soundness of the new 
banking system. Instability in one element of the financial system might adversely 
affect the whole financial system. 
3.2. Islamic Finance: Concepts and Applications 
3.2.1. Islamic principles in financial activities 
Every individual in his life must determine the presence of satisfaction according to his 
own criteria. In economics, individual satisfaction is usually measured in terms of 
utility. The utility, in turn, motivates all economic activities'. In Islam, the concept of 
utility is certainly inspired by the concept of welfare (maslaha). According to Shatibi 
(1987), welfare is built on five fundamentals: life, property, faith, reason and posterity2. 
A similar fundamental concept of Islamic economics, which is mentioned by the 
International Association of Islamic Banks (1996), includes ownership, justice, wealth 
distribution and the prohibition of interest. Chapra (2000) restates the expression of al- 
Gazali (1111 A. D) about the objectives of sharia: 
`The objective of the sharia is to promote the well-being of all mankind, which lies 
in safeguarding their faith (din), their human self (nafs), their intellect ('aql), 
An individual would engage in an economic transaction if he could obtain at least a minimum level of 
satisfaction from the transaction. On the contrary, if the transaction cannot give a minimum satisfaction to 
the transacting parties, the economic transaction will not happen. 
2 In Islamic concepts, the individuals should harmonize their needs with the concept of maslaha that has 
been determined in the Islamic teaching. Economic efficiency is not the prime concern since the 
objectives of the economic process have to be in accordance with the five fundamentals of maslaha. 
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their posterity (nasl) and their wealth (maal). Whatever ensures the safeguard of 
these five serves public interest and is desirable'. 
Any action undertaken has to promote these five elements in order to provide maslaha 
for human beings. Islamic banks and their operations are considered to be an integral 
part of a complete Islamic economic system, and must align with injunctions outlined in 
the holy Qur'ran and the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessing of 
God be upon him). 
Ahmed (1986) states the three basic principles outlined by Islam. First, a human being 
is not the absolute owner of any resource since they are only the trustees of the God3. 
There are social obligations to be undertaken within the limits set for it. Therefore, 
Islam always discourages wealth concentration within just a few hands. Second, there is 
moral or religious guidance in pursuing the acquisition and development of resources 
(i. e. the economic aspect of man's life)4. Third, the final focus of the economic activities 
should be on achieving prosperity for the community, although individuals are allowed 
to `own' wealthy. Social solidarity is the justification and aim of an Islamic state, so that 
3 The expression of the absolute ownership is revealed in the Quar'an (3: 189) as: `To Allah belongeth the 
dominion of the heavens and the earth; And Allah bath power over all things. ' However, the bounty of 
the resources is provided for the prosperity of the whole of human society (2: 29): `It is He who hath 
created for you all things that are on earth; then He turned to the heaven and made them into seven 
firmaments. And of all things He bath perfect knowledge. ' 
4 The importance of acquiring wealth lawfully is revealed in the Qur'an (4: 29-30) as: `0 ye who believe! 
Eat not up your property among yourself in vanities; but let there be amongst you traffic and trade by 
mutual good-will; Nor kill (or destroy) yourself: for verily Allah bath been to you most merciful. If any 
do that in rancour and injustice - soon shall we cast them into fire: and easy it is for Allah'. Islamic 
teaching also demands all Muslims to spend their money for the welfare of the people and not on wasteful 
or pleasurable activities (2: 219): `They ask thee concerning wine and gambling. Say, "In them is great 
sin, and some profit, for men; but the sin is greater than profit. " They ask thee how much they are to 
spend; say "What beyond your needs. " Thus doth Allah make clear to you his sign; in order ye may 
consider. ' In conducting the business, the Qur'an also outlines the right conduct for Muslims (4: 36) as: 
`Serve Allah, and join not any partners with Him; and do good to parents, kinsfolk, orphans, those in 
need, neighbors who are near, neighbors who are strangers, the companion by your side, the way-farer (ye 
meet) and what your right hands possess; for Allah loveth not the arrogant, the vainglorious. ' and also 
(4: 139) : `0 ye who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even as against yourself, 
or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for Allah can best protect both. 
Follow not the lusts (of your hearts), lest ye swerve, and if ye distort or decline to do justice, verily Allah 
is well-acquainted with all that ye do. ' 
5 Islamic teaching emphasis the importance of fulfilling social obligations as revealed in the Qur'an 
(51: 19): `And in their wealth and possessions (was remembered) the right of the (needy), Him who asked, 
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Muslims, freed from the pressures of material need, would find it easier to fulfil the 
aims of their life in worshipping God. 
Chapra (2000) states that the Islamic perspective toward economics puts emphasis on 
the socio-economic dimension, where the goals include not only economic well-being 
but also human brotherhood and socio-economic justice, sanctity of life, prosperity, 
individual honour, mental peace and happiness, and family as well as social harmony. 
Maximising wealth and consumption is not the only goal in the life of an individual 
since there are still social obligations to fulfil. According to Islamic teaching, a society 
may only achieve a short period of economic prosperity if it neglects the moral fibre of 
individuals and society since the moral fibre is very essential in forming positive norms 
within the society and influencing consumer behaviour. A balance between earning and 
spending and mutual benefit for the whole community should be achieved as it also 
prohibits unlawful means of acquiring wealth. 
Islamic principles in financial activities basically represent moral guidance in running 
the business. Haron and Shanmugam (1997), as well as in Siddiqi (1986), summarise 
the basic principles of business according to Islam as: 
The principles of Islamic business comprise of honesty, and trade is to be 
conducted in a faithful and trustworthy manner. Islam conceives trade as an 
honest effort, an earnest endeavour, and a human striving for earning one's 
rightful livelihood. Trade manipulations and malpractices aimed at earning unfair 
profit through operations like hoarding, black-marketing, profiteering, short- 
weighting, hiding the defective quality of merchandise, and adulteration cannot be 
regarded as honest trade. 
and him who (for some reasons) was prevented. ' Islam also emphasizes the remembrance of putting aside 
self interest in order to support social welfare (180: 3): `And let no those who covetously withheld of the 
gifts which Allah hath given them of His Grace, think that it is good for them; nay it will be the worse for 
them; soon shall the things which they covetously withheld be tied to their necks like a twisted collar. ' 
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This moral guidance is adopted when formulating any business instruments that are 
considered permissible (halal). A modern reinterpretation of the Islamic law of finance 
has been undertaken by famous Islamic lawyers. They are Al-Khafif, Al-Sanhuri, Zahra, 
Zarqa, and others6. The basis of the reformulation of the classical law is simplification 
and rationalisation with respect to the rapid development in financial activities. 
In accordance with the basic principles, any Islamic financial product developed has to 
accord with those principles. The general rules of Islamic banking and finance have 
involved simplification of the complexities of the classical religious teaching (fiqh) into 
a few basic rules or principles. Haron and Shanmugam (1997) identify the general 
objectives for the existence of banking institution from an Islamic point of view7. First, 
Islamic financial institutions can help Islamic society execute financial dealings in 
respect of the ethical individual values and social values of Islamic teaching. Second, 
Islamic financial institutions may enable Islamic society to mobilise and utilise financial 
resources in order to foster economic development and prosperity within the principles 
of Islamic teaching that assure the rights and obligations of both the individual and the 
community. Third, Islamic financial institutions are expected to strengthen the fraternal 
bonds through mutual benefit by promoting economic development. Basically, Islamic 
financial institutions try to incorporate financial profit and morality as ultimate 
objectives simultaneously. 
According to Khan (1983), the main principles of Islamic banking operations are: 
i. Prohibition of the payment of usury in all forms of transaction; 8 
6 These Islamic lawyers are recognized by the AAOIFI (Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions, Manama, Bahrain). 
7 The conclusions relate to the Dar Al-Maal Al-Islamic Trust which holds 25 business and financial 
companies in 15 countries. 
8 In the Islamic concept, capital holder is not allowed to ask for predetermined returns on his capital since 
the borrower may not achieve the required level of productivity to fulfil his promise; hence it is 
considered unjust. The prohibition of usury is explicitly revealed in the Qur'an: `But Allah hath permitted 
trade and forbidden usury... ' (2: 275). A further discussion about usury and the Islamic perspective 
toward the application of usury can be found in Antonio (1999), Mills and Presley (1999), and Vogel and 
Hayes (1998). 
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ii. Undertaking business and trade activities on the basis of fair and legitimised (halal) 
profit; 
iii. Fulfilling the obligation of giving to charity (Zakah)10; 
iv. Prohibition of monopoly; 
v. Co-operation for the benefit of society and development of all religiously legitimised 
(halal) aspects of business trade and investment that are not prohibited by Islam; 
Iqbal (1999) states that modem Islamic banks mostly perform the same function as 
conventional banks but with some distinguishing features. First, Islamic banks always 
promote the profit and loss sharing concept to investors as well as borrowers". Second, 
there are some moral restrictions imposed on financial activities. Islamic banks are 
prohibited from financing activities that are not in accord with Islamic teaching, 
including those that are known to be harmful to society. 
The prohibition from accepting or paying usury comes from two main sources i. e. the 
Qur'an and the tradition of the Prophet. According to Haron and Shanmugam (1997), 
usury can be divided into two categories i. e. increased usury and delayed payment 
usury. Increased usury occurs when there is inequality either, in terms of quantity or 
quality of goods, which are involved in a process of exchange. Delayed payment usury 
occurs when there is an increase in the values as a result of deferred payments. 
Presley and Sessions (1994) state that the prohibition of interest in economic activities 
may create a number of problems. First, an individual is not automatically entitled to a 
financial reward for abstinence. Second, there is no moral foundation for the application 
of interest. Third, money is not equated with capital since a transformation of money to 
9 Unlegitimised investments consist not only of pork and alcohol-containing food industries, but also of 
all the business that are not in accordance with the social and religious interests, such as casinos, 
prostitution and environmentally-harmful industries. 
10 In Islamic teaching, it is obligatory for all Muslims to give a certain part of their wealth or income to 
poor people (2.5 percent of wealth or income) annually. These charity funds are managed either by 
charity organizations for consumption or by Islamic banks as benevolent loans to increase the 
productivity of Muslims in general. 
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capital is required. Money is not fungible by its own. The increase in the value of 
capital can only be obtained through real business activities. Finally, lenders and 
borrowers share in business uncertainty. At the macroeconomic level, Chapra (1985) 
explores the benefits that can be gained by the implementation of an interest-free 
monetary system (i. e. an equity-based monetary system). 
Besides the prohibition of usury, Islamic teaching also prohibits Muslims from risk- 
trading activities that are considered as gambling or speculative activities. Islamic 
teaching, as a matter of fact, differentiates speculative activity form searching to 
uncertainty when conducting business activities. According to Kahf (2000), speculative 
activities are prohibited because it is not based on real economic activities. Wealth 
distribution cannot be based on (dominated by) fabricated chances that are created by 
vain. This leads to the prohibition on conducting gambling-like economic activities, 
such as zero-sum derivative transactions. 
When it comes to the implementation of the Islamic norms in practice, different 
opinions towards the standard operations of Islamic financial institutions are most likely 
to appear. In order to support the standardisation of products of Islamic banks, some 
countries that operate Islamic banking systems established the National Sharia Councils 
(NSCs). The main objective of the NSCs is to assure the compliance of Islamic banks 
with the sharia rules. The members of the NSCs are persons who are well-trained and 
have sufficient knowledge in business and Islamic law to judge the conformity of a 
particular product of an Islamic bank to sharia rules. 
11 As a matter of fact, there are some types of western financial companies, such as mutual funds 
67 
CHAPTER 3 
3.2.2. Islamic Financial Activities 
A. General Banking Activities 
IS LAMIC_ BANKING 
In general, Islamic banking operations have adopted western banking tools and 
procedures (Khan, 1983). Only if there is a contradiction with Islamic principles do they 
devise their own tools and procedures to accomplish their banking activities. Islamic 
banks collect depositors' funds from (dispersed) depositors like western banks do, but in 
a different way. Deposits in Islamic banks are divided into two different types, based on 
a commitment to invest. 
a. Savings and current accounts (SA) 
Current accounts and savings accounts are provided for depositors who do not want 
to commit for investment. In this type of deposit, although the depositors allow the 
bank to take the benefit from the deposit, the bank has to guarantee that they get the 
full amount of their money back when it is called. The reward given to the depositors 
is discretionary and not obligatory, and is paid only in the case where the bank is 
earning substantial profit. The depositors get bonuses as a result of cumulative profits 
during a certain period. 
b. Investment accounts 
If a depositor commits for investment, the deposit will take the form of an investment 
account. In this type of deposit, depositors are dealing with investment risks. If the 
project generates high returns, the depositors will gain the high returns proportional 
to the share agreed upon. The account holders will get a share of the profits after a 
minimum agreed period of the investment The account holders are not allowed to 
withdraw their money before the minimum agreed period. If they need to withdraw 
their money before the minimum agreed period, the depositors either forego their 
share of the profit or they may be entitled to receive some discounted profit 
companies and venture capitalists, which apply the same sharing principles as Islamic banks. 
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depending on the duration of the deposit with the bank. There are two types of 
investment account: 
i. Accounts with authorisation (PSIA" ) 
This account is also known as an unrestricted investment account. The depositors 
give full authorisation to the bank for investing their money in any project chosen 
by the bank. Repayment to the depositors is based on the returns of the bank as a 
whole. Therefore, the repayment depends very much on the quality of the assets 
of the bank. 
ii. Accounts without authorisation (PSIAR ) 
This account is also known as a restricted investment account. The depositors may 
choose any particular projects that have been chosen by themselves or the bank 
and will receive a share of the profit according to an agreed percentage. In 
contrast with the accounts with authorisation, in this kind of investment the 
repayment (principal and monetary surplus) is based on the performance of the 
particular project. 
In raising capital finance, an Islamic bank has fewer alternatives than a western bank. 
The prohibition of interest has limited their flexibility to access financial markets, 
especially in dealing with interest-based financial instruments, since the sources of 
funds for Islamic banks are only based on sharing agreements. Another source of funds 
for Islamic banks is the capital market. Like other institutions, Islamic banks have 
access to funds by selling their external equity in the equity market. Stockholders and 
unrestricted investment account holders will enjoy the same methods of reward, i. e. 
profit-and-loss sharing-based rewards, except for voting rights (because of the 
shareholders' financial involvement for an infinite time horizon). 
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Exhibit 3.1 
Sharing-Based Modes of Financing 
Type Description Comments 
PLS Mode Profit and loss sharing At the core of Islamic banking 
Mudharaba Trustee finance contract Three conditions need to be met: 
The bank provides the entire capital needed for 
financing a project, while the entrepreneur offers his 1 The bank should not reduce risk by 
labour and expertise. The profits (losses) from the requesting collateral; it bears 
project are shared between the bank and the exclusively the financial risk. 
entrepreneur at a certain fixed ratio. Financial losses are Collateral, however, may be requested 
borne exclusively by the bank. The liability of the to help reduce moral hazard, e. g., to 
entrepreneur is limited only to his time and efforts. prevent the entrepreneur running away. 
However, if negligence or mismanagement by the 2. The rate of the profit has to be 
entrepreneur can be proven he may be held responsible determined strictly as a percentage and 
for the financial losses incurred. not as a lump sum. 
3. The entrepreneur has the absolute 
It is usually employed in investment projects with short freedom to manage the business. 
gestation periods and in trade and commerce. 
It affects both the assets and liabilities sides of banks' The bank is entitled to receive from the 
balance sheets. On the liabilities side, the contract entrepreneur the principal of the loan at the 
between the bank and depositor is known as end of the period stipulated in the contract, if 
unrestricted mudharaba because depositors agree that and only if a surplus exists. If the 
their funds can be used by the bank, at its discretion, to enterprise's books show a loss, this will not 
finance an open-ended list of profitable investments and constitute default on the part of the 
expect to share with the bank the overall profit accruing entrepreneur, except for negligence or 
to the bank's business. On the assets side, the contract mismanagement. 
between the bank and the agent-entrepreneur is known 
as restricted mudharaba because the bank agrees to 
finance a specific project carried out by a specific 
agent-entrepreneur and to share the profits according to 
an agreed formula. 
Musharaka Equity participation contract Banks can exercise voting rights 
The bank is not the sole provider of funds to finance a corresponding to their share of the firm's 
project. Two or more partners contribute to the joint equity capital. Their representatives can sit 
capital of an investment. Profits (and losses) are shared on the firm's board of directors. 
strictly in relation to the respective capital All parties invest in varying proportions, and 
contributions. It is usually employed to finance long have the right to participate in the 
term investment projects. management of the entreprise. 
Muzar'ah Traditional counterpart of the mudharaba contract in 
farming. The harvest is shared between the bank and the 
entrepreneur. The bank may provide funds and land. 
Musaqat Traditional counterpart of the musharaka contract in 
orchard keeping. The harvest is shared among the 
partners based on their respective contributions. 
Direct The same concept as in conventional banking. The bank Bank can exercise voting rights 
Investment cannot invest in the production of goods and services corresponding to their share of the firm's 
which contradict the value pattern of Islam, such as equity capital. Their representatives can sit 
gambling. on the firm's board of directors. 
Source: Kazarian, 1993; lqbal and Mirakhor, MI; and Frrico and rarahbaks1 (1996) 
On the assets side, Khan (1995) divides the form of Islamic financing into two types; 
direct financing (sharing-based assets) and indirect financing (non-sharing-based 
assets). Direct financing consists of mudharaba (venture capital) and musharaka (joint 
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financing). The sharing principle is applicable for commercial purposes only; hence, it 
is not applicable either for consumption purposes or for non-commercial activities that 
are not profit-generating. Indirect financing consists of trading-based modes, leasing- 
based modes and service-based modes. 
Exhibit 3.2 
Non Sharing Based Modes of financing 
Non-PLS 
Modes 
Non Profit and loss sharing modes They are used in cases where PLS nodes cannot 
be implemented, for example, in cases of snmall- 
Qard al- 
Hasanah 
Bai' Salam or 
Bai' Salaf 
Ijara 
Ijara wa iqtina 
Min-abaha 
Jo'alah 
Source: 
Beneficience loans 
These are zero-return loans that the Quran exhorts 
Muslims to make to `those who need them'. Banks are 
allowed to charge the borrowers a service fee to cover 
the administrative expenses of handling the loan, 
provided that the fee is not related to the amount or 
maturity of the loan. 
Deferred payment sales 
The seller can sell a product on the basis of a deferred 
payment in instalments or in a lump sum payment. The 
price of the product is agreed upon between the buyer 
and the seller at the time of the sale and cannot include 
any charge for deferring payments 
Purchase with deferred delivery 
The buyer pays the seller the full negotiated price of a 
product that the seller promises to deliver at a future 
date. This mode only applies to products whose quality 
and quantity can be fully specified at the time the 
contract is made. Usually, it applies to agricultural or 
manufactured products. 
Leasing 
Lease purchase 
A party leases a particular product for a specific sum 
and a specific period of time. In the case of a lease- 
purchase, each payment includes a portion that goes 
toward the final purchase and transfer of ownership of 
the product. 
Mark up 
The seller informs the buyer of his cost of acquiring or 
producing a specified product; then profit margin (or 
mark up) is negotiated between the buyer and the seller. 
The total cost is usually paid in instalments. 
Service charge 
A party undertakes to pay another party a specified 
amount of money as a fee for rendering a specified 
service in accordance with the terms of the contract 
stipulated between the two parties. This mode usually 
applies to transactions such as consultations and 
professional services, fund placements, and trust 
services. 
Contrary to contracts based on the PLS principle, 
modes such as mark up, leasing, and lease 
purchase have a predetermined and fixed rate of 
return and are associated with collateral. 
In fact, banks add a certain percentage to the 
purchase price and/or additional costs associated 
with these transactions as a profit margin, and the 
purchased assets serve as a guarantee. 
Additionally, banks may require the client to 
offer collateral. 
These instruments can be considered to be more 
closely associated with risk aversion and they do 
not substantially differ from those used in a 
conventional banking system, other than in their 
terminology and in some legal technicalities. 
They are considered to conform to Islamic 
principles because the rate of return is meant to 
be tied to each transaction, rather than to the time 
dimension. However, some Muslim scholars 
advocate a stricter utilisation of such a mode. 
: Iabal and Mirakhor. 1987: and Errico and Farahbaksh (1998) 
71 
I 'A 
U-J AI' i LR -3 ISLAMIC BANKING 
Vogel and Hayes (1996) divide the forms of Islamic financing into two types: equity 
like financing and non-equity-like financing. Non equity-like investments that are 
provided for the short term consist of working capital financing and leasing. Equity-like 
investments that are provided for long term financing consist of profit-and-loss-sharing- 
based loans. The sharing-based modes of financing in Islamic banks are summarised in 
Exhibit 3.1, while non-sharing modes are summarised in Exhibit 3.2. 
Since Islamic banks operate in accordance with different principles, they adopt different 
basic practices from western banks. Most of the differences result from the application 
of the sharing concept, either in application on the funding side (i. e. 
depositors/investors) or the lending side (i. e. borrowers). Errico and Farahbaksh (1998) 
summarised the comparison of banking framework between Islamic banks and 
conventional banks in the form set out in Exhibit 3.3. 
Exhibit 3.3 
Comparison of Banking Frameworks 
Characteristic Paradigm Version of Islamic Conventional Banking 
Banking 
Nominal value guarantee 
Demand deposits Yes Yes 
Investment deposits No Yes 
Equity-based system where 
capital is at risk Yes, directly Yes, indirectly 
Rate of return on deposits Uncertain, not guaranteed Certain and guaranteed 
Mechanism to regulate final Depends on bank's performance / Irrespective of bank's 
returns on deposits profit from investments performance / profit from 
investments 
PLS principle is applied Yes No 
Use of Islamic modes of 
financing: PLS and non-PLS Yes N/A 
Use of discretion by banks with Possible for reducing moral Yes, always 
regard to collateral hazard in PLS 
Yes in non-PLS 
Bank's pooling of depositors' 
fund to provide depositors with Yes No 
professional investment 
management 
Source: Errico and Farahbaksh (1998) 
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Basic features of financing techniques 
Conceptually, the focus of Islamic modes of financing is on PLS as an alternative to 
interest-based financing. However, Khan (1995) reports a divergence between theory 
and practice in the order of preference for these modes of financing. Most Islamic banks 
depend on mark-up based techniques. To understand this controversy, we need to go 
deeper into the basic features of Islamic financial techniques. There are five basic 
modes of finance: principal-agent financing (mudharaba); joint financing (musharaka); 
leasing (ijara); deferred payment (bay' al-salam); and mark up (murabaha). All of the 
Islamic financial techniques, practically and theoretically, are reflected in these five 
basic models. Each basic model has its own financial characteristic that differs from the 
others. Mudharaba is the most risky mode of finance since the capital-provider (an 
investor / bank) does not have control over the management while he has to be 
responsible for the whole of any financial losses arising from the use of such finance. In 
contrast with mudaraba, musharaka is less risky since the capital-provider has some 
control over the business, besides other parties who are also risking their own capital in 
the business. In the case of bay' al-salam, although the return has been fixed at the 
beginning of the contract, there is still uncertainty over the future prices of the 
commodities involved in the contract. Therefore, the capital provider has to be able to 
forecast the future price of the commodities. The practice of leasing in Islamic banks is 
just the same as the leasing techniques adopted by conventional banks. The finance 
provider puts at stake the whole of his capital investment as well as the opportunity cost 
of capital for the whole period until the capital is received back. The safest mode of 
financing in Islamic banking is mark-up. The finance providers bear risk only for the 
period in which a spot sale is to be made and the goods handed over to the client. Mark 
up based financing just requires knowledge of the current prices of the goods to 
determine the financing and return on it. In many cases, if the financial providers do not 
know the appropriate level of return, they use other financial indexes as a benchmark, 
like interest rates. The comparative features of Islamic financing techniques are 
summarised in Exhibit 3.4. 
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Exhibit 3.4 
Comparative Features of Islamic Financing Techniques 
Mudharaba Musharaka Leasing Mark up Bay' al- 
Salam 
Nature of financing Investment Investment Leasing base Combination of Combination of 
base base debt and trading debt and trading 
Role of capital Nil Full control Full control Full control on Nil 
provider in on the use of the use of 
management finance finance 
Cost of capital Uncertain Uncertain Fixed and Fixed and Relatively fixed 
predetermined predetermined and 
predetermined 
Source: Khan(1995) 
B. Other Islamic Financial Activities 
The Islamic financial system consists of several elements. Besides Islamic banks, there 
also exist Islamic insurance companies, securities companies and non-bank investment 
companies, such as trust companies. However, the development of this industry is still 
in its early stages. The existence of insurance companies in the Islamic economic 
environment is relatively new. It has taken a long time for Islamic economics scholars 
to find legitimacy for insurance in Islam. The prime concern of the debate is because of 
the prohibition of gambling in economic activities. Conceptually, Islamic economics 
differentiates between facing business uncertainty and conducting gambling activities; 
even though, when it comes to daily activities, it is difficult to distinguish between the 
two. Having had a long debate concerning its religious legitimacy, Islamic scholars 
have realised that insurance is a basic human need, as accidents and their financial 
consequences, which require insurance cover, are universal (Siddiqi (1986)). 
Accordingly, he states that the basic principle of insurance, from an Islamic point of 
view, is aimed at relieving the deprived and destitute from want and misery so that not a 
single member of society remains un-provided for in his basic needs. Accordingly, a 
new form of Islamic insurance arrangement, called takaful, has been widely accepted by 
religious scholars as well as the financial community. The insurance arrangement is not 
a bilateral contract transferring a known risk, but rather it is a charitable collective 
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enterprise by which Muslims pool resources to aid each other in the event of casualty or 
loss. 
Islamic securities markets have, so far, not achieved significant development in Islamic 
financial markets. Moreover, the development of securities markets in some countries 
has differed from that of other countries. In some countries, like Malaysia and 
Indonesia, financial markets are structured using a debt-like contract that is less 
acceptable to some Islamic financial experts from other parts of the Islamic world, like 
Middle-east countries12. However, attempts to secure convergence in perception have 
never stopped, especially after the establishment of the AAOIFI13. Conceptually, 
financial instruments in Islamic financial markets must be based on profit-and-loss 
sharing (mudaraba or musharaka), which is basically like equity participation. There are 
three common types of equity-based financial instruments. The first type is mudaraba 
funds. The mudaraba funds mechanism creates opportunities for investors to get 
involved in large project financing. This form of investment is considered as a direct 
financing scheme. Funds so pooled can be used to conduct business using lawful 
contracts. Mudaraba funds are financially similar to mutual funds where investors share 
in profits and losses. The second type is the common share. This kind of investment has 
been facilitated by the custom of using conventional companies which issue common 
stock as fund raising vehicles, which may even substitute for Islamic partnerships. Like 
other Islamic investment schemes, share companies cannot be formed for Islamically- 
invalid purposes, such as production of liquor or other harmful goods. The third type is 
the revenue bond. An existing company can issue revenue bonds (muqarada bonds) and 
sell them to investors for the purpose of financing a specific prospective project or 
12 Malaysia operates debt-based instruments (like bonds) in their Islamic financial markets. The most 
crucial thing for the Malaysian Islamic financial expert to determine the Islamicity of those instruments is 
the underlying asset. However, some Islamic financial experts have sought convergence in the use of 
Islamic financial instruments in order to attract Islamic investors from other parts of the Muslim world. 
They suggest the implementation of equity-based financial instruments instead of debt-based financial 
instruments (Rosly and Sanusi, 1999). 
13 The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) is established 
to standardize Islamic banking operations. Through the implementation of the accounting standard 
internationally, Islamic banks might interact easily. This accounting standard might even give a correct 
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activity separable from the company's general activities. The profits of this separate 
activity are split according to an agreed percentage. The contract may provide (non- 
binding) for future retirement of the bonds at their then market price, and often provides 
that a specific percentage of the investor profit share is paid periodically to the holders 
of the bonds to retire their investment in stages. 
The restrictions on the sale of debt for debt prohibit trading activities in mark-up based 
instruments, like murabaha, al salam, ijara and other mark up instruments, in the 
secondary market. The sale of debt for debt is discounted trading on fixed-return 
instruments that yield discounted profit margins. The majority of religious scholars 
suspect that some of these transactions involve usury (riba). However, there is a major 
innovation that has now been accepted that sees securities as representing capital 
interest in mudaraba or musharaka partnerships reflecting not personal partnership 
interest but shares in the ownership of the enterprise. The advantage of this construction 
is that co-owners are allowed to sell their interests to third parties without having to 
seek the permission of other co-owners. This means that the ownership has become 
tradable. This concept can be applied in equity and equity-like product trading. 
3.2.3. Financial risk exposures of Islamic banks 
Islamic banks face slightly different financial risks from western banks. According to 
Beikos (1997) of Capital Intelligence, Cyprus, as also discussed in Errico and 
Farahbaskh (1998), Islamic banks exhibit higher levels of financial risk than 
conventional banks do for a number of reasons. First, as most of the investments of an 
Islamic bank are on a profit-and-loss-sharing basis, the variation of the rate of ultimate 
return to the bank of its investments is greater. This argument is, however, not fully 
acceptable since most Islamic banks, currently, are predominated by non profit-and- 
loss-sharing investments. Second, Islamic banks suffer from liquidity risk since a large 
proportion of their assets is in non-liquid form. Third, Islamic banks are heavily 
understanding about Islamic bank activities to other financial institutions outside Islamic banking systems 
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exposed to the risk of exchange rate movements since they are not allowed to hedge 
their positions. Finally, Islamic banks are more exposed to the risks arising from 
changes in government fiscal and monetary policies than conventional banks as they are 
participating in profit-and-loss-sharing modes with business enterprises. 
Homoud (1994) states that Islamic banks are basically exposed to several financial risks 
i. e. liquidity risk, credit risk, capital structure (solvency) risk and currency risk. He 
states that the composition (profit-and-loss sharing and non profit-and-loss sharing) of 
assets and liabilities of an Islamic bank should be maintained in balance. Obaidullah 
(1998) states a similar classification for financial risks. He also emphasises the role of 
investment deposits that he assumes to be equal with tier-two equity capital, which 
performs a function as financial buffer. 
i. Credit risk 
An effective credit risk management is a critical component of a comprehensive risk 
management and essential to the long-term success of any banking organisation. An 
Islamic bank will be able to maximise its risk-adjusted rate of return by maintaining 
credit risk exposure within acceptable parameters. A sound credit risk management, 
therefore, should be implemented for the entire portfolio as well as for the risks in 
individual credits of transactions. The principles for a sound management of credit risk, 
outlined by the Basle Committee of July 1999, cover some important areas. First, the 
bank should establish an appropriate credit risk environment. The boards of directors 
are required to regularly review credit risk strategy that reflects the banks' risk taking 
capacity. The position of senior management is critical since they are involved directly 
in risk-taking activities. At the operational level, the strategy implemented should cover 
all products and activities that contain credit risk. Second, the bank should operate 
under sound lending procedures. Sound and well-defined lending procedures are 
required since a bank always faces adverse selection problems in choosing between 
potential projects. The sound and well-defined lending procedures should also cover 
and give a chance for mutual interactions between those two different systems. 
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legal lending limits that might prevent a bank from over-concentration in giving loans. 
Legal lending limits might also prevent moral hazard problems caused by over- 
financing to related parties. Third, the bank should maintain an appropriate credit 
administration, measurement and monitoring process. An adequate information system 
plays an important role in supporting such continuous processes. Information lags and 
inaccuracy may result in inappropriate decisions being taken by executing management. 
Forth, the bank should ensure adequate control over credit risk. The credit risk 
management process will ultimately depend on corporate governance. There should be 
good communication between the board of directors, the executing/senior management 
and all parties that are involved in the risk taking process to make sure that the policy 
set has been fully implemented. Finally, the supervisors should always require that 
banks have an effective system in place to identify, measure, monitor and control credit 
risk as part of an overall approach to risk management. As mentioned earlier, Islamic 
banks have two different types of assets: non profit-and-loss sharing-based (fixed- 
claims) and profit-and-loss sharing-based of assets (variable-claims). 
Fixed claim types of assets 
Non profit-and-loss sharing assets of the Islamic banks are basically the same as the 
debt-based assets of western banks except for one thing; according to the sharia 
principles, Islamic banks are not entitled to collect extra payments for late payment14 
(Khan, 1983). In practice, it is difficult to differentiate between incapable debtors and 
capable debtors who are unwilling to pay; hence, an efficient legal system that could 
provide arbitration to solve business disputes is deemed necessary. Some financial 
experts state that since Islamic banks do not have a built in mechanism to prevent delay 
in repayment, Islamic banks are likely to witness a greater incidence of defaults 
15. In 
order to overcome this complication, there have been several sharia-approved ways to 
minimise the risk of default, such as holding responsible a financially-capable debtor 
14 It is mandated in the sharia law to free the indigent debtors from indebtedness. Delinquency caused by 
explainable reasons cannot be penalized. 
15 The application of interest in giving loans can be viewed as a built in incentive for the borrowers to 
repay the loans as soon as they can since delaying repayments means paying additional costs. 
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who delays payment of the loan without any reasonable explanation, and to compensate 
the lender for any loss resulting from late payment. In addition, Islamic banks are 
allowed to hold collateral to minimise moral hazard. 
Technically, Islamic banks can benefit from the recent development of credit risk 
assessment techniques by western banks, although Islamic banks seem to require less 
sophisticated technical tools for the assessment of credit risk. The application of some 
statistical tools to assess financial performance, as a matter of fact, has been carried out 
since the early sixties. Numerous studies were devoted to assessing one's ability to 
combine publicly-available data with statistical classification techniques in order to 
predict business failure. In his early studies (Altman with his Zeta analysis, 1968) has 
provided stimulus to other papers. There have been myriad studies about business 
failure classification models done in 21 countries. Altman and Narayanan (1996) 
explain that business failure identification and early warnings of impending financial 
crisis are very important. Countries throughout the world have been concerned with 
individual entity performance assessment. Some recent statistical techniques, such as 
multiple discriminant analysis, logit analysis, probit analysis, and bayesian discriminant 
analysis, have been applied to construct a failure classification model. Fisher Black and 
Myron Scholes and, subsequently, Robert Merton have introduced a different approach 
to predicting the future prospects of a firm by using market values, which evolve 
randomly through time. The basic assumption of this approach is that when the value of 
the firm falls so low that the firm's assets are worth less than its financial obligations, 
default occurs. These statistical approaches would help the Islamic banks and their 
supervisors in assessing the quality of the loaned funds16 
16 Banking regulation also requires the banks to classify their earning assets into five categories 
depending on the probability of default. The higher the probability of default of the bank assets, the more 
the bank should provide for by way of allowances for earning asset losses. The assessment process 
includes some determining factors, such as business prospects, financial condition and repayment 
capacity. Asset qualities are usually classified as `current', `non-current', `doubtful' and `loss'. The 
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Variable types of assets 
In the real world, real asset values might be higher or lower than expected, or even 
negative. In the case where the return is negative, the bank cannot claim even for the 
principal amount. The expected return of a project depends on internal factors and 
external factors. Internal factors relate the expected return to individual performance 
(i. e. effort and skill). External factors relate the expected return to the performance of 
the industry in which the funds are invested. Accurate information that performs a 
function as benchmarks can reduce the risk of the adverse selection problem. Often, the 
financing is given to extend businesses by lending the borrowers additional working 
capital. Since the business is already established, the banks find it difficult to obtain a 
`fair' profit sharing index. Alternatively, Islamic banks use a benchmark to measure the 
real productivity and compare it with its internal rate of return. Some Islamic banks use 
industry indexes and some of them use interest rates to determine a desired level of 
income share. 
ii. Market risk 
Islamic banks are exposed to market risks since they are involved in trading activities. 
According to Obaidullah (1999), market risks in Islamic banks can be grouped into 
three major categories i. e. equity price risk, currency risk and commodity risk. 
Equity price risk 
Islamic banks are able to invest their funds in terms of financial participation in a 
variety of companies through stock buying in the capital market or direct placements. 
Direct placements - As reviewed earlier, Islamic banks, through profit-and-loss-sharing 
scheme, are able to conduct equity based financing, either in particular projects or in the 
companies. In direct placement schemes, the Islamic banks expect future growth of net 
asset value that is usually realised in terms of dividend payments. Market forces, in this 
case, do not directly affect the value of investments. Equity market investments - 
Conducting investment activities through the capital market requires a higher level of 
classification does not only depend on the delinquency period, but also on other aspects that may indicate 
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skill by Islamic banks since the value of investments (value of the firm) is not only 
affected by the financial performance of the companies themselves but also by market 
sentiment, as illustrated in Exhibit 3.5. There are two kinds of motivation for 
conducting stock trading activities. Pure investors expect monetary surplus from 
dividend payments, whilst pure speculators expect monetary surplus from capital gains. 
Islamic banks should recognise the most dominant market forces and other market 
characteristics that will potentially affect their investments17. In a capital market that has 
just reached an emerging stage (assumed to be an imperfect market), one cannot expect 
stable stock market prices. Therefore, in some countries, the banks are not allowed to 
conduct transactions in the stock market. 
Exhibit 3.5 
Determining aspects for investments in a stock market 
Net Asset Market 
Value Perception 
Supply 
and demand 
Dividend -- 
J Expected Stock rice cash inflow price 
Investor Speculator 
the `true' quality of the loan. 
The value of investments is affected by dividend payments 
aI 
dt and future stock prices -I dz. 
at az 
The dynamic form for investment value is given by dI = aI - dt + aI - dz . In fact, the future stock at az 
price is affected by expected future dividend payments and other market forces; hence, z is a function of 
earning (E) and exogenous market forces or zf (E, M) . The investment value then becomes 
dI = 
aI 
dt + 
aI 
dE + 
aI 
dM 
. at aE am 
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Currency risk 
Islamic banks, which are active in facilitating international trade and business activities, 
are exposed to currency risk. The currency risk results from foreign exchange 
transactions and all forms of investments denominated in foreign currencies, including 
overseas investments. The more volatile the exchange rate, the higher the level of risk 
the currency trading or overseas investment will pose. Currency risk that results from 
currency trading activities includes the net spot position, irrecoverable guarantees and 
any other item representing a profit and loss in foreign currency. 
However, currency transactions on a deferred basis are not permissible according to the 
majority of sharia scholars. Currency trading wherever undertaken by an Islamic bank is 
on a spot basis. Therefore, limiting currency risk is much more difficult for Islamic 
investors than for their non-Islamic counterpart, since risk-curbing measures that are 
commonly used in conventional finance theoretically are not available to Islamic 
investors. Some Islamic financial experts set forth the needs for hedging instruments in 
economic transactions. They argue that Islamic banks are allowed to provide hedging 
instruments as long as those instruments are accompanied by real underlying 
transactions (Khan and Chapra, 2000). Islamic banks do not require a sophisticated 
market risk assessment tool since Islamic banks are not allowed to generate profit from 
recently-developed derivative instruments. 
Commodity price risk 
Islamic banks are also exposed to (commodity) price risk. In trading activities, profits 
generated are made through agreements between the bank and customers. Profits are 
generated from the difference between buying prices and predicted selling prices, for 
example salam financing. The salam concept is usually used to finance agricultural 
production activities, like rice growing activities, wheat, etc. The payment is settled at 
the beginning of the contract, which is applied for a short-term period, ranging from 2 to 
6 months. 
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iii. Liquidity risk 
As reviewed earlier, Islamic banks have two different types of deposits i. e. 
savings/current accounts and investment accounts. Different proportions of each type of 
deposit will pose different levels of liquidity risk. The analysis of a fractional reserve 
banking system may be beneficial in explaining how the optimal allocations are 
different when the objective is to reduce the risk of future bank runs' 8. As Islamic banks 
offer two different schemes of investment, savings/current accounts depositors are 
allowed to withdraw their funds at any time they like, while investment account 
depositors have to fulfil the term of investment agreed upon. In the first case, let us 
assume that the liabilities side of an Islamic bank is dominated by savings/current 
accounts. The liquidity risk arises as the depositors try to maximise their consumption 
utility by either withdrawing their funds earlier or laterl9. Stability will be achieved only 
if the expected return from future consumption is greater than present consumption 
( pR >_ 1). p is a minimum expected return, which is represented as a discount factor, 
whilst R represents the expected return. An Islamic bank may have two types of 
depositors. The first type of depositor is a common depositor, who always tries to 
maximise returns and ignores whether the investment is religiously-prohibited or 
permitted. A common depositor who chooses an Islamic bank when the return for 
depositors given by the Islamic bank is higher than for a conventional bank will 
benchmark the deposit rate of conventional banks as his minimum expected return. 
Once the return by the Islamic bank goes lower than the deposit rate, the opportunity 
18 Diamond and Dybvig (1987) have inspired a simple model of liquidity insurance in a depository 
institution. The analysis is, however, important in explaining optimal allocation of resources in which 
banks collect the endowments of deposits (deposits) and invest a fraction of them in long term 
investments whilst the banks offer depositors the possibility of withdrawal on demand. 
19 Case 1: Liabilities are dominated by savings/current accounts 
The depositors will maximise his consumption utility (U) : 
max U= it, u(C, ) + p2r2u(C2 ) 
Cl, C2 ,J 
subject to : 'z, C, =I -I 
; T2 C2 =RI 
as the expected consumption (2r, C, and 7r, C2) at period 1 and 2 respectively. 7t, and iz2 represent the 
probability of taking action in period 1 and period 2. 
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cost rises (pR < 1); therefore, no optimal allocation exists. The common depositors, in 
that condition, are impatient to withdraw their funds earlier. On the contrary, with a 
religious-driven depositor, his choices are constrained by religious rulings. His 
minimum expected return may be at zero since he is prohibited from dealing with 
interest-based banks. He will place his funds with Islamic banks as long as the expected 
return is not negative. This indicates the importance of maintaining compliance with 
sharia rules by Islamic banks. If an Islamic bank is suspected of having a low level of 
compliance with the sharia rules, it may trigger religious-driven depositors (assumed 
patient depositors) to pull their funds out of the banks. 
In the second case, let us assume that the liabilities side of an Islamic bank is dominated 
by investment accounts which are based on profit-and-loss sharing and represents 
medium term contracts. In the condition where the deposit claims are tradable among 
the investors, investment-based deposits have the potential to promote optimal resource 
allocation without causing potential instability in the banking system20. Therefore, the 
more the investment deposits dominate the Islamic bank liabilities, the more flexible the 
Islamic banks manage their liquidity schedule. Islamic banks have few financial sources 
to fulfil their liquidity needs. The prohibition on holding debt instruments has made 
Islamic banks totally reliant on their ability to solve their liquidity mismatch. The 
absence of secondary markets exacerbates liquidity risk in the Islamic financial sector. 
In most countries that operate Islamic banks, liquidity instruments from central banks 
are not even provided since debt based instruments are not allowed. Inter-bank money 
market instruments should also be based on profit and loss sharing. 
20 Case 2: Liabilities are dominated by investment accounts 
In Jacklin (1987), as discussed in Freixas and Roschet (1995), the price equilibrium is determined by the 
d 
dividend distribution, 2z, = ? C2 -. d and p represent dividend payment and price of the participation 
p 
unit. In the analysis, the participation units are assumed marketable. The expected consumption level will 
d R(1-d) 
be C1 =- and C, This equilibrium leads to a similar budget constraint faced by debt- 
)TI ; T' 
C based contracts arranged by debt-based depository institutions: ; z1 C1 + 7z, 2 =1. 
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Islamic banks solve their liquidity needs in a number of ways. First, Islamic banks 
minimise maturity gaps between their assets and liabilities. Second, Islamic banks may 
invest in marketable and sharia-approved equity based investment securities, like 
stocks, mudaraba-bonds and mudaraba security funds. Third, in some countries, Islamic 
banks may invest in debt-like financial securities to fulfil their liquidity needs21. 
iv. Operational risk 
As intermediary institutions, Islamic banks face the same types of operational risk as 
conventional banks. Breakdowns in internal controls and corporate governance might 
occur that could lead to financial losses through errors, fraud, or failures to perform in a 
timely manner. Other aspects of operational risk include major failure of information 
technology systems or events, such as major fires or other disasters. 
v. Legal risk 
By definition, an Islamic bank is a bank that voluntarily complies with Islamic law 
besides complying with local financial and banking regulation. Since Islamic banks 
have to comply with sharia principles, they should be sure that the uses of the funds will 
not contradict sharia principles, such as liquor production, casino, prostitution, etc. If 
the sharia board or the bank finds moral misuse of the funding, Islamic banks have to 
withdraw their funds. This (morally) legal constraint may produce potential disputes 
since, in practice, there may be some cases that are difficult to judge whether those 
activities are in conformity with sharia principles or not. In order to solve this problem, 
in most countries, the national sharia boards establish general guidance for the Islamic 
conduct of business (Fatawa). Moreover, the attempts to achieve international 
convergence in sharia-approved activities within Islamic banks has been started by 
formulating international guidelines that have been circulated and approved by Islamic 
banks around the world. 
21 Khan and Chapra (2000) also mention the current development in providing Islamic banks liquidity 
support. It includes the possibility of formalizing the inter-Islamic bank money market and lender of the 
last resort facilities for Islamic banks. 
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More generally, the financial risks of Islamic banks as compared to conventional banks 
are summarised in Exhibit 3.6. As illustrated, there are three additional areas (the 
shaded areas) that should be of concern in supervising Islamic banks i. e. assessing 
income risk, the legal risk relating to the compliance with sharia rules, and capital 
structure risk. 
Exhibit 3.6 
A comparison of financial risks facing conventional and Islamic banks 
Type of financial risk Items to be concerned with 
Western banks Islamic banks 
1 Credit risk Default value at risk Default value at risk 
Income expectation for sharing- 
based assets 
2 Market risk Volatility of market variables Volatility of market variables 
3 Liquidity risk Maturity mismatches and 
alternative funding sources 
Maturity mismatches and alternative 
funding sources 
4 Operational risk Hardware/system problems and 
fraud 
Hardware/system problems and fraud 
5 Legal risk Compliance with local legal 
framework 
Compliance with local legal 
framework 
Compliance with sharia rules 
6 Capital structure Level of capitalisation Level of capitalisation 
(solvency risk) Composition of capital, including 
investment deposits 
3.3. The Current Regulatory Framework for Islamic Banks 
3.3.1. Regulatory concepts 
Religious roots (flqh) 
Administration/regulation is recognised in the Arabic word `yudabbiru', which has 
several meanings22. The word means directing, conducting, regulating and optimising. 
According to sharia, the regulation is implemented as a delegation of authority from the 
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public to improve trust and confidence, which should be conducted in accordance with 
the sharia principles (Al-Buraey, 1990). The objectives of the regulation are providing 
justice and delivering prosperity (social equity) and efficiency. The regulation is 
conducted as a continual process to find any possible improvements according to the 
concept of maslaha, as indicated in Exhibit 3.7. The analysis of possible improvements 
should involve all market participants. 
Exhibit 3.7 
The figh concept of regulation 
of 
Possibility 
for 
improvement 
Research and 
consultation with 
all market participal 
Enforcement 
and punishment 
Condition 
Coverage of Regulation 
As reviewed earlier, Islamic banks exist to deliver religiously-approved financial 
services. An Islamic banking system should have financial soundness and religious 
(sharia) compliance. Khan and Chapra (2000) state the three reasons why Islamic banks 
need a set of prudential regulations. First, Islamic banking regulations should ensure the 
sustainable systemic stability of the banking system, which can positively contribute to 
economic developments. In an absence of sound systemic regulation, the failure of a 
corporation may destabilize the whole banking system. Once the depositors lose their 
confidence in the banking system, bank runs may possibly happen. The other reason for 
22 It can be found in the Holy Qur'an: X: 3, X: 31, XIII: 2 and XXXII: 5. 
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systemic crises is because the assets and liabilities of the banks are interconnected. A 
liquidation process without proper management may damage the whole payment 
system. Second, there is a need to ensure an adequate level of compliance with the 
sharia rules23. Third, in a global financial system, Islamic banks should consider their 
international acceptance by the other internationally-operating financial institutions. A 
close co-operation among the Islamic banks and other conventional financial institution 
will be very beneficial to the development of Islamic banks themselves. Therefore, 
without loosing its conceptual distinctions, Islamic banks need a set of banking 
regulations that promotes soundness and stability in the long run. 
The idea of establishing sound business practices through a sound auditing and control 
process is implicitly stated in some verses of the Qur'an. There are at least three basic 
principles that can be used as the basis of the supervisory process. First, the 
encouragement of transparency in any aspect of business24. As reviewed earlier, 
transparency plays an important role in promoting prudent behaviour by the banks, 
prudential banking practices and, ultimately, a sound banking system. Asymmetric 
information existing between market players reduces market efficiency and may 
possibly create moral hazard within the system. This idea is, however, similar with 
current supervisory trends that emphasises a higher level of transparency. This includes 
the requirements for minimum disclosures, risk assessment and a fair asset valuation 
process, and other informational banking regulations. Second, the encouragement of fair 
treatment and competence25. Fair treatment will basically support a sound market 
mechanism. Excessive protection of incompetent market players will ultimately reduce 
23 There are basically three operational distinctions between Islamic and western banks as a result of the 
adoption of religious concepts. First, there are restrictions on Islamic banks investing their funds only in 
religiously approved investments. Second, the prohibition of speculation (gharar) has prevented Islamic 
banks from dealing with speculative short term investments, such as the trading of derivative instruments. 
Third, the prohibition of usury in transactions makes the financial structure of the Islamic banks distinct 
from the western banks'. 
24 (2: 147) `The truth is from thy Lord So be not at all in doubt. ' (49: 6) `0 ye who believe! If a wicked 
person comes To you with any news, Ascertain the truth, lest Ye harm people unwittingly, and afterwards 
become Full of repentance for What ye have done. ' 
2' (28: 26) `Hire him! For the best (man) that thou canst hire is strong, the trustworthy. ' 
88 
market efficiency and market competitiveness in the long run. Third, the encouragement 
of regulation enforcement26. 
Exhibit 3.8 
General objectives of a supervisory framework for Islamic banks 
Basic 
concept 
Responsible 
institution 
Objectives of 
supervision 
Ultimate 
objective 
Fiduciary and 
agency roles 
Banking 
supervisory body 
Monitoring for 
compliance with 
prudential banking 
regulations 
Principles underlying 
Islamic Finance 
Sharia 
supervisory body 
Monitoring for 
compliance with 
sharia rules 
A sound Islamic banking system 
The enforcement of regulation is one important aspect of establishing a sound banking 
system. Goodhart et. al. (1999) report that some banking problems in some countries are 
caused by weak regulation enforcement. Islamic teaching contains values that are not in 
conflict with modern banking supervisory principles. It may even strengthen the 
argument that, without losing their identities, the banking supervisory authorities that 
operate Islamic banks can benefit from recent developments in the western banking 
supervisory framework27. The general framework for a supervisory process for Islamic 
banks is shown in Exhibit 3.8. 
26 (5: 8) '0 ye who believe! Stand out firmly For Allah, as witnesses To fair dealing, and let not The 
hatred of others To you make you swerve To wrong and depart from Justice. Be just: that is Next to Piety: 
and fear Allah. For Allah is well-acquainted With all that ye do. ' 
27 The core principles for effective banking supervision, outlined by the Basle Committee, contain the 
general Islamic norms. Fundamental precepts, as reported by Hall (1997), cover several ideas. First, it is 
aimed at maintaining confidence in the financial system. Second, it encourages market disciplines and 
enhances market transparency and surveillance. Third, it gives the supervisory operational independence, 
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The prudential regulations for Islamic banks should be reviewed continuously since 
there are always differences between the concepts and applications. Errico and 
Farahbaksh (1998) report that the current practices of Islamic banks diverge from the 
original concepts in several important ways. First, in order to gain public confidence 
and especially to avoid bank runs, the capital value guarantee is implicitly or even 
explicitly written in the laws and regulations. Second, in the highly competitive and 
global financial system, Islamic banks have to compete with more competitive and 
long-established conventional banks. 
The religious aspect is not the only factor attracting investors; Islamic banks have to 
consider the economic reasons. Therefore, in some cases, the profit-loss sharing-concept 
is not strictly applied. Some Islamic banks guarantee the minimum expected return for 
investors, hence the investors are not dealing purely with investment risk. Third, most 
of the financing activities are carried out through non profit-and-loss sharing modes. 
Fourth, discretion with regard to collateral is common in financing, even in the profit- 
and-loss-sharing modes of financing. These facts show how current Islamic banking 
practices have moved away from the paradigm version. Moreover, the lack of risk 
assessment techniques for the sharing modes has made most Islamic banks risk averse. 
They choose non-sharing modes rather than sharing modes in their major investment 
activities. 
The more Islamic banking practice diverges from the `perfect' paradigm, the more it 
loses its distinctive features and tends to resemble conventional banking. Lastly, the 
authors show how the shifting paradigm of Islamic banking practices affects the focus 
of Islamic banking supervision (see Exhibit 3.9). 
and the means and power to conduct both on-and off-site supervision and enforce their decisions. Fourth, 
it ensures that the financial risks are adequately managed. Finally, it emphasizes close co-operation with 
other supervisors where the operations of the banks cross national boundaries. 
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Exhibit 3.9 
Shift in focus of Islamic banking supervision 
Issue Paradigm Version of Islamic Banking in 
Islamic Banking Practice 
Robustness to absorb external shocks Higher Lower 
1. Liquidity risk Less likely More likely 
2. Insolvency risk Less likely More likely 
Relative importance of: 
Assessment and management of 
operational risks: 
1. Reliance on appropriate procedures 
and adequate infrastructure Higher Lower 
2. Reliance on human technical 
expertise Higher Lower 
Prudential standards Relevant; to be assessed on a Crucial 
bank-by-bank and country-by 
country basis 
Information disclosure requirements Higher Lower 
Source: Enrico and Farahbaksh (1998) 
3.3.2. Regulations concerning sharia compliance 
Islamic banks should always synchronise their financial activities with the religious 
guidance, which is outlined in the opinion of jurists on points of law. These opinions are 
usually called fatwa. These fatwas are issued by individuals or religious bodies, which 
are established by the governments. A fatwa, as a matter of fact, is a technical 
interpretation of religious law, which can be used in financial activities and other daily 
activities28. Fatwas may have operational implication for Islamic banks. Islamic banks, 
for instance, need accounting standards that are in accordance with the fatwas29. In 
1991, The AAOIFI, which was formerly known as the Financial Accounting 
Organisation for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions, was established. The main 
purpose of its establishment was to review and to develop accounting and auditing 
standards for Islamic financial institutions that are internationally recognised in order to 
28 Every Muslim country may still have different sets of fatwa regulating Islamic banks although steps 
towards convergence are still being pursued. 
29 The information which is provided by the accounting standard includes compliance with Islamic rules 
and social responsibilities, like the allocation of charity funds (zakah funds). Financially, the accounting 
reports can also be used to ensure the ability of an Islamic bank to cover its financial risks. 
91 
CHAPTER ISLAMIC BANKING 
assist users of these reports in making decisions. An Islamic bank usually has a sharia 
supervisory board (SSB) to ensure the accordance of banking products, allocation of 
investments and banking management with Islamic principles. The SSB provides a 
report about the level of compliance with sharia rules together with the bank's annual 
report. 
3.3.3. Regulations concerning financial soundness 
A. Islamic banking and the Basle Committee's core principles for effective banking 
supervision 
The `Core Principles for effective banking supervision' were designed as the first 
attempt by the Basle Committee to present a comprehensive document on good 
supervisory practice. The comprehensiveness of the Principles that underpins them 
makes them applicable equally to industrialised countries, emerging markets and 
economies in transition. The approach to banking supervision adopted by the Basle 
Committee represents a the response to the rapid evolution of the financial market 
where the old supervisory techniques have become inadequate as a means of monitoring 
the performance of a bank. Some qualitative aspects, such as the quality of corporate 
governance, risk management and internal controls, are now emphasised more in 
banking supervision. 
Islamic banking systems, in fact, are facing a similar situation. The Islamic banking 
supervisors are mandated to understand about the nature of the Islamic banking 
business. These regulators can benefit from recent developments of in the western 
banking supervisory framework. Most of the principles are still relevant to the 
promotion of best practice in an Islamic banking regulator framework. Through a deep 
understanding of the nature of the Islamic banking business and the current western 
banking supervisory framework, Islamic banking regulators will be able to develop a 
sound banking system without losing its system's own distinction. In Exhibit 3.10, we 
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can see the relevance of the core principles for effective banking supervision to best 
practice in Islamic banking supervision. 
Exhibit 3.10 
The relevance of the core principles for effective banking supervision outlined by the Basle 
Committee to Islamic banking supervision 
Headings of the 
Core Principles for The Relevance of the Principles to Islamic Banking Supervision 
Effective Banking 
Supervision 
1 Preconditions for Islamic banking systems should also have a sound legal framework for 
effective banking banking supervision that ensures the supervisory process can be 
supervision conducted effectively. Islamic banking systems need other additional 
supervisory standards i. e. sharia standard. 
2 Licensing and The licensing process can be viewed as the first stage in establishing a 
structure sound Islamic banking system. A sound licensing process can prevent 
the banking system from being crowded by short-sighted players. 
3 Prudential regulations Islamic banking operations need different and unsuitable banking 
and requirements regulations and requirements. The prudential regulations and 
requirements need to adopt some operational differences, such as the 
redefinition of the capital adequacy requirement since the banks have 
different capital structures, and a proper measure of the quality of Profit- 
and-loss-sharing assets to assess the risk of the investments. 
The new approach to Islamic banking regulation should reflect the risk 
taking capacity of an Islamic bank in order to ensure the sustainability of 
its operations. 
4 Methods of ongoing The supervisors must ensure that they have the means and powers to 
banking supervision gather information, both on- and off-site, and the authority to enforce 
their decisions. 
5 Information Information requirements are one of the key factors in Islamic banking 
requirements operations. The more symmetric the information shared between the 
market participants, the more it encourages the environment to apply the 
perfect paradigm of Islamic banking. 
6 Formal powers of As part of a sound legal framework, the Islamic banking supervisors 
supervisors should be equipped with adequate power to regulate. 
7 Cross-border banking In a global financial market, Islamic-banking regulators should think 
about the compatibility of regulatory setting. Since the Islamic banks are 
expected to facilitate international trade and businesses, the quality of the 
banking operations as well as the supervision has to meet international 
standards. 
In practice, the Basle principles for effective banking supervision have been adopted by 
most Islamic banking regulators, even if those Islamic banking systems have separate 
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Islamic banking laws (see Exhibit 3.11). In the absence of properly-designed banking 
regulatory instruments, most Islamic banking regulators adopt the western regulatory 
standards (such as the CAMEL rating system to measure the level of soundness of 
banking operations), the Basle capital adequacy standard, sound asset valuation 
techniques, and other prudential measures. However, there is a need to have a properly 
designed banking regulation for Islamic banks that accommodates the operational 
differences. Some technical regulations cannot be directly applied because Islamic 
banks have different type of nature of contract. 
Exhibit 3.11 
The adoption of banking standards by Islamic banking regulators 
Characteristics of the banking system 
Countries Types of banking 
system 
The existence of 
separated 
Islamic bank law 
The existence of 
national sharia 
board 
Adoption of 
Basle Accord 
Bahrain Dual No Yes Yes 
Gambia Dual Yes Yes Not clear 
Indonesia Dual No Yes Yes 
Iran Single Yes Yes Yes 
Jordan Dual Yes Yes Yes 
Kuwait Dual Yes Yes Yes 
Malaysia Dual Yes Yes Yes 
Pakistan Dual*) Yes No Yes 
Qatar Dual No Yes Yes 
Sudan Single Yes Yes Not clear 
Turkey Dual No Yes Yes 
UAE Dual Yes Yes Yes 
Yemen Dual Yes Yes Not clear 
Source: Khan and Chapra (2000), compiled 
*) The Islamization of the financial system in Pakistan has been postponed 
Islamic banks, technically, perform fiduciary and agency roles. A new concept of 
capital regulation is required to accommodate the differences. Nevertheless, other 
supporting factors (i. e. sound asset valuation and risk assessment standards, sound 
market discipline and supervisory review) are still required to strengthen the 
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supervisory process30. In the presence of sharing-based assets, the supervisors should be 
fully equipped with appropriate actuarial skills to fairly assess the quality of Islamic 
banks' assets. 
Exhibit 3.12 
A Comparison of early warning systems 
Aspects Western banks Islamic banks 
Capital Objective: to enhance the banks' Objective: to enhance the banks' fiduciary 
fiduciary role and agency roles 
The calculation of capital adequacy The calculation of capital adequacy should be 
should be supported by : supported by : 
- Sound asset valuation and risk - Sound asset valuation and risk assessment 
assessment - Sound market discipline and standards for 
- Sound market discipline and supervisory review. 
standards for supervisory review. 
Asset quality Asset quality assessments are Asset quality assessments are conducted to 
conducted to ensure operational ensure the operational sustainability (ex ante). 
sustainability (ex ante). In the presence of sharing-based assets, the 
assessment should be capable of estimating 
the expected returns. 
Management The assessment of management quality The assessment of management quality is 
is conducted to ensure that the bank conducted to ensure that the bank 
management is qualified to run the management is qualified to run the business. 
business. The emphasis of modern The emphasis of modern banking supervision 
banking supervision is to ensure that is to ensure that the bank has a sound financial 
the bank has a sound financial risk risk management system. One aspect that is 
management system. also important for Islamic banks is the 
knowledge of sharia aspects. 
Earning The assessment of earning is conducted The assessment of earning is conducted to 
to evaluate financial performance (ex evaluate financial performance (ex post) 
post). 
Liquidity The assessment of liquidity is The assessment of liquidity is conducted to 
conducted to evaluate the capability of evaluate the capability of prompt repayment. 
prompt repayment. 
In Islamic banking operations, the sharia aspects are also important. The regulators 
should posses appropriate managerial skills and adequate knowledge of the sharia. 
Although the knowledge of the sharia is not technical, and will not affect the financial 
30 The second and the third pillars of the new capital accord contained in the Basel Committee's 
consultative paper issued in April 2001. 
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performance of the banks directly, compliance with the sharia principles will potentially 
affect the confidence of religious depositors who want to place their funds in the Islamic 
banks because of religious motives. Exhibit 3.12 shows a comparison of the partly 
objectives of early warning system used for Islamic banks and western banks. 
The relationship between banks and the monetary authority 
The regulation of daily banking operations cannot be separated from the policy for 
economic development. It was mentioned earlier that the main objective of banking 
regulation is to assist in the fulfilment of macroeconomic targets. Generally, the 
relationship between the banking system and the monetary authority contains two 
elements. First, the monetary authority uses banks as channels through which to control 
money stock growth in order to achieve monetary objectives using several monetary 
instruments (such as reserve requirements and open market operation31). Unfortunately, 
these instruments work through interest bases, which is unacceptable under Islamic 
financial principles. Thus, the monetary authority cannot use Islamic banks as channels 
through which it can pursue monetary targets. Secondly, in a severe market liquidity 
shortage, the central bank acts as a lender of last resort for banks to overcome their 
liquidity mismatch. This support however, also charging interest rates. Western central 
banks normally determine higher interest rates in order to encourage banks to manage 
their liquidity properly. But, Islamic banks cannot use this facility since central banks 
would not lend to banks without interest-based returns. The absence of a lender of last 
resort facility may be the main reason why Islamic banks tend to keep higher levels of 
liquidity. However, some countries, like Malaysia and Indonesia, have been trying to 
overcome their obstacle by developing some money market instruments for Islamic 
banks that would enable Islamic banks to interact not only among themselves but also 
with their central banks. 
31 Through contraction and expansion mechanism, monetary authority tries to control level of money 
supply that is considered optimal for economic development. Generally the contraction is achieved by 
selling treasury bills while the expansion is achieved by buying commercial papers issued by the banks 
(although the instruments used may differ between countries). The buying and selling activities are 
conducted through the auctions in the money market. 
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B. Current development of Islamic banking regulations 
One aspect, which currently has got attention by the Islamic banking experts, is the new 
approach for capital regulation. The existence of Profit Sharing Investment Accounts 
[PSIA] raises some fundamental issues in calculating the Capital Adequacy Ratio 
[CAR] for an Islamic bank. The basic issue surrounds the possibility of including PSIA 
as a component of capital because they have a risk-absorbing capability. In this respect, 
the AAOIFI's Discussion Memorandum on the Calculation of the Capital Adequacy 
Ratio for Islamic Banks [issued in January 1998] is relevant. This document tries to 
design a capital adequacy framework for Islamic banks within the Basel's capital 
adequacy framework. Following this, the AAOIFI issued the Statement on the Purpose 
and Calculation of the Capital Adequacy Ratio for Islamic Banks in March 1999. 
According to this statement, Islamic banks' own capital is exposed to normal 
commercial risk, fiduciary risk and displaced commercial risk32, implying that these 
types of risk should underlie the design of the capital regulations. It proposes three 
things. First, that there should be no inclusion of PSIA in the risk bearing capital33 
Second, that all assets financed by debt-based liabilities and own-capital should be 
included in the denominator of the CAR. And, third, 50% of PSIA -financed assets 
should be included in the denominator of the CAR. The last measure is needed to cover 
34 possible losses arising from misconduct or negligence in investment activities. Thus: 
CAR = oc (3.1) WQC+L (OC + L) + WPSfA , (0.5 * PSIAu ) 
32 Displaced commercial risk expresses a possibility that depositors will withdraw their funds if the return 
given to the depositors is lower than the other banks. Some Islamic banks give minimum guaranteed 
return to depositors although it is prohibited by the sharia. 
33 The statement does not distinguish between PSIAU and PSIAR . 34 If the bank management acts in breach of the investment contract, or is guilty of misconduct or 
negligence in the management of the investors' funds, then the bank may be legally liable in respect of 
losses sustained on those funds (AAOIFI, 1999). 
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where OC35 is the bank's own capital; L36 represents its non-PLS-based deposits; Woc+L 
represents the average risk weight for assets financed by OC and L; and 
WPSIA 
represents the average risk weight for assets financed by PSIA. Like the Basel 
standards, the AAOIFI standard requires the CAR to be at least 8%. 
Khan and Chapra (2000) suggest an adoption of separated capital adequacy standards 
for demand deposits and investment deposits. They argue that the separation of capital 
requirements will enhance comparability, transparency, market discipline, depositor 
protection and systemic stability. Furthermore, they mention the possibility of either 
keeping the demand deposits in trading book or pooling the investment deposits in the 
securities subsidiary. 
3.4. Current Developments in Islamic Banking 
3.4.1. Some evidence for Islamic banking and finance internationally 
The Islamic banking industry has been growing rapidly. The industry continues to gain 
confidence from Muslim society. It is indicated by the growth of the funds under the 
Islamic banks' management (Exhibit 3.13). Most investors are located in the Middle 
East region that accounts for almost 60% of the funds. The Middle East region is also 
dominant in terms of the individual asset size of the banks (Exhibit 3.14). The level of 
variability in asset size is given in Exhibit 3.15. 
35 The Islamic bank's own capital is calculated according to the Basel methodology and comprises two 
tiers: Tier 1 and Tier 2. This basic calculation has been adopted by the AAOIFI's Financial Accounting 
Standard (No 11: Provision and Reserves). 
3" The AAOIFI uses L to include all other (non-PLS-based) deposits. From now we use SA to express all 
other non-PLS-based deposits. 
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Exhibit 3.13 
Funds under management 
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Sources: Directory of Islamic Banks and Financial 
Institution (1997) 
Exhibit 3.14 
Funds managed by Islamic Institutions by region 
Region Funds managed 
($ millions) 
Percentage 
South and south east Asia 27,487.7 24.8 
G. C. C. Countries 14,088.5 13.0 
Middle East 69,076.1 59.5 
Africa 730.6 1.1 
Asia 2.0 0.2 
Europe and America 1,139.0 1.4 
Total 112,589.8 100.0 
Source: Directory of Islamic Bank and Financial Institutions (1997) 
Exhibit 3.15 
Distribution of Islamic banks in terms of asset size and regions 
Region 
South 
Asia 
Africa South 
East Asia 
Middle 
East 
GCC USA and 
Europe 
Mean 801.5 48.9 75.2 2,839.1 1,022.5 146.9 
StDev 1,725.7 49.9 242.1 5,435.7 2,295.0 173.3 
(Millions of USU) 
Sources: Compiled from the Directory of Islamic Banks and Financial Institution (1997) 
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Islamic banks in the USA and Europe followed by the G. C. C. countries are the most 
efficient. This is indicated by a high level of Return on Assets (ROA), as seen in Exhibit 
3.16. 
Exhibit 3.16 
Distribution of Islamic banks in terms of profitability (ROA) and regions 
Region 
South 
Asia 
Africa South 
East Asia 
Middle 
East 
GCC USA and 
Europe 
Mean 2.36 1.39 1.50 2.43 4.25 11.19 
StDev 4.41 10.35 14.93 4.31 4.94 9.86 
(Percentages) 
Sources: Compiled from the Directory of Islamic Banks and Financial Institution (1997) 
Contemporary Islamic banks are dominated by murabaha or mark-up modes of 
financing. It is estimated that 70 percent or more of investments by Islamic banks are 
not on a profit and loss sharing basis (Igbal (1998)). The general overview about the use 
of financing in Islamic banks is described in Exhibit 3.1737. However, Dar and Presley 
(1999) report that, in some countries (Switzerland and Iran), sharing modes of financing 
are dominant and they earn a higher level of profitability. 
Exhibit 3.17 
Financing by modes 
Murabaha 37 
Musharaka 19 
Mudaraba 6 
Ij ara 9 
Others 29 
Sources: Compiled from the Directory of Islamic Banks and 
Financial Institution (1997) 
100 
Currently, the financing area of Islamic banks has covered various business sectors, 
dominated by the trade sector (see Exhibit 3.18). 
Exhibit 3.18 
Financing by sectors 
Sector Percentage 
Trading 32 
Agricultural 6 
Industry (manufacturing) 17 
Services 12 
Housing and constructions 16 
Others 16 
Total 100 
Sources: Directory of Islamic Banks and Financial Institution (1997) 
3.4.2. The development of Islamic banking in Indonesia 
The establishment of the first Islamic financial institution in Egypt in 1963 has had a 
significant influence on the development of Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia. 
Since then, many religious scholars have held summits in their efforts to find an 
alternative intermediary system that is free from interest, thereby, meeting the demands 
of the Muslim community for an interest free banking system. Almost 80 percent of 
Indonesia's 200 million population are Muslim. It is thus evident that there are many 
people who do not wish to put their money in the interest-based banking system. 
Therefore, there is a potential hidden supply of resources to be mobilised by the 
government, in order to optimise savings/investment activities. 
The existence of Islamic non-bank financial institutions started well before a formal 
Islamic legal base came into force. In 1968, an Indonesian Muslim trust company and 
37 Profit-and-loss sharing-based products consist of Mudaraba and Musharaka (25 percent of total), while 
non-profit-loss sharing products consist of Murabaha and Ijara (46 percent). The rest 29 percent could be 
a combination of these two concepts of financing. 
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an Afro-Asian Islamic business organisation were founded. In 1980, there were attempts 
to establish an Islamic micro finance scheme called `Bait at Tamwil Teknosa-ITB', 
which was initiated by a university. In 1983, the two largest Islamic organisations in 
Indonesia began to operate Islamic rural banks to facilitate financial activities in their 
communities. 
Exhibit 3.19 
Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia 
Type of Islamic 
financial institutions The number of institutions 
Commercial bank 1 Islamic commercial bank, 6 private owned 
commercial banks and 3 government owned 
commercial banks that operate Islamic branches 
Rural bank 78 Islamic rural banks in operation 
Micro-finance house Approximately 2000 micro-finance houses in rural area 
Insurance company 2 Islamic insurance companies 
Securities company 2 Islamic securities companies 
Source: Bank Indonesia, 1999 
The first Islamic commercial bank came into operation in 1992. In order to facilitate 
demands of the Islamic community, the government has recently included Islamic banks 
as an element in the national banking system in a new banking act. Since the new 
banking act came into force, there are many banks that have shown their interest in 
operating Islamic banks. Some of them are interested in converting all their activities 
onto an Islamic basis and some of them are interested in opening Islamic branches. 
Today, there are various types of Islamic financial institutions that operate in Indonesia 
(see Exhibit 3.19). 
The Islamic banking system is growing at almost 20% annually, in terms of total assets 
(within periods of 1992 to 1999), assisted by the stipulations of the banking act and the 
central bank act which clearly support the development of Islamic banks in Indonesia. 
The number of branches has also increased (see Exhibit 3.18). The government 
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promotes a dual banking system that allows conventional banking and Islamic banking 
to operate side by side. 
Exhibit 3.20 
(a) Total Assets of Islamic Banks 
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The customers are free to choose which system to use. The government, in turn, is in a 
position to provide a sound and efficient banking system. Islamic bank supervisors are 
in a pivotal position to build public confidence through the establishment of a sound 
Islamic banking system. The current application of Islamic banking concepts is still far 
from the `perfect paradigm'. The application of profit-and-loss sharing has shifted to 
revenue sharing, in which the capital providers are more risk averse than the capital 
providers within a profit-and-loss-sharing system. On the liabilities side, all depositors' 
funds are placed in savings deposits that are explicitly guaranteed by the shareholders 
and ultimately by the government (in principal amount)38. 
38 Before 1997, there was no such deposit insurance scheme applied in the Indonesian banking system. 
However, since the banking crisis of 1997, the government has implemented a blanket guarantee to avoid 
deposit runs. The crisis was triggered by a severe fall in the external value of the Indonesian currency 
(Rupiah) and was followed by a deterioration of bank assets caused by a severe and long monetary 
turbulence. Subsequently, there were many banks that became insolvent. Triggered by the liquidation of 
103 
BANKING 
The initial move by the Indonesian banking regulator to properly regulate Islamic banks 
was realised by proposing a new banking act as a legal foundation for the stipulation of 
further technical regulations. The house of representatives of the Republic of Indonesia 
has ratified the new banking act, which has effectively come into force on November 
10,199839. From the elucidation to the Act Number 7 of 1992 concerning banking, as 
amended by the Act of the Republic of Indonesia Number 10 of 1998, it is stated that: 
Meanwhile, the role of a Bank which conducts its operations based on sharia 
principles needs to be increased in order to meet the people's aspirations and 
needs. This Act provides broader opportunity for the public to establish a Bank 
which conduct its operation based on sharia principles, including the opportunity 
for commercial banks to establish a branch office which conducts activities solely 
based on sharia principles. 
Therefore, the operations of an Islamic commercial bank encompass providing 
financing and/or conducting other activities based on sharia principles, in accordance 
with regulations stipulated by the banking supervisory authority40. The new banking act 
also includes general guidance for sound Islamic-banking practices, such as sound 
practices for financing activities and financial participation and the existence of Bank 
Indonesia as the banking supervisory agency. At the moment, the regulator applies the 
same supervisory framework to western banks and Islamic banks. The only thing 
different is the recognition of new instruments that are approved religiously 41 
The existence of Islamic banks in the monetary system has also been regulated in the 
new Act concerning the central bank. In the Act of the Republic of Indonesia number 23 
several commercial banks, depositors had started to pull their funds out of the banking system, which 
resulted in a dramatic economic contraction. 
39 The Act number 7 of 1992 concerning banking, as amended by the Act of the Republic of Indonesia 
number 10 of 1998. 
40 Letter in of Article 6 in the Act of the Republic of Indonesia number 7 of 1992 concerning banking, as 
amended by Act number 10 of 1998. 
4' The new banking act is incorporated into several technical banking regulations concerning capital, asset 
quality, liquidity, management etc. 
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of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia (central bank), the central bank has also prepared a 
monetary control system that can be applied to Islamic banks42. At the same time, the 
central bank also operates the task of lender of the last resort on sharia principles to 
overcome temporary liquidity mismatches in Islamic banks43. The interaction with the 
central bank is important at this moment, especially in the condition where there are just 
a few Islamic banks involved in the Islamic money market. At the early stage of 
development where there was only one Islamic bank in existence, interest based inter- 
bank loans (loaned by conventional banks) was the only choice to overcome temporary 
liquidity mismatches because the central bank did not have any mechanism for lending 
to the Islamic bank. 
3.5. Summary 
Islamic banking is the realisation of a need for religiously-approved financial services 
by Muslim society. The operations are in accordance with religious rulings that 
emphasise three fundamental aspects i. e. the prohibition of usury in all forms of 
transactions, the prevention of gambling/speculative activities, and the restriction of 
investments to permissible investments (halal). Technically, Islamic banks adopt the 
approach of western banks in their operations. However, because of the prohibition of 
usury, Islamic banks collect and place depositors' funds in different ways. Islamic 
banks provide three types of deposits, and leave the choice up to the consumer. Each 
type of deposit requires a different level of commitment for investment. On the assets 
side, Islamic banks employ profit-and-loss sharing schemes (i. e. mudaraba and 
musharaka) and non profit-and-loss sharing schemes (i. e. murabaha, ijara and salam). 
42 Point (2), Article 10, Chapter IV of Act of the Republic of Indonesia Number 23 of 1999 concerning 
Bank Indonesia. The development of Islamic banking in Indonesia has shown a high growth rate, hence 
the government considers it important to include Islamic banks in monetary operations. 
43 Article 11 Chapter IV Act of the republic of Indonesia Number 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia. 
Before the legal base for Islamic banks came into force, Islamic banks (there was only one Islamic banks 
in operation) was forced to interact with other conventional banks on an interest basis since there were not 
any supporting financial instruments established for Islamic banks. However, since the stipulation of the 
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The desire of the Muslim community to have their own financial system followed by 
the rapid development of Islamic financial institutions poses challenges for the banking 
regulatory and supervisory authorities, which are required to establish a sound and 
efficient Islamic banking system. In practice, Islamic banks are not the only players in 
the Islamic financial system. There also exist other non-bank financial institutions, such 
as Islamic insurance companies, and Islamic trust companies. The Islamic banks exist to 
provide financially sound and religiously-approved financial services. The regulatory 
framework for Islamic banks should cover financial and religious aspects (sharia 
compliance), in order to promote a sound Islamic banking system. 
Current banking supervisors have used a western banking framework to supervise 
Islamic banks. In the absence of comprehensive Islamic banking regulations, the 
Indonesian banking regulator adopts western-style banking regulation to supervise 
Islamic banks. Although most regulatory concepts are relevant, the regulators should be 
able to recognise operational differences. First, Islamic banks perform agency role and 
fiduciary roles at the same time. The regulations adopted should be able to enhance both 
roles. This highlights the importance of an appropriate capital regulation since an 
Islamic bank has a different nature of contract to a western bank. There have been 
attempts to design, partially, appropriate regulations for Islamic banks, including capital 
regulation. However, the current capital regulation for Islamic banks does not pose 
sufficient attention to the agency role. Second, the regulations used should ensure sharia 
compliance. A low level of compliance with the sharia principles may ultimately erode 
public confidence in the banking system. 
The development of Islamic banks internationally has also inspired the development of 
Islamic banks in Indonesia. The value of the total assets of Islamic banks operating in 
Indonesia has been growing at almost 20 percent annually in recent years. In order to 
fulfil the aspirations of the Muslim community, the Indonesian House of 
Representatives has ratified a new banking system that mentions explicitly the existence 
new banking act, the banking supervisory authority has designed some financial instruments that enable 
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of Islamic banks in the Indonesian banking system. The new banking act can be viewed 
as a legal foundation for the stipulations of further technical Islamic banking 
regulations. 
Islamic banks to interact with each other and to interact with the monetary authority in an Islamic way. 
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Appendix 3. A 
Summary of prudential regulations applied to Islamic banks in Indonesia 
Capital adequacy requirements44 
Islamic banks are required to comply with capital regulations that are applied to western 
banks, including a requirement to maintain a minimum capital ratio equal to four 
percent of risk weighted assets and rules relating to the determination of 
core/supplementary element of capital. However, the capital regulation applied has not 
taken account of other elements that are typically held by Islamic banks that also 
perform a function like capital, such as investment-based deposits. The Islamic bank 
supervisors and regulators, in the future, should be able to adopt a different approach 
without creating excessive moral hazard for the shareholders in conducting fiduciary 
roles. 
Assessment of earning assets quality45 
Considering a bank's survival is highly dependent on the readiness of the bank to face 
the risk of losses arising from the placement of funds, the quality of its earning assets is 
important. The quality of earning assets is determined by business prospects, financial 
condition and the repayment capacity of the customers, and is routinely assessed by 
bank supervisors46 
as Referring to the Decree of The Board of Managing Directors of Bank Indonesia Number 
31/146/KEP/DIR dated November 12,1998 Concerning Amendment to Decree of The Board of 
Managing Directors of Bank Indonesia Number 26/20/KEP/DIR dated November 29,1993 Concerning 
the Bank Capital Adequacy Requirement 
as Referring to the Decree of The Board of Managing Directors of Bank Indonesia Number 
31/147/KEP/DIR dated November 12,1998 Concerning Earning Assets Quality 
46 The quality of loan will be classified into five general categories: current; special mentioned; 
substandard; doubtful; and loss. Before the stipulation of the new banking act, the classification of 
earning assets quality was based on delinquency periods (current, substandard, doubtful and loss for no 
delinquency, 3 month interest payment arrears, 6 month interest payment arrears and 12 month interest 
payment arrears respectively). The new regulation for assessing the earning assets quality of the banks 
will give a chance to a bank supervisor to fairly assess the real asset value of the bank. However, it 
requires a higher level of skill by the bank supervisors in interpreting other market signals before deciding 
the loan quality of the banks. 
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Allowance for earning assets losses47 
In its operations, a bank has to be able to cover anticipated losses; therefore banks are 
obliged to establish an allowance for earning assets losses. The allowances for earning 
asset losses are in the form of general provisions and special provisions. General 
provisions are less than 1 percent of earning assets classified as `current'. Special 
provisions must comprise 5 percent of earning assets classified as `special mentioned', 
15 percent of earning assets classified as `substandard', 50 percent of earning assets 
classified as `doubtful' and 100 percent of earning assets classified as `loss'. 
Annual financial statements and published financial statement for commercial banks48 
Bank financial statements are important sources of information for the public concerned 
with evaluating bank performance. Therefore, it is necessary for banks to prepare more 
transparent financial statements that will strengthen the social control function of the 
public in respect of banking institutions. The annual financial statement should include 
a balance sheet, a statement of commitments and contingencies, an income statement 
and retained-earnings statement, a cash flow statement, notes to the financial statement, 
and details on credit to connected parties, earning assets quality, allowances set aside 
for earning assets losses and the capital adequacy ratio. Published financial statements 
should include details on the balance sheet, the statement of commitment and 
contingencies, the income and retained earnings statement, and other information 
relating to the composition of shareholders, the composition of management, credit to 
connected parties, earning assets quality, allowances for earning asset losses and the 
capital adequacy ratio. 
47 Referring to the Decree of The Board of Managing Directors of Bank Indonesia Number 
31/148/KEP/DIR dated November 12,1998 Concerning Allowance for Earning Assets Losses 
48 Referring to the Decree of The Board of Managing Directors of Bank Indonesia Number 
31/176/KEP/DIR dated December 31,1998 Concerning Annual Financial Statements and Published 
Financial Statements for Commercial Banks 
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Legal lending limit for commercial banks49 
Lending which is beyond a `reasonable' limit to individual borrowers or groups of 
debtors, whether connected parties or non-connected parties to a bank, is commonly one 
of the major causes of bank failure. In order to avoid such business failure as a 
consequence of concentrated lending it is necessary that banks seriously apply 
prudential principles in their lending activities by diversifying their credit portfolios. 
The legal lending limit for an individual debtor or group of debtors comprising a non- 
connected party shall not be more than 20 percent of capital, whilst the legal lending 
limit for a connected party, whether an individual debtor or a group of debtors, shall not 
exceed 10 percent of capital. 
Net open position for commercial banks 50 
The emergence of new instruments in parallel with the growth of the foreign exchange 
market has given rise to increased risks for banks. In the light of this increased risk, it is 
deemed necessary for banks to apply prudential principles in a more appropriate manner 
for the management of foreign exchange funds. Each bank shall maintain its net open 
position at the close of each business day at not more than 20 percent of capital that is 
calculated on a consolidated basis for all domestic and overseas branch offices. The net 
open position is defined as the absolute value of the sum of net difference between 
assets and liabilities in all foreign currencies recorded on the balance sheet. 
Liquidity monitoring for commercial banks' 
In order to safeguard the continuity of banking operations and uphold public 
confidence, it is necessary for banks to maintain adequate liquidity for the settlement of 
liabilities. Management of liquidity that complies with prudential principles through the 
use of a proper liquidity monitoring system is important if the bank is to handle any 
49 Referring to the Decree of The Board of Managing Directors of Bank Indonesia Number 
31/177/KEP/DIR dated December 31,1998 Concerning Legal Lending Limit for Commercial Banks 
so Referring to the Decree of The Board of Managing Directors of Bank Indonesia Number 
31/178/KEP/DIR dated December 31,1998 Concerning Net Open Position for Commercial Bank 
5j Referring to the Decree of The Board of Managing Directors of Bank Indonesia Number 
31/179/KEP/DIR dated December 31,1998 Concerning Liquidity Monitoring for Commercial Banks 
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liquidity difficulties that may arise. Liquidity monitoring reports requested consist of 
cash flow projections and maturity profiles. Cash flow projection statements consist of a 
statement of projected cash flow for 3 months into the future, comprising assets and 
liabilities in on-balance sheet accounts and claims and liabilities in off-balance sheet 
accounts. Maturity profile statements consist of a statement of the profile of assets and 
liabilities in on-balance sheet accounts that will mature in the future. These reports shall 
be reported in consolidated form, both in rupiah and foreign currencies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROFIT AND LOSS SHARING CONTRACTS: 
CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 
4.1. Introduction 
The prohibition of usury creates technical problems for the basis of transactions in 
Islamic finance. Vogel and Hayes (1996) state that the participation of depositors in 
Islamic financial institutions is basically founded on non-interest based partnerships. 
For that reason, the partnership has to rely on the following two principles: 
- Return on the capital depends on the profit gained instead of being fixed in advance. 
- Capital (including depositors' funds) is directly subject to financial risk since both 
profits and losses affect the net asset value (NAV) of Islamic banks. The NAV of the 
bank reflects the growth or deterioration in asset value during a period as a result of 
the operation of the business. 
On the basis of these operational differences, Islamic economists have long been trying 
to formulate an appropriate form of operation for Islamic intermediary institutions. In 
1955, a notion of `two-tier mudaraba' as the model for Islamic financial institutions was 
firstly developed as an alternative for Islamic communities to fulfil their needs for 
financial investment instead of using interest-based systems (see Exhibit 4.1). 
In the early concept of two-tier mudaraba, depositors of Islamic banks were treated as 
investors who are exposed to financial risks. Depositors are exposed to loss 
(proportional with the owners' equity) since the depositors' funds are placed on a profit- 
and-loss sharing agreement and the terms of the contract are fixed. The early 
implementation of PLS in the Islamic financial institutions left several problems to be 
addressed. First, this type of financial arrangement creates uncertainty for depositors 
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since they will receive uncertain returns or may even face a loss; yet not all depositors 
in the Islamic community are willing to take risks. Besides, there is a possibility of 
facing agency problems caused by asymmetric information that makes depositors 
vulnerable to `unnecessary losses'. Second, depositors' funds are considered as 
participation in investments. Thus, depositors have less flexibility in using their funds 
because funds withdrawal depends on the period of the projects financed. Third, in the 
application of the two-tier mudaraba concept, Islamic banks are obliged to provide a 
stable, secure and competitive return to depositors. Banks realistically fear that any 
losses experienced would cause bank-runs, which obviously would have a serious 
effect, not only on mudarib as a borrower but also on the depositors. Such an event is 
thought likely to discredit other Islamic financial institutions as well as destroying 
public confidence. 
Exhibit 4.1 
Two-tier mudaraba 
First Tier Second Tier 
Project Capital E: > Capital 
Capital provided 
by depositors of 
Islamic financial 
institution 
Capital provided by 
banks to finance 
a particular project 
or other business to 
an entrepreneur 
Source: Vogel and Hayes (1996) 
In order to overcome these problems, Islamic banks have introduced various kinds of 
products to meet the customers' needs. Some products apply pure PLS/revenue sharing 
concepts while others are hybrid (a combination of PLS/revenue sharing and fixed 
claims) and mark-up types of contracts. On the assets side, Islamic banks have also 
introduced mixed-typed of products. Every country, in fact, adopts a different approach 
to implementing the PLS concept depending on the confidence and the readiness of 
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society to fully apply the concept'. The Indonesian Muslim society, for example, does 
not apply a pure profit-loss-sharing concept. On the liabilities side, all depositors' funds 
are based on savings accounts, which do not apply a PLS concept. All depositors' funds 
are also covered by the national deposit insurance scheme. The rewards for depositors 
are based on revenue sharing instead of PLS; hence, Islamic bank depositors are risk 
averse. On the assets side, more than 95 percent of the banks' assets are invested in non- 
PLS contracts, although the portion of PLS-based assets is increasing. Therefore, the 
operations of Islamic banks still resemble conventional banking operations but with 
some modifications. 
This chapter tries to review analytically the contract choices made based on different 
risk-preferences and the religious preference of the contracting parties, and also 
informational availability. 
4.2. Types of Contracts in Principal-agent analysis 
4.2.1. The choice of contract and the risk aversion level 
Baldwin (1998) reviews a sharing contract from the individual's point of view. 
Individual rationality is the basic requirement for the existence of an economic 
transaction. Rationally, a person will engage in a business contract if and only if the 
expected return of the contract is higher than his minimum utility reservation. The 
minimum utility reservation in economic transactions is assumed to be in the form of 
minimum expected monetary income. The individual's rationality is derived from the 
1 Dar and Presley (1998) provide a number of explanations for the failure of Islamic financial institutions 
to use PLS modes of finance (on the assets side). First, PLS modes of finance are considered vulnerable 
to agency problems since the bank is not able to observe the actual efforts performed by the borrowers. 
Second, in order to be used efficiently, PLS requires well-defined property rights. Third, especially in a 
dual banking system, Islamic banks have to compete with conventional banks that are already well 
established and mostly offer competitive products. Fourth, non-participatory partnerships performed by 
the bank. Fifth, PLS is not feasible for short-term financing. Sixth, an unfair tax treatment is considered to 
be an obstacle in applying PLS modes of finance. Seventh, the absence of secondary markets for PLS has 
led to inefficiency in funds mobilization. And finally, over-regulation of Islamic banks in some countries 
has also restricted their portfolios to fixed-return assets. 
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principle of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (i. e. the profit share for the agent will 
give the principal a minimum utility reservation and the profit share for the principal 
will give the agent a minimum utility reservation)2. By using the Kuhn-Tucker theorem 
for analyzing the complimentary slackness in the optimization program, he proves that 
the profit and loss sharing principles fulfil the condition of strong individual rationality 
and Pareto optimality. The optimum share ratios for both parties are 
Za =, 8(E - da- d p) 
for the agent, and zp= (1- ß)(E - da- d p) 
for the principal, 
where (E - da -d p) 
is a share base and ß is a share coefficient of a PLS contract. The 
sharing coefficient is derived after fulfilling the minimum expected monetary surplus 
required by the principal and the agent as risk premium. 
Besides the risk preference, the level of asymmetric information between the 
contracting parties is very important in determining the type of contract used. Presley 
and Sessions (1994) propose a comparative model looking at debt-based contracts and 
profit-loss-sharing based contracts. The discussion compares the utility maximisation 
process under a symmetric and an asymmetric information condition in which a second 
best solution may only be expected. A PLS contract leaves freedom for an agent to exert 
effort directly since the effort affects the relationship between capital investment and the 
outcome of the project. Since the agent is free to choose the optimal level of effort, a 
profit-sharing contract is able to control the agent by designing a contract with the right 
incentive compatibility constraint; hence, a better outcome for the project may be 
expected. 
2 The individual's rationality is achieved when the monetary results gives the utilities to the contracting 
parties higher than their minimum utility reservations i. e. Xa >_ da and xp >_ dp. The relationship 
between xa and xp is given by xp= y/ (xQ) _E- Xa , where 
E is a share base. The sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium is fulfilled if the profit share for the agent satisfies the minimum utility reservation of 
the principal and vice versa (mathematically, it is expressed by dp= yi'(xä) and xp= ip'(d °) . 
By 
using the theorem of Eichberger (1993), Baldwin (1998) derives the optimal solution for PLS contract as 
follows: 
f(X, d) = argmax{(xa -da)O(xp -dp)'-ßlxp < E- xa, xa > dQ, xp > dp} 
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In a contract, each contracting party will always try to maximise their personal interest. 
A decision or action taken by one party will be a constraint for the other party. Hence, 
each party tries to maximise their utility subject to constraints imposed by other 
contracting parties3. The contracting parties (a principal and an agent) bargain with each 
other in order to obtain the optimal sharing ratio (see Exhibit 4.2). 
Exhibit 4.2 
The sharing coefficient and the return expected by the bank 
Industrial 
Historical 
performance 
Individual 
performance 
Expected 
cash inflow 
Bargaining 
Bank for sharing Entrepreneur 
coeffident 
Expected II Expected 
return return 
The principal and the agent will use any information possible to predict the expected 
cash inflow generated from the project. Based on the expected cash inflow of the project 
and the expected monetary return, the contracting parties will determine the sharing 
ratio. A lower expected cash inflow (because of either the poor performance of the 
industry or a lower level of capability by the entrepreneur) will lead the bank to increase 
the sharing ratio in its favour since the banks usually have their own internal rate of 
return to achieve. This process also shows how information plays a very important role 
in supporting fair sharing agreements. 
3 There have been many articles about principal agent optimization programs such as those by Holmstrom 
(1979), Macho-Ines and Peres-Castrillo (1997). 
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Let us define a utility function of a principal as: 
x 
Up = Max 
JUp(x-s(x))f(x, e)dx [e, x] 
where, x, e, s(x) , and f (x, e) represent a monetary output of the contract x E=- [x, x] , 
level of effort by the agent, agent's share of the monetary output and a density function 
of expected outcomes (via the relationship x: f(uncertainty and effort) respectively. Let 
us define a utility function of an agent as: 
fU, (s(x)) f (x, e)dx -V (e) > Ua 
The principal is naturally concerned with the result received and the profit share (pay- 
off) paid to the agent (s(x)). The principal's utility function expresses his preferences 
or objective to obtain the greatest possible profit as represented by Up (x - s(x)) . The 
principal maximizes his monetary surplus that he might have under the restriction that 
the agent is willing to accept the contract. The restriction for the agent means that he 
must have bigger expected pay-off than his minimum requirement (U). Minimum pay- 
off requirements include operating costs and minimal expected return for the principal. 
V(e) represents the agent's opportunity cost that should be paid when the agent 
allocates his time to manage the project shared. Hence, the principal takes an action or 
decision under the agent's restrictions. The participation condition between the 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
contracting parties is given by: 
A= 
Up (x - s(x)) (4.3) 
Uý (s(x)) 
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In the first case, we assume that the principal is risk-averse, while the agent is risk- 
neutral; hence, 
Up (x -s0 (x)) = C, where C is a constant 
x- s°(x) = UP' (C) or s°(x) =x- UP1(C) (4.4) 
The equation (4.4) shows the preference of risk-averse principal, who like fixed return 
contract better than variable return contracts. The shared output for the agent represents 
the variability of the output, whilst the principal enjoys a constant monetary output. This 
means the agent is fully responsible for the fixed amount of monetary return to the 
principal (Up-'(C)). 
Exhibit 4.3 
Edgeworth box of risk-averse investors and risk neutral fund user 
W2 
X1 
l 
OP 
X2 
OA 
W1 
The bargaining process between the investors and the borrowers can also be analyzed 
graphically in an Edgeworth box (Exhibit 4.3). The 45° lines from Op and OA express 
the highest level of certainty from the principal and the agent points of views. w, and 
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w2 represent monetary output shared to the agent in the two possible different 
conditions 1 and 2. The risk neutrality of the agent is described in a straight-line utility 
curve that is tangential to the principal's utility curve at a point that has the same slope. 
In the second case, we assume that the contracting parties both have certain levels of 
risk aversion. In Macho-Ines and Peres-Castrillo (1997), an optimal sharing ratio 
between two parties that have certain levels of risk aversions is expressed in a linear 
form of the optimal contract. The relationship between those two parties is given by: 
s°(x) = c+bx, (4.5) 
where b=r and 
UP 
= rp is defined as the principal's measure of absolute risk 
r +r U PaP 
aversion while 
Ua 
= ra is defined as the agent's measure of absolute risk aversion4. The Ua 
equation (4.5) is obtained as a result of the optimization process of the utility functions 
of the contracting parties. Those functions are optimized with respect to (s(x)) and the 
Kuhn Tucker first order condition of the optimal sharing rule with respect to x. The 
result of the sharing agreement depends on the level of confidence of the contracting 
parties in expecting the future results. In this case the two contracting parties share a 
proportional level of financial uncertainty. The more risk averse the one party, the lower 
the sharing ratio required. The implementation of a hybrid contract is a good example 
explaining this concept. Although the investors in Islamic economics are always 
encouraged to have a low level of risk aversion in a contract, they still need a level of 
certainty (at least the principal) guaranteed. Exhibit 4.4 shows the optimal sharing ratio 
between risk-averse types of contracting parties. The more risk aversion one party 
(illustrated by a more concave utility curve) the closer the point of tangency to him. 
' They use the term `absolute risk aversion' as defined by Arrow (1960). 
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Exhibit 4.4 
Edgeworth box of risk-averse investors and borrowers 
w2 n. 
X1 
-H 
W1 
OP X2 
i 
Source: Macho-Ines and Peres-Castrillo (1997) 
Islamic teaching, in fact, encourages the contracting parties to share the financial risk 
(to lower the level of risk aversion). However, the current practice of Islamic banking 
and the pure concept can be seen as a paradox. This contradiction can be explained in 
some ways. Islamic teaching also (in some verses) mentions some preconditions to 
achieve the optimality of the contract that include: trustworthiness (symmetric 
information) which is supported by a sound accounting system, hardworking behaviour 
(effort sensitive). Unfortunately, some of those preconditions are unavailable in most 
developing countries. The lack of adequate infrastructure and information technology 
has made the system inefficient. These conditions will ultimately build up risk-averse 
preference by capital holders although, to some extent, they still want to comply with 
religious rules. This situation is reflected by the domination of non-PLS based products 
although, to some extent, the sharing concept is still adopted. The next section reviews 
the possible contractual problems that may potentially arise in the Islamic banking 
activities. 
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4.2.2. Possible contractual problems 
In a sharing contract, the uncertainty of the outcome comes from not only the 
production activities but also from the contract itself. The investors face informational 
imperfection in achieving bargaining solutions, since the investors (depositors) and the 
banks share different levels of information. The banks and the borrowers 
(entrepreneurs) also share different levels of information. The increased level of 
uncertainty may increase the level of risk aversion; hence, the contracting parties 
(investors) may increase their minimum utility reservations (payment-floor). 
In this section, the discussion will be focused on the informational problems that may 
result in increasing the level of uncertainty in the contract. The informational problems 
discussed include unobservable effort and hidden productivity. Other possible problems 
discussed are the lack of accounting system and possible price parity in a dual banking 
system. 
A. Unobservable effort 
Moral hazard is a familiar situation in which the principal and agent face a conflict of 
interests. The moral hazard problem arises when the principal is unable to observe the 
effort of the agent or even if he can, it is not verifiable, hence it is not contractible. On 
the other hand, the principal receives private information after the realisation of the 
contract. Therefore, the pay-off of the agent does not depend on effort. In practice, 
asymmetric information affects the optimisation process. The moral hazard will 
potentially arise after the contract has been signed. There is asymmetric information 
relating to effort performed by the agent during the contract period. The fundamental 
point of the moral hazard problem is that the agent chooses the effort he will exert that 
gives the optimal benefit for him (the higher the effort, the higher the cost to the agent). 
5 See also Holmstrom (1979), Shavel (1983) and Haris and Raviv (1983). 
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Recalling equation (4.2), optimisation by the agent is represented by 
e E: -: arg Max 
JUa (s(x)) f (x, e)dx -V (e) . e 
x 
In the case of a investor-borrower relationship, the borrower will seek to maximise his 
monetary return while giving the lowest level of effort. After the contract is signed, 
there is a possibility of the borrower (entrepreneur) engaging in a prospectively more 
profitable project. The investor still expects the borrower to allocate most of his time to 
this project, while the borrower will look at the expected return of the other project as 
an opportunity loss. The more prospective/profitable the project, the higher the 
opportunity cost for the borrower since he has to allocate his limited time to manage the 
less prospective/profitable project. The investor will only know the effort given by the 
borrower after the project has been realised. 
Exhibit 4.5 
Moral hazard in profit and loss sharing 
U(x, 
, e) -V 
(e)) 
e 
In Exhibit 4.5, illustratively, one can see the utility function of the principal 
(x - s(x)) f (x, e) where x E=- [x, x] . The principal expects the agent 
to exert the highest 
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possible effort to obtain the highest outcome possible. f (x, e) expresses the existence 
of diminishing rate of return of the production function where fe (x, e) >_ 0 and 
J ee 
(x, e) < 0. As mentioned earlier, the utility function of the agent is constrained by the 
opportunity cost V (e) where V' (e) >0 and V" (e) >_ 0. Thus the agent's utility function 
will be (s(x) f (x, e) -V (e)) . Different concavities between the production function and 
opportunity cost function result in effort optimisation by the agent. The agent will 
choose the most optimal level of effort (e°) that can give him the maximum utility from 
the contract. 
The analysis above infer that the optimal level of effort chosen by the agent depend 
upon the production function and the opportunity cost (the possibility of allocating his 
time anywhere else to get a higher monetary return in aggregate). Poor quality of 
contract may also create wrong incentive to the agent to `abandon' the project 
contracted. 
Baldwin (2000) reviews the possibility of applying a bonus scheme to induce the agent 
to supply a higher level of effort that will ultimately give mutual benefit to the 
contracting parties. The analysis exposes the importance of specifying the precise 
degree of risk aversion when technology considerations and too low a performance 
target preclude the use of a dichotomous incentive contract for risk neutral agents, in 
which the linear profit sharing ratio is contingent on the outcome. 
B. Hidden productivity (adverse selection problem) 
Another type of informational problem, possibly faced, is an adverse selection problem. 
Very often, the principal and the agent do not have all the relevant information about 
each other. The principal never has a complete set of information explaining the 
condition of the agent as well as the project. The adverse selection problem exists when 
the agent has information that the principal has not, while that typical information is 
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very relevant and important in estimating the `true' value of the project and, finally, the 
fair sharing coefficient. In such condition, the agent will try to exploit informational 
rent6. 
Before the contract is signed, the contracting parties will have different opinion about 
the project. Naturally, the principal will propose the lowest value possible so that he will 
have the highest sharing index possible for him. The agent, on the other hand, will 
propose the highest value possible so that he will have the highest sharing index 
possible for him. There have been many paper discussing the possible adverse selection 
problems in different types of contracts including insurance industry and project 
financing7. 
Investors (investment depositor on the liabilities side and Islamic banks in the assets 
side) are facing adverse selection problems. One possible step to reduce the asymmetric 
information is to choose market indexes as benchmarks. In a more symmetric 
information condition, the principal will be able to distinguish agent types. For example, 
the launching of market indexes of industrial performance will help Islamic banks to 
judge whether a borrower is under performed as compared to the average financial 
performance in the similar industry. 
C. Poor accounting standard 
Accounting standard is one of factors in the PLS contract. The major issues are about 
revenues and costs recognition since this standard will finally determine the profit 
6 Macho-Ines and Peres-Castrillo (1997) formulise the typical problem as follows. The principal is 
maximising her expected profit subject to the restrictions that the agents would decide to engage in the 
contract. In this case, the principal will face two possible different types of agents: good (G) and bad (B). 
The most efficient agent will not want to pass himself off as some other type. The optimal contract must 
be such that greater effort is demanded of the most efficient agent. The objective of the contract is to 
maximise the utility in facing those two different types of agents (with the probability of having good- 
type agent and of having bad-type agent). 
Akerlof (1970) pioneered a discussion of adverse selection problems as expressed in the market for 
lemon discussion. Other important reviews about adverse selection can also be found in Mirlees (1974), 
Spence (1974) and Guesnerie and Laffont (1984). 
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shared. Standardisation of accounting system may help to prevent disputes between the 
contracting parties. The level of accounting standardisation will determine the 
confidence level of the contracting parties to implement PLS contract; otherwise, they 
choose revenue sharing contract. For example, the use of revenue sharing contract, in 
stead of profit-loss-sharing contract, may reduce uncertainty while having the same 
expected return. In the PLS scheme, monetary surplus is distributed after subtracting the 
costs spent in the business. In the revenue sharing scheme, monetary surplus is 
distributed before subtracting the costs. The income of the principal depends only on the 
realisation of the state of nature. On the other hand, the agent has to be responsible for 
the monetary cost he spends besides the realisation of the state of nature. The payment 
schedules for both schemes (PLS and revenue sharing) are described in Exhibit 4.6. 
Exhibit 4.6 
Payment schedule for profit and revenue sharing 
Profit sharing Revenue sharing 
Agent Principal Agent I Principal 
Gross revenue x X 
Cost c C - 
Sharing coefficient a 
Monetary sharing a(X-C 1-a (X-C ßX-C) 1-ß)X 
The principal and the agent will bargain, so that, the expected return from PLS contract 
is the same as the return from a revenue-sharing contract. The relation between the 
revenue-sharing (E[JrRS ]) and PLS ratio (E[7rPLS ]) (assuming the same expected return) 
is given by: 
E[lrRS ]= E[7rPLS ]; hence, 
a(E[x] - C] = , ßE[x] 
)6=a Ll - E[R]J L 
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where a and 6 represent share coefficients for PLS and revenue-sharing. R and C 
represent revenue earned from and cost spent for the project shared. The variances for 
the PLS and revenue sharing are given as follows: 
Var[7rPLS ]= Var[C] + Var[R] + Cov[C, R] 
Var[JrPLS ]= Var[TZRS ]+ [Var[R] + Cov[C, R]] (4.7) 
Since Var[C] >0 and Cov[C, R] >_ 0, then Var[7rPLS ]> Var[zc ] 
Risk-averse investor will like revenue sharing schemes better than PLS scheme since 
the revenue sharing schemes can reduce the risk while having the same expected profit. 
The share base in a sharing contract can vary. In practice, deductibility of capital cost 
from the share base can be optional in a sharing contract. Baldwin (2000) analyses 
(analytically) the motivation for using the deductibility of capital cost from the share 
base, which leads to conclusions. First, non-deductibility of the capital cost from the 
share base has precluded the attainment of Pareto efficiency by linear sharing contracts 
when the expected utilities of the agent and investor are both maximised by the same 
investment decision. Second, when the cost of capital is not deductible from the share 
base and the agent chooses the investment decision, then there exist a problem of over 
investment from view point of a risk neutral investor. 
In the condition where the cost is also a function of effort, the agent will be able to 
increase his utility by the increasing the effort level until it reaches the maximum point. 
Due to the asymmetric information problem, which may be worsened by the lack of 
standardisation of the accounting system, the contracting parties often do not agree with 
each other about the fair classification of the costs. In this condition, the principal will 
prefer having monetary surplus prior to the actual realisation of the business (i. e. 
revenue sharing) to having a profit and loss sharing scheme. This type of informational 
problem can be described in a mathematical model below. The cost spent by the agent is 
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not invariant to the effort. Sometimes, the agent takes benefits on the effort delivered. 
The optimisation process of the contract will be: 
Max Jup (x - s(x) - C(e)) f (x, e)dx [e, x] 
x 
x 
subject to JUa(S(X) + C(e)) f (x, e)dx -V (e) >U 
x 
eE arg Max JUQ (s(x) + C(e)) f (x, e)dx -V (e) 
(4.8) 
Maximizing the agent's incentive compatibility constraint with respect to e, we have: 
Ua (s(x) + C(e)) + 
f. 
fe (x' e 
e)) 
C' (e)UQ (s(x) + C(e)) = f, 
V' (e) 
e) 
(4.9) 
Holding the sufficient condition that 
f (x' e) 
>08, C' (e) > 0, and U,, (s(x) + C(e)) > 0, 
fe (x, e) 
those conditions tell us that the agent has an incentive to always increase the cost in 
order to increase his utility, whilst the principal suffers from the excessive effort 
delivered by the agent. 
In such a condition, the principal seems not to have a better choice than to require that 
the agent to engage in a revenue sharing scheme i. e. the principal is risk averse. As 
shown in Exhibit 4.7, it can be seen that the agent may receive a higher monetary 
surplus if he exerts a higher level of effort from e° to e'. He may receive monetary 
surplus (s(x(e)) -V (e)) for PLS and (s(x(e)) -V (e))' revenue sharing respectively. On 
the contrary, the principal may receive a lower level of monetary utility since his 
monetary surplus is deducted by costs as a result of a higher level of effort. 
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Exhibit 4.7 
Different intensity of moral hazard in profit sharing when cost is invariant to effort 
U(x, e) (x (e) s(x(e))). '........... V e) 
x(e) - s(x(e))) 
(x(e)) -V (e)) 
e1 e0 
(s(x(e)) -V (e))' 
D. Price parity in a dual banking system 
e 
In practice, an entrepreneur has the freedom to choose the most preferable types of 
contracts, either PLS or fixed-return. In the case of long-term business financing, the 
religious-driven entrepreneurs will choose sharing-modes of financing for religious 
reasons whilst common entrepreneurs will choose either variable return or fixed return 
funding for purely economic reasons (i. e. to minimise the cost of capital). In a dual 
banking system, any borrower can determine the most economical financing scheme 
whether it is PLS or fixed return. Islamic banks thus face an adverse selection problem. 
For a closer look at this potential problem, let xpls and x., be the returns to the profit- 
loss sharing mode and fixed return modes for the entrepreneur respectively. The return 
on the PLS mode depends on the wage (w), the PLS coefficient (a), and the return on 
investment (; T). 
8 See Mirlees (1976) for proof 
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While the return for the fixed return mode depends on the return of investment (7r), the 
interest rate (i) and the size of the loan (L). 
Xf =ic-iL 
Under this option, common entrepreneurs will self-select to the mode of financing that 
gives the optimum return for their investments. 
Max Xarb =I xpls -X fix (4.10) 
If the PLS mode gives the entrepreneur a higher probability of return than the fixed 
return, naturally he chooses the PLS mode to finance his investments. 
xpl1 - xf >_ 0 
w+iL>-(1-a)ir (4.11) 
From the last inequality, it is shown that entrepreneurs will self-select the PLS mode in 
the case where the expected profit of the investment is marginal. On the other hand, if 
the fixed income mode gives the entrepreneur a probability of higher return, he chooses 
the fixed return mode to finance his investments. 
<0 xpls -xf, x 
w+iL < (1- a)iz (4.12) 
From the inequality, it is shown that entrepreneurs will self-select the fixed income 
mode in the case where the interest rate is low, wage level is low or the expected profit 
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of the investment is high. Dar, Harvey and Presley (1998) relate size and profitability of 
a project to the contract choices by entrepreneur and capital providers9. 
Exhibit 4.8 
Profitability and contractual choice 
Profitability Capitalist Entrepreneur 
Very low Fixed return contracts - 
Medium PLS contract PLS contract 
Very high No contract Fixed return contract 
Source: Dar, Harvey and Presley (1998) 
Exhibit 4.8 shows the relationship between contractual choice and the level of the 
profitability of the project financed. The table implies that a profit-loss-sharing contract 
is preferable only for moderately profitable projects. Exhibit 4.9 shows the relationship 
between the contractual choice with respect to profitability and size of the projects. The 
table implies that a profit-loss-sharing contract is attractive for small to medium sized 
prod ects. 
Exhibit 4.9 
Project size and contractual choice 
Project Size Capitalist Entrepreneur 
Very low PLS contract PLS contract 
Medium PLS contract PLS contract 
Very high No contract Fixed return contract 
Source: Dar, Harvey and Presley (1998) 
9 They model a basic income model as a function of fixed salary, an incentive function, and the profits of 
the project. In the PLS contract, it is assumed that the income of the agents comprises fixed salary and a 
profit share. Maximisation of the basic income function with respect to the level of investment gives the 
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4.3. Religious Preferences and the Optimality of Contracts 
Religious utility 
Conceptually, Muslims should have multidimensional types of utilities, where the 
monetary utility (al-maal) is not the only aspect to be achieved. The economic decision 
is made as a result of an optimisation process rather than just maximising of one 
important aspect. The concept of sharing is among the aspects, which are preferred or 
more highly recommended from the religious point of view. Muslims believe that the 
implementation of the sharing concept may foster the sense of brotherhood in facing 
future business uncertainty. Therefore, a higher portion of one's wealth being shared 
can be associated with a higher level of religious compliance. The higher level of 
religious compliance will bring a higher utility. However, the significance still depends 
upon the economic agent's religious sensitivity. Let us assume that religious utility is a 
function of religious compliance (R), which is characterised in (4.13). 
U=f (R) ; 
U' (R) >_ 0; 
(4.13) 
The inequality of the first derivation of the utility function shows the variety of religious 
preferences among Muslims. The non-religious sensitive Muslim will have U' (R) = 0; 
i. e. he will not earn a higher level of utility as a result of a higher level of religious 
compliance. 
Level of sharing and the expected return 
As reviewed in the previous section, the expected return resulting from a sharing 
contract depends upon many determining factors. These factors include the availability 
of information, the preferences of the agent and the application of minimum standards 
for accounting in the business. A principal may expect a lower level of return in the 
output elasticity function that indicates the choice of contract parameters that depends on size and 
profitability. 
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absence of minimum credible information when involved in the sharing contract. 
Exhibit 4.10 examines the possible reason for expected returns in share contracts. 
Exhibit 4.10 
Possible reasons for lower expected returns in share contracts 
Areas of weakness Sources of disincentives Possible result 
Lower level of information Higher level of informational rent A lower expected return 
available available to the agent in determining 
the share index 
Lower level of Higher level of agency cost to A lower expected return 
trustworthiness for abandon the project when the agent 
conducting the business finds a prospectively more profitable 
project 
Lower level of accounting A higher possibility of having A lower expected return 
standard financial disputes over the recognition 
of revenues and costs 
In an adverse condition, a higher portion of sharing in a financial contract may be 
negatively correlated with the financial outcome. To support this argument, let assume 
that the business condition affects the probability density function of the productivity 
function as illustrated in Exhibit 4.11. 
Exhibit 4.11 
The probability function for two different conditions 
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--- -- - -- - ----- - ------------ 
fA (x) and fB(x) represent optimistic and pessimistic business environments. Those 
two different projects have possibilities of generating positive as well as negative 
returns (x (=- [x, x], x<0 and x> 0). Let assume that fA (x) is stochastic-dominant over 
fB(x) (First Stochastic Dominant (FDC))10. Mathematically, this property can be 
expressed as follows: FA (x) >_ FB (x) . Exhibit 4.12 
illustrates the cumulative probability 
distribution function that shows stochastic domination of FA (x) over FB (x). 
Exhibit 4.12 
Cumulative distribution function 
Let us assume that there are two different projects A and B that have income 
expectation EA[x] and EB[x] respectively. The two projects are equally 
prospective/profitable if only EA[x] = EB [x] . The 
income expectation can be expressed 
as follows: 
xx 
JXJA(x)dX = 
JJB(xcix 
ab 
(4.14) 
The total expectation of the project is the positive expected returns minus negative 
expected returns (E[x] X- E[x]I-x ). If project A generates positive expected returns 
10 Further discussion for the theory of stochastic dominance can be found in Litzenberger and Huang 
(1991). 
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higher than the positive expected returns of project B (EA[x]I O> 
EB[x]l 
o 
), equal rate of 
returns of the projects are the same if EA[X]J°, > EB[x]l ob or -a< -b (see appendix 4. A 
for mathematical derivation). Intuitively, if there is a project that generates high- 
expected positive return (profit), one can accept high-expected negative return (loss). 
On the contrary, one can accept low-expected negative return, if the project generates 
low-expected positive return. 
Exhibit 4.13 
Distribution function for expected returns 
x x 
Exhibit 4.13 shows the expected return of the two projects (the distribution function 
times the value of possible returns). 
The contract choice 
Let us assume that the utility of every Muslim depends upon two general determining 
factors: monetary return and religious motives (4.15). 
U=f (x, R) ; (4.15) 
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The marginal utility of the individual depends upon those two variables. If the monetary 
return is also determined by religious motives (the level of sharing), then the 
relationship among those variables is given in (4.16). 
dU = 
au 
dx + 
au 
dR and x: f (R) , then, äx öR 
dU= 
au ax+ÖU 
dR LaXÖR aR 
Exhibit 4.14 
Utility optimisation 
U=f(x, R) 
06, 
0.4 
02 
00 
(a) Positive correlation between monetary and religious utility 
22 
(b) Negative correlation between monetary and religious utility 
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In the case where a higher level of religious compliance causes a negative result, the 
optimality of the contract is given by (4.16) and graphically illustrated in Exhibit 4.14. 
au ax au 
ax aR aR 
Exhibit 4.14 (a) illustrates the utility optimisation process if the religious compliance is 
positively correlated with the monetary result. The utility of the individual will increase 
as the level of religious compliance increases. 
Exhibit 4.14 (b) illustrates the utility optimisation process if the religious compliance is 
negatively correlated with the monetary result. The optimal utility will be achieved 
when the marginal disutility resulting from the monetary loss is equivalently 
compensated for by the increase in religious utility as a result of higher religious 
compliance. 
More practically, we may assume that the utility functions of the investors are given by 
(4.17). 
U= U(x(R)) + U(R) (4.17) 
Let us assume that we have two different conditions that may give different levels of 
outputs. In condition 1, we have a sufficient level of information and industrious agents. 
The investors may expect a higher level of income when they engage in sharing 
contracts. In condition 2, we have an insufficient level of information and non- 
industrious agents. In this case, the investors may expect a lower level of income when 
they engage in sharing contracts. 
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Graphically, Exhibits 4.15 (a) and (b) illustrate in 2-dimensionally different investors 
having different types of religious preferences in two different business environments: 
pessimistic and optimistic conditions". From the illustration, we can see two different 
optimisation processes. The non-religious motivated investors will, pragmatically, 
choose two different types of transactions in different business environments. In a 
developed financial environment, when sharing contracts may give higher rates of 
return, the non-religious investors will go to dividend-based markets. In a less 
developed financial market, the non-religious investors will go for fixed-return based 
contracts. The religious investors, in an advance financial market, will go for sharing- 
based contracts for two reasons: monetary returns and religious motives. However, in a 
less developed financial market, religious investors will go for hybrid-contracts, which 
to some extent still protect their minimum financial security. 
Exhibit 4.15 
Utility optimisation processes with different types of religious utility and different business 
environments 
Non religious type 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
O 'ý ý, 'ý bh ý0 10OO OOOOOOOOOO 'ý 
Levelof shariacompliance 
Optimistic ------ Pesimistic 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
(a) (b) 
11 We use the exponential utility functions to simulate the two extreme conditions. As discussed in Booth 
(1997), the feature of exponential utility function is that the individual exhibits `constant absolute risks 
aversion'. For simplicity, the monetary return utility and religious utility are characterized by the same 
utility functions. The utility functions are expressed as follows: 
I1 
U(x) = e-a x, U(R) =eýR, and x=Q+ FR . 
In an optimistic condition, F is assumed to have 
positive value and negative value in a pessimistic condition. 
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4.4. Types of Contract Available in Islamic Banks 
4.4.1. Sharing based contract (SBC) 
In a sharing-based contract, the principal (bank as the lender or investor to a bank) 
expects a wide range of expected returns. The principal may expect very high rate of 
return if the agent (bank as the trustee to investor or entrepreneur as the agent to a bank) 
can perform very well. But, if the entrepreneur does not perform very well, the principal 
may face financial losses or may even loose all his capital. The principal and the agent 
may determine either profit/loss or revenue as share base depending upon their 
confidence on the accounting standard used. 
SBC = SBC + ASBC 
- SBC<ASBC<oo (4.18) 
The inequality (4.18) shows the wide range of possibility of financial returns (ASBC) 
expected by the principal. 
On the liabilities side, SBC is implemented into several products that covers equity 
shares (EC), restricted investment deposit (PSIAR) , and unrestricted 
investment 
deposits (PSIA"). On the assets side, SBC is implemented into several products that 
covers financial participation in companies/financial institutions, join-financing 
(musharaka) and venture capital (mudaraba) 
4.4.2. Hybrid contract (HYB) 
In a hybrid contract, the principal will receive semi-definite positive monetary returns, 
as defined in inequality (4.19). Like the SBC, the share base can be either profit/loss- 
based or revenue-based. 
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HYB = HYB + AHYB 
AHYB>_0 (4.19) 
The principal still gets a minimum level of certainty (at least the monetary return will 
not be less than zero). On the liabilities side, hybrid contract is used in the saving 
accounts, where the principal amounts of deposit funds are guaranteed. Most of 
investors of Islamic banks place their funds in hybrid type contract since they need their 
principal value guaranteed although they share the monetary surplus (as a form of 
compliance with the sharia principles). In some cases, Islamic banks are even under 
pressure to give a minimum rate of return to their depositors in order to induce those 
investors to maintain their funds with the banks although this practice is obviously 
prohibited by the Islamic concept (AAOIFI, 1999). On the assets side, many Islamic 
banks have also used this type of scheme. In order to enhance the repayment capacity on 
the principal amount, most of Islamic banks require the borrowers to provide collateral 
that can be executed when the borrowers fail to fulfil their financial obligations. To 
some extent, the existence of hybrid contract can be considered as a stepping stone 
before SBC can really implemented in the Muslim society. 
4.4.3. Mark-up contract (MU) 
Mark-up contract is, basically, a predetermined return type of contract. This type of 
contract is used when the profit and loss sharing concept is not possible to apply such as 
trade financing activities. As expressed in equation (4.20), the monetary return is 
determined in advance. The predetermined returns should not be benchmarked to the 
interest rate, but it should be accorded with the average returns in typical industries. 
M=M+AM 
AM is fixed in advance 
(4.20) 
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On the liabilities side, mark-up contracts ma appear in its balance sheet when the bank 
purchase such leasing products (ijarah). On the assets side, the mark-up contract is 
implemented in a number types of products that include trade financing (murabaha), 
leasing (ijara), production financing (salam/ishtishna) (although the lender is still 
exposed to the market risk). Most of Islamic banks apply a requirement for collateral to 
enhance repayment capacity. 
All the products offered by Islamic banks can be classified into three base financial 
contracts. Exhibit 4.16 summarises possible types of contracts available in Islamic 
banks and their financial characteristics. 
Exhibit 4.16 
Types of contracts and the level of risks 
Types of contracts Sources of Probability Level of 
uncertainty of losses risk 
Pure sharing Profit and loss Revenue and cost Yes 
contract based 
Very high 
Revenue Revenue Yes 
based 
Hybrid between Profit and loss Revenue and cost No 
sharing and based 
fixed return Revenue Revenue No 
contract based Low 
Fixed return - No 
contract 
4.5. Summary 
The basic operation of an Islamic bank is derived from the concept of partnership and 
typical religious rulings. However, the early concept of an Islamic intermediary scheme, 
that is called `two-tier mudaraba', creates two major problems. First, it provides less 
flexibility to depositors in using their funds since they are treated just like pure 
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investors. Second, it is vulnerable to informational problems, such as moral 
hazard/agency problems. 
The types of contracts are, as a matter of fact, the results of bargaining processes 
between principals and agents. The more risk averse the contracting parties, the higher 
the level of certainty required. The level of uncertainty is affected by the productivity 
level and degree of information symmetry. In a sharing contract, the capital holder 
(principal) may face informational problems that happen before (ex-ante) and after the 
contract (ex post). Before the contract is signed, the principal may face an adverse 
selection problem, where the entrepreneur (agent) can exploit his informational rent to 
maximise his utility. After the contract is signed, the principal may face moral hazard 
problem, where the principal will not be able to observe the actual effort made by the 
agent. Another possible problem can happen as a result of poor accounting standard 
applied in the industry that can put the contracting parties into a dispute of cost and 
revenue recognition. 
In a Muslim society, we may find people having different levels of religious motives. 
The call for sharing will be implemented depending upon their religious sensitivity. In 
an optimistic situation, non-religious and religious types of people may go for sharing 
contracts since they may expect a higher rate of return while complying with religious 
rules. In an adverse situation (pessimistic), the two different types of people may choose 
different types of contracts. Non-religious people might choose fixed-return contracts 
since they expect only a higher monetary return. Religious people might choose hybrid 
types of contracts. With the hybrid contracts, religious people may have a certain level 
of financial security besides also, to some extent, allowing them to comply with 
religious norms. 
Current Islamic banking operations provides various types of products to meet different 
levels of risk aversion. On the liabilities side, investors may choose savings deposit 
types of investment, which guarantee the principal value of the investments. The 
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investors may also choose investment deposits if they want to share the risk and return 
with the bank (assumed more sophisticated and risk neutral). On the assets side, the 
banks also have various kinds of products to meet the needs of practicality and different 
levels of risk aversion when facing different types of investments. 
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Appendix 4. A 
The derivation of the stochastic dominance 
Equal expected returns for two different projects are formulised as follows: 
EA[x] = EB [x] , or 
X 
f xfA (x) dx =f xfB (x)dx 
ab 
It assumed that FA(x) is dominant over FB(x) (first stochastic dominance (FCD)), i. e. 
FA (x) >_ FB (x) . To simplify the problem, the variables of partial integration are defined 
as follows: 
Let U=x, dU=dx 
V= FA (x) , 
dV = fA (x)dx 
Then we have, 
xx 
xFA (x)I 
a- 
JFA (x)dx = xFB (x) b- 
JFB (x)dx 
, or 
ab 
x 
{FA () - FB()j+ bFB(b) - aFA (a) = 
fFA(x)dx 
- 
JFB(x)dx 
ab 
The cumulative probability density function for any distribution function have value 1 at 
the highest possible outcome (x) ; thus, 
FA(x) = FB (x) =1 
bFB(b)-aFA(a) _ 
X 
JFA (x)dx - 
JFB (x)dx 
ab 
Let assume: a, bcx<0; then, 
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X00 
bFB (b) - aFA(a) =I FA (x)dx - 
JFB (x)dx + JFA (x)dx - 
JFB (x)dx 
0ab 
00 
JFA (x)dx - 
JFB (x)dx >0 
ab 
Hence, 
00 [bFB 
(b) + JFB (x)dx - 
[aFA 
(a) + JFA (x)dx > 0; or, 
ba 
00 [bFB 
(b) + JFB (x)dx > 
[aFA 
(a) + JFA (x)dx 
ba 
00 
if, (a). JFB (x)dx = JFA (x)dx , we 
find that -a< -b. Then (b). bFB (b) > aFA (a) , so 
ba 
that 
FB (b) 
>a>1. Then the result is consistent that -a< -b. FA (a) b 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CONCEPT OF CAPITAL FOR ISLAMIC BANKS AND 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS 
5.1. Introduction 
Capital adequacy has become one of the most important indicators for assessing the 
soundness of banking operations. Due to its importance, the western banking system has 
already established internationally recognised capital regulations, which are formulated 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In its latest consultative document, 
the new Basel capital accord (issued in January 2001) covers not only the calculation of 
capital adequacy ratios but also other supporting issues, like sound supervisory 
processes and market discipline. 
Many steps have, in the recent past, been taken to devise an appropriate framework for 
capital regulation of Islamic banks. As reviewed earlier, the AAOIFI released a 
statement on the purpose and calculation of the capital adequacy ratio for Islamic banks 
in 1999, although the concept seems to need continual review. Khan and Chapra (2000) 
have also proposed a fundamental concept of capital adequacy for Islamic banks. 
The capital regulation has a wide impact on the financial system. At the micro level, the 
objective of capital regulation is to improve the operational sustainability of an 
individual bank. At the macro level, the objective of capital regulation is to enhance 
systemic stability. Islamic banks perform fiduciary roles and agency roles at the same 
time. The capital adequacy standard should be designed to reflect banks' risk taking 
capacity and to promote a better quality of sharing contract. 
Technically, appropriate risk assessment techniques will also improve the effectiveness 
of capital regulations in maintaining the soundness of banking operations. Islamic 
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banking can benefit from recent development in risk assessment techniques applied in 
western banking, besides also developing certain risk assessment techniques to capture 
financial risks that exist only within Islamic banking operations. 
5.2. Financial structure of an Islamic Bank 
5.2.1. The building blocks 
A. General features of the liabilities sid 
As reviewed earlier, in the paradigm version of Islamic banking, all the depositors 
should place their funds in investment deposits (PSIA). The value of liabilities is always 
equal to the value of the asset since the depositors put their funds in equity-based 
investments. Therefore, the paradigm versions of Islamic banks, structurally, do not 
need a financial cushion. From the capital composition's point of view, Islamic banks 
can be equated with the open-ended-mutual funds companies. There is merit in the 
argument that Islamic banks in such cases are not under pressure to stabilise the 
periodic disbursements to account holders. However, the bank must declare the Net 
Asset Value (NAV) of these funds at frequent intervals to enable investors to 
continuously monitor the performance of the bank. A rational investor should not expect 
a stable income unless the asset composition of the bank is predominantly in non-PLS 
products. 
Enrico and Farahbaksh (1998) state that the ability of Islamic banks to reduce the capital 
value of investment deposits, in an excessive sense, could introduce strong incentives 
for moral hazard that could result in systemic risk. Islamic banks should provide more 
sophisticated schemes that give more protection to depositors' funds in order to gain 
public confidence and, finally, to improve the robustness of the banking system. There 
are at least two key factors in an Islamic environment to help prevent the corrosive 
effect of problem assets on the level of capital. First, Islamic banks should have a more 
developed concept of the adequacy of valuation reserves. It is argued that a case of a 
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loss should not be viewed as an automatic setting aside of provisions against loan 
losses. Second, Islamic banks should have an ability to administer and collect their 
loans effectively. 
In current practice, Islamic banks' activities diverge from the paradigm version in 
several ways. Some Islamic banks explicitly or implicitly guarantees all deposits, 
including investment deposits. Some Islamic banks give a guarantee on the expected 
rate of return on saving deposits. These financial guarantees are given to make Islamic 
banks more competitive in the global market although, conceptually, it is not in 
accordance with the sharia rules. In the western environment, risk-averse depositors 
(households) place their funds in debt liabilities rather than in the financial 
intermediaries' stocks since they want to limit the risk on the assets, and maximise 
liquidity. The depositors are not supplied with sufficient information that can be used to 
evaluate the real value of claims held by the banks. The western banks have to be able 
to fulfil financial obligations, which are fixed, whilst managing risky assets which are 
fluctuating in value. Hence, the existence of bank capital is the consequence of the 
nature of the contract. This is the reason why minimum capital ratios have become a key 
part of current prudential regulations in Islamic countries. 
Current Islamic banking practices provide various schemes of investments to fulfil the 
different needs of depositors. As reviewed in the previous chapter, there are three major 
types of depositors' funds. First, non-investment deposits. Second, restricted investment 
deposits. And thirdly, unrestricted investment deposits. Different deposit schemes can 
be viewed as a contract menu provided for different types of depositors. Depositors 
might have opportunities to compose their portfolio of deposits according to their own 
needs. An investor may need portfolio investment that comprises different levels of 
risks at the same time. Risk-neutral depositors will choose a higher proportion of risky 
assets while risk-averse depositors will prefer a higher proportion of riskless assets'. 
' The model relates an individual's utility function to the minimum risk premium required to induce full 
investment in the risky assets. The higher the level of risk aversion, the higher the risk premium required 
to induce full investment in the risky assets (see Huang and Litzenberger, 1991). 
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Non-investment depositors are risk-averse investors who are not willing to participate in 
the uncertainty of business. Although there is no fixed return required, a principal 
amount guarantee resembles a debt-based liabilities system and hence they need a sound 
repayment capacity of the bank at the time they want to liquidate their assets. 
Unrestricted investment depositors (PSIA' ) 
Unrestricted investment depositors exhibit a higher level of risk taking behaviour since 
they are willing to take part in the uncertainty of business; therefore, they will face the 
possibility of profits and losses. The position of these depositors and the banks involves 
principal-agent relationships dealing in PLS contracts. On behalf of shareholders, 
managers are contracted to carry out business activities. Once they have agreed upon the 
contract (signed by both parties), the bank will carry out business actions to fulfil what 
is written in the contract. 
Restricted investment depositors (PSIAR ) 
Restricted investment depositors can be considered as sophisticated investors since they 
are involved in making investment decisions. Islamic banks, in this case, act as 
investment administrators; therefore all responsibility for any loss should fall on 
depositors. For this reason, the AAOIFI suggests that restricted investment deposits are 
not included in the Islamic banks' balance sheets. Restricted investment depositors only 
need administrative and information services that allow them to assess their investment 
performance clearly. Islamic banks normally charge fees for delivering these 
informational and administrative services. Therefore, there is no need to apply any 
regulation since restricted investment depositors are fully informed and realise the risks 
they are running as a result of their investment decisions; the financial regulators' 
objective should be to only protect unsophisticated (assumed less informed) and 
dispersed depositors. 
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The shareholders of Islamic banks receive their monetary surplus from profit shared. If 
the bank earns profits, the shareholder will obtain a profit share and an additional profit 
share as a management fee. If the bank generates losses, the shareholders and 
unrestricted investment depositors will share the losses. The shareholders in this event 
are not entitled to any additional monetary surplus for a reward for managing the 
unrestricted depositors' funds. 
The income streams for shareholders, depositors and savings account holders, as a result 
of business activities, are illustrated in Exhibit 5.1. pEC, PPSIAU, psA and pf define 
income for shareholders, unrestricted investment depositors, saving depositors and extra 
monetary surplus for shareholders if the bank earns substantial profit. The net earning 
gained by the bank (x) gives different income (ICEC , ; TPSIAu and JzsA) 
for shareholders, 
unrestricted investment depositors and savings depositors respectively. If the bank 
generates losses, the shareholders and the unrestricted investment depositors will share 
the losses ( PEC and 
PEC + PPSJAU 
PSIAU 
PEC + PPSIAU 
respectively). 
Exhibit 5.1 
Income streams in Islamic banks 
71S Pf+PEC 
Pf +Pec +Prsu° +PSA 
PEC 
PEC + PPA" 
-x x 
-l 
a) Income stream for shareholders 
7Ed 
PPSLe 
Pf + PEC + PPSI t: ". -+ 
PsA 
PPSIAU 
PEC + PPSIAU 
-7d 
b) Income stream for unrestricted 
investment depositors 
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Profits earned will be shared among shareholders, unrestricted investment depositors 
and saving accounts/current account depositors. The shareholders will also enjoy an 
extra profit share (p f) as a reward for infinite equity participation2, therefore 
shareholders will get a profit share proportional to their financial participation and the 
monetary surplus earned by the bank from the management fee. 
Exhibit 5.2 
Payback guarantee and incentives for Islamic bank investors 
Source of bank Payback guarantee Type of Role in Incentives 
funds depositors investment for 
decision investors 
Owners' equity (EC) Like in a conventional bank, - Dividend 
owners' equity is not guaranteed. 
Deposit is repayable in full. To None Bonus 
Non-investment deposits guarantee the repayment, the Unsophisticated 
(SA) deposit is backed by owners' and risk averse 
equity. 
Restricted investment deposits are Sophisticated High Profit share 
not considered as liabilities of the and risk that is 
bank. The bank would not share in taking earned from 
Restricted any losses, which would be individual 
(PSIAR) absorbed entirely by the restricted projects investment holders, since the bank 
Investment does not have an unconditional 
deposits ri ht to use or dispose of this fund. 
The bank is not obligated in case of Unsophisticated None Profit share 
loss to return the original amount of and moderately from total 
Unrestricted funds received from the account risk taking investment 
(PSIAU) holders unless the loss is due to of the bank 
negligence or breach of contract 
2 Unrestricted investment depositors and an Islamic bank can be viewed as a principal and an agent that 
engage in a contract to conduct business activities. An agent is entitled to have some profit shares as a 
management fee in managing the principal's fund. In this case, the shareholders of an Islamic bank are 
entitled to enjoy a monetary surplus from management fees as a reward for managing the depositors' 
funds. 
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The profit shares for shareholders, unrestricted investment depositors and 
savings/current 
pPSIAU 
accounts 
Pf + PEC + PPSJAU + PSA 
and 
depositors 
PSA 
are 
Pf+PEC 
, Pf + PEC +PPSIAU + PSA 
Pf + PEC + PPSJAU + PSA 
respectively. 
A summary of the financial characteristics of the liabilities side of an Islamic bank is 
illustrated in Exhibit 5.2. 
Generally, the financial products in the liabilities side can be divided into two types of 
claims: fixed claims and variable claims. The fixed type of claim consists of the fixed 
part of saving accounts (SAFc). The variable types of claim consist of equity capital 
(EC), variable parts of saving accounts (SAVc), and unrestricted investment deposits 
(PSIA"). The building block for the liabilities side of an Islamic bank is illustrated in 
Exhibit 5.3. 
Exhibit 5.3 
The building blocks of the liabilities side 
Products Fixed claims Variable claims 
SAFC Fixed - 
SAVc, PSIA1' 
, 
EC Undetermined Fixed 
B. Basic features of the assets side 
Islamic banks have two general types of loan portfolio i. e. a sharing-based loan 
portfolio and a non-sharing based loan portfolio. The sharing-based contract is 
encouraged to improve long- term partnership between lenders and borrowers whilst the 
non-sharing-based contract is used to meet practical demands (short-term contracts). 
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Exhibit 5.4 shows the distinguishing characteristics of sharing-based assets from non- 
sharing-based assets. 
Exhibit 5.4 
Distinguishing characteristics of sharing based assets 
Sharing-based assets Non-sharing based assets 
1. Determination Sharing rate of monetary surplus is Monetary reward is determined ex- 
of monetary determined ex-ante. Monetary reward ante. 
rewards is determined ex-post. 
2. Objectives Emphasise the partnership between Emphasise the practicality when 
the lender and the borrower. sharing schemes cannot be applied. 
3. Terms Usually applied for medium to long Usually applied for short to medium 
term contracts. term contracts. 
4. Functions of Collateral is held to reduce moral Collateral is held to assure repayment 
collateral hazard by an agent in case of by the borrowers when the contract is 
applied breaching the agreed contract. due. 
5. Expected return Fully depends on individual and Depends directly on the market 
industrial performance. benchmarks. 
The financial products of an Islamic bank can be classified into three general types of 
claim: fixed claims in terms of final value, fixed claims in terms of inventories; and 
variable claims. There are several products that can be classified into the first category 
i. e. murabaha/mark-up (MR), bai' bithaman ajil/deferred sale (BBA), ijarah/leasing 
(Y), the fixed part of hybrid contract (SHH, ý) , and the 
fixed part of qard al 
hassan/b enevo lent loan (QHFc). The values of second types of claims depend upon 
market variables. The real values of the products can be known through a marked-to- 
market process. The products include salam/agricultural product financing (SA), 
istishna/project financing in manufacturing (ISH), and al-Dayn/foreign-exchange 
trading (DA) . The values of 
the third types of claim fully depend upon the real 
productivity of the entrepreneurs. The products include the variable parts of sharing 
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products (SHHYB) and full sharing products (SH). The general building block of 
financial products on the assets side is illustrated in Exhibit 5.5. 
Exhibit 5.5 
The building blocks of the assets side 
Fixed claims 
Products In terms of final 
values 
In terms of 
inventories 
Variable claims 
A, 
(MR) (BBA) (IJ) 
(SHHra) (QHFC) 
Fixed - - 
(SA) (ISH) (DA) Marked to market Fixed - 
(SHvc ) (SH) HYB Undetermined - Fixed 
For more details about the variety of investments see Haron and Shanmugam, 2000; 
Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998; and Haron, 1998. 
5.2.2. Contractual arrangements within an Islamic bank 
An Islamic bank uses various types of financial contracts. Exhibit 5.6, section (a) shows 
three types of deposits on the liabilities side of an Islamic bank: non-investment 
deposits [ SA ]; unrestricted profit-sharing investment deposits [ PSIAU ]; and restricted 
profit-sharing investment deposits [ PSIAR ]. Islamic banks guarantee the principal 
amount of deposits and share any monetary surplus with the SA, whilst they share the 
profit or losses with the PSIA". Islamic banks provide only administrative services to 
the PSIAR since the depositors are themselves actively involved in investment decision 
making3. This demonstrates that Islamic banks perform fiduciary and agency roles at the 
3 The PSIAR depositors have the right to determine the investment types chosen, the banks merely 
provide them with information about feasible investments. Therefore, the 
PSIAR depositors take 
responsibility for investment risk. 
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same time. Islamic banks should maintain their repayment capabilities for the risk- 
averse depositors, and deliver the highest monetary return possible to the risk-taking 
investors. 
However, the proportion of PSIA" to total assets varies depending upon the preferences 
of the investors; the higher the proportion of PSIA", the more significant the agency 
role undertaken (i. e. the PSIA" give full authorization to the bank to take all decisions 
relating to the investment process). On the contrary, the higher the proportion of SA, 
the more significant the fiduciary role undertaken (i. e. the bank should strive to 
maintain the value of the SA first and foremost). The capital regulations for Islamic 
banks should be capable of enhancing the fiduciary roles performed for risk-averse 
depositors, and the agency roles performed for risk-taking investors. 
Exhibit 5.6 
Inter-relationships within an Islamic bank 
Regulatory framework 
Banking "Early warning system 
regulator -Entry regulations --Entry 
lending limit 
(c) 
Financial 
Assurance 
Islamic Bank 
Assets ........... 
Shareholders Principal-agent PLS-based 
relationship 
Managerial 
incentives 
Debt based Non PLS 
relationship based 
Management 
Islamic Bank Depositors 
Debtbased Principal-agent Administrative 
relationship relationship services 
Non-investment Unrestricted Restricted 
depositors investment depositor investment depos 
......................................................................................................................................................................... 
............... 
1 
(a) 
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Exhibit 5.6, section (b) shows various types of investment on the assets side of an 
Islamic bank. These investments can be classified into PLS- and non-PLS-based 
investments. Mudaraba and musharaka modes of financing can be classified as PLS- 
based investments [PLSI] whilst murabaha, ijara and salam can be classified as non- 
PLS-based investments [MUI-denoting `mark-up'-based investments]. In practice, there 
also exist hybrid-types of investment [HYB] that combine the two basic modes of 
finance [i. e. some part of the claims is fixed and some part is variable. For example: 
lending money with a guarantee on the repayment of principal but also sharing the 
profits]. Individual Islamic banks select their preferred compositions of assets. [For 
more details about the variety of permissible Islamic investments, see Haron and 
Shanmugam, 1997; Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998; and Haron, 1998]. 
Exhibit 5.6, section (c) shows the pivotal position of the banking regulator, who is 
trying to ensure the sustainability of the savings/investment process. The regulations 
implemented should be able to provide the right incentives and protection for all market 
players to induce them to behave prudently. Besides designing a proper set of financial 
ratios for capital regulation, the regulators of Islamic banks should also consider 
adopting the second and third pillars of the Basel Committee's new capital accord to 
empower the supervisory process and to improve transparency in the banking system. 
A financial cushion is required by an Islamic bank to absorb financial losses. An 
Islamic bank with a high proportion of SA needs a high financial cushion to underpin 
its operations. For unrestricted investment depositors, equity capital can be viewed as a 
financial participation in a PLS contract that may give an incentive to the shareholders 
to more actively monitor the activities of the bank. 
A possible regulatory framework designed for the capital adequacy assessment of 
Islamic banks is summarised in Exhibit 5.7, and is explained more fully below. 
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Exhibit 5.7 
Possible Regulatory Approach Based on Characteristics of Deposits 
Debtbased Repayment 
depositors assurance for 
debt based 
liabilities 
Unrestricted 
investment Reducing 
depositors 
Hmoral 
hazard 
Restricted Reducing 
investment 
asymmetric 
depositors 
H 
information 
Covenant 
reporting 
5.3. The proposed capital adequacy regulation for Islamic banks 
5.3.1. A Critique of the AAOIFI approach 
Although significant efforts have been made for designing a more appropriate capital 
regulation for Islamic banks, there are a number of criticisms to be addressed. First, the 
existing capital adequacy ratio developed by the AAOIFI is only designed to assure a 
given level of solvency and ignores the agency roles performed by Islamic banks and 
the principal/agent relationships involved. Second, there has been an inconsistency in 
defining the restricted investment deposits. According to the international accounting 
standards developed by the AAOIFI (AAOIFI, 1997), PSIAR type of deposits cannot be 
recognised as liabilities of Islamic banks and should not be reflected on the banks' 
statements of financial positions. This is because the depositors are highly involved in 
investment decisions. Thus, it can be argued that PSIAR -financed assets should be 
excluded from the risk-weighted assets in the denominator of the CAR. Yet in the CAR, 
no distinction is drawn between PSIAL and PSIAR . (From now on, I exclude PSIAR 
from the analysis) And third, the possibility of a bank facing `an abnormal risk' arising 
Financial Sufficient equity 
buffer participation/ 
capital 
Monetary 
incentive in 
the principal- 
agent 
relationship 
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from a managerial dispute (i. e. where the PSIA" depositors consider that a bank has 
neglected or breached the contract agreed upon) should be seen as legal risk, which 
ideally requires a case by case approach being taken (i. e. depending upon the terms used 
in the contract. In this case, the bank should be able to identify the difference between 
deposit taken on a pure PLS basis and those representing a hybrid contract. Deposit with 
any potential claim (partly) should be classified as a hybrid-type of contract. 
In practice, Islamic banks may have different proportions of PSIA" in their balance 
sheets. The variability of the PSIA" proportion is simulated in the following analysis 
(see Appendix 5. A for the underlying assumptions used and full details, and Exhibit 
5. A. 1 for data simulation). Exhibit 5.8, section [a] shows the ratio of OC to PSIA" as a 
function of the percentage of PSIAU to total assets [TA ]4. This indicates that Islamic 
banks, which have a higher proportion of PSIA" within their assets, will have a lower 
proportion of OC to PSIA". 
Exhibit 5.8 (a) 
Proportion of OC to PSIA' as a function of the ratio of PSIAU to TA 
10.0 
9.0 
8.0 
7.0 
6.0 
N 5.0 
CL 
4.0 
O 3.0 
2.0 
1.0 
0.0 
PSIA" to TA [ °/t 
Data source: Exhibit 5. A. 1 in Appendix 5. A 
4 TA is equal to the total of OC , 
SA and PSIA' 
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Exhibit 5.8, section (b) shows the relative agency (i. e. monitoring) cost 
V (e) 
) as a function of the percentage of PSIA" to TA 5 
a(OC, PSIA') . 
This indicates that a 
higher level of relative agency cost is associated with a higher proportion of PSIA" to 
TA as the latter implies lower monetary surplus for shareholders. A high level of 
relative agency cost thus implies a high probability that shareholders will exert less 
effort (e) to supervise the bank and instead, allocate their funds to a more profitable 
investment. 
Exhibit 5.8 (b) 
Relative agency cost as a function of the ratio of PSIAU to TA 
25 
V5 
0 
15 
20 
v 
Q 10 
d 
p 
0 
C, 
N0 -11, t11 <-3A ýýo , ý0 ý0 ßr0 
PSIAU to TA [0/4 
Data source: Exhibit 5. A. 1 in Appendix 5. A 
5 Shareholders of an Islamic bank are assumed to receive monetary surplus a as a function of the 
proportion of (OC) to the total equity based capital (OC + PSIAU). V (e) represent an opportunity 
cost as a result of spending time monitoring the activities of the bank. The higher the effort (e) given by 
the shareholders, the higher the opportunity cost. It is expressed in terms of a unit cost, 
V(e) 
' which represents agency costs as a proportion of 
the monetary return received by the 
a(OC, PSIAu) 
shareholders. A higher relative agency cost for the shareholders implies a higher probability of them 
abandoning the task of supervising the management since the monetary reward cannot sufficiently 
compensate for the opportunity cost incurred. 
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5.3.2. Possible improvements 
A. Possible enhancement of fiduciary roles 
Prudent financial structure 
The assets and liabilities structure is an important feature of a prudent financial 
structure6. Fulfilling the accounting principle that total assets must be equal to total 
liabilities, the total value of PLS, , HYB, and MU, (i. e. the value of PLS-based, hybrid, 
and mark-up-based assets respectively) is equal to the total of equity-based capital 
[ EC, ] and debt-based capital [ DBCJ ] in period t7, i. e. 
PLS, + HYB1 + MU, = EC, + DBC1 (5.1) 
Therefore, the total cash flow of PLS [ APLSt+, ], hybrid [ AHYB,,, ] and markup-based 
assets [ AMUr+, ] in the period t+1 is equal to the total cash flow of equity-based capital 
[ AEC, j ] and debt-based capital [ ADBC, +, 
] in period t +1. That is, 
APLSt+, + AHYB, +, + 
AMU, 
+, = 
DEC, 
+, + 
ADBCt+, 
where: 
- PLS, <- APLSS+I < oo 
8 
0S OHYBI+1 < °° , 
AMU, j = aMUt ,a: 
Average rate of mark-up, 
AECt+, = 8(APLSt+, + OHYBB+, + AMU, ) 
9, and 
(5.2) 
6 Obaidullah [1999] also mentions the importance of maintaining a balance between PLS-based and non- 
PLS-based products on the assets and liabilities sides of an Islamic bank. 
7 To keep it simple, we are making no distinction between equity capital and PLS-based deposits, and 
between general debt and other fixed-claim deposits i. e. EC, is assumed to include 
PSIAU, and DBCC 
is assumed to include SA and all other fixed claim liabilities. 
8 The equation shows a possibility that the future value of a PLS-based asset might be zero (totally lost). 
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In an adverse condition when total cash flow is negative, risk-averse depositors [fixed 
claimant and hybrid deposit holders] receive nothing, i. e., ADBCC+, = AHYB+, = 0. In 
order to prevent insolvency, the negative cash flow should be less than the equity-based 
capital, i. e., 
- AEC,,, <_ EC, 
Putting the value of AEC,,, from Equation (5.2) into Equation (5.3) yields: 
PLS, < ECt + caMUt 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
In an Islamic bank, collateral is applied to ensure repayment of the debt-based assets 
and to avoid contractual breaches in PLS contracts, with the consequence that the 
monetary surplus of the hybrid assets and the total value of the PLS-based assets are not 
also considered as liabilities10. Therefore, in order to implement a prudential banking 
operation and to ensure the sustainability of the banking operations, the value of PLSS 
should not exceed the total value of EC, plus the expected monetary surplus of the 
markup-based assets [ aMU, ] [as shown by Equation (6) above]. 
9 The equation shows that the expected return to the shareholders is proportionate to the sharing 
coefficient (ß), and that if the bank experiences losses, the financial losses should be less than its loss 
absorbing capability. 
10 Referring to the Basel Committee's principles about credit mitigation, the collateral is mandatory to 
back-up the repayment if the loans are defaulted on. An asset which is not sufficiently backed-up by 
sound collateral, should be backed-up by equity capital. In the case above, the expected value of the PLS- 
based assets and the monetary surplus of the hybrid-based assets should be considered as zero 
(PLSl+1 =0 and AHBYr+, = 0). 
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Minimum level of net-worth 
A requirement for a minimum level of net-worth (financial cushion) to enhance the 
capacity of a bank to maintain its solvency when facing temporary financial shocks has 
been adopted widely by Islamic banking regulators in many countries. However, the 
calculation of the CAR should only include the assets financed by debt-based liabilities 
and own capital11. In other words, the capital adequacy ratio should be calculated as 
follows: 
CAR' = 
oc 
R WAQC+DBC 
(5.5) 
where R WAQC+DBC is the value of the risk weighted assets financed by OC and DBC . 
Subject to this caveat, the regulators should adopt the same methodology used by the 
Basel Committee. 
Islamic banks may have similar elements of capital to the western banks. The only 
difference is the elimination of the components that apply fixed-determined return to the 
investors. The AAOIFI as a centre for convergence of Islamic banking regulation has, 
currently, adopt the Basel's methodology to classify the bank's capital into Tier 2 and 
Tier 2 and its restrictions. 
Tier 1- In the Tier 1 capital, Islamic banks cannot have perpetual preferred stock. This 
because, most kinds of preferred stocks pay the investors a fixed rate of income, which 
can be classified as predetermined return contract. The elements of Tier 1 Islamic 
banks' capital might consist of paid-up capital/common stock and disclosed reserve 
(this also includes disclosed retained earning). 
Tier 2- In the Tier 2 capital, Islamic banks cannot also have elements that are based on 
predetermined return contract such as subordinated loan and convertible bonds 
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(debt/equity). The elements of Tier 2 Islamic banks' capital might consist of 
undisclosed reserves, asset revaluation reserves and general provisions/general loan loss 
reserves. Investment (sharing based) deposits cannot be included in the Tier 2 capital 
since it is unusual for investment deposits to have at least 5 years maturity (AAOIFI, 
1999). 
B. Possible enhancement of agency roles 
Minimum level of net-worth and shareholder value 
The requirement for a minimum financial cushion is aimed at protecting the risk-averse 
depositors. This is also expected to enhance the agency role of Islamic banks, as 
explained below. In an Islamic bank, the level of OC is not the only factor determining 
shareholder value. The PSIAU also proportionally affect shareholder value. The higher 
the proportion of PSIA" in total deposits, the higher the financial buffer for the bank; 
but, at the same time, the shareholders enjoy a lower level of earnings. Shareholder 
(deterministic) value is thus directly proportionate to the level of financial participation; 
a= 
OC 
. If 
SA is dominant (a -- 1) in the deposit mix, the shareholder value OC + PSIA 
resembles that of western bank. If the net worth of the bank is negative (i. e. OC plus 
PSIA" is negative), the bank is operated under the threat of liquidation by the banking 
regulator. In the liquidation process, the shareholders and equity-based depositors 
receive nothing. The savings depositors receive their financial claims in full 
(government deposit insurance arrangement) and the financial guarantor pays the 
difference between the claimed value and the real asset value of the bank. 
As illustrated in Exhibit 5.9 (see Exhibit 5. B. 1 for data simulation), the shareholders 
with a higher level of financial participation increase their risk aversion way before the 
net worth of the bank becomes negative, as compared with the shareholders holding a 
lower level of financial participation in a bank. This is because the former would suffer 
11 Insolvency in an Islamic bank happens when TA < DBC . 
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more from monetary loss than the latter. It can be concluded that a bank with a higher 
capitalisation will have a wider risk aversion threshold for shareholders, which might be 
able to act as a safer internal insurance mechanism. 
Exhibit 5.9 
Absolute risk aversion as a function of the net asset value 
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Data source: Simulation in Appendix 5. B 
This theoretical analysis addresses the importance of financial participation by 
shareholders, especially when SA is significant. From the analytical derivation (see 
Appendix 5. B), it is found that the proportion of PSIAU in total deposits is negatively 
correlated with the level of risk aversion shown by shareholders' 2. And the higher the 
12 This analysis, as a matter of fact, is a modification of the analysis by Milne and Whalley (2001) and 
aims at analyzing the shareholder value of Islamic banks under the threat of liquidation if the banks 
become insolvent. The reason for the liquidation process is because the banking regulator wants to 
minimize the systemic costs. In order to strengthen systemic stability, some countries that operate Islamic 
banks establish a safety net scheme to enhance the repayment capacity of the Islamic banking system for 
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financial participation by the shareholders, the more prudently the shareholders will 
behave. This phenomenon is quite important since the shareholders play important roles 
in directing the management of the bank. 
A requirement for minimum financial participation by shareholders 
PLS at least in theory, if not in practice, is the most distinguishing feature of Islamic 
finance. However, due to information asymmetry, agency problems are likely to exist 13 
The regulations implemented should be able to improve the quality of the contracts 
entered into, so that all the contracting parties benefit14. One possible option to improve 
the quality of the contracts is to require a minimum level of financial participation by 
the shareholders, OC, proportionate to the PSIA" [imposed in addition to the Basel's 
capital adequacy framework]. The mutual benefits for the contracting parties can be 
obtained under several assumptions [see Appendix 5. C for mathematical derivation]. 
First, the level of effort is positively affected by the sharing ratio. Second, the higher 
level of effort brings a positive monetary benefit. And third, the total increment of 
monetary surplus is higher than the opportunity cost. This is expected to enhance the 
agency role of Islamic banks. 
5.3.3. The implications of the minimum capital ratio requirements 
In the simulation (see Exhibit 5. D. 1 in Appendix 5. D), we choose a minimum financial 
participation 
OCR 
of 6% arbitrarily 15. And, as in the previous simulations, the 
PSIA 
analysis is conducted by inputting all possible variations of the proportion of PSIA" to 
SA. Shareholders' minimum equity stake should be determined by the minimum CAR 
the risk-averse depositors. The implementation of a safety net scheme may, however, create moral hazard 
since there is a possibility of transferring bankruptcy cost from the bank to the government. 
13 PSIA" depositors engage in fixed term contracts; hence, they have less flexibility to withdraw their 
funds if the banks do not perform well financially. 
14 Mathematically, this is expressed in Pareto optimality. Baldwin [2000] develops a basic framework for 
financial participation in a profit-sharing contract. 
15 The optimal minimum financial participation, as a matter of fact, should be determined empirically. 
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of 8% [as indicated in equation 5.5] or the minimum financial participation requirement, 
whichever is the higher. This requirement has significant implications when PSIAU 
dominate the total liabilities of an Islamic bank. 
Exhibit 5.10 
The effects of imposing a minimum financial participation on shareholders 
(a) On relative agency costs 
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Data source: Exhibit 5. D. 1 in Appendix 5. D 
Avg. risk weight of 150% 
. 
Avg. risk weight of 100% 
Avg. risk weight of 50% 
Exhibit 5.10, section [b] shows that the OC to PSIA' ratio becomes binding when the 
percentage of PSIA" to TA becomes dominant. This can, alternatively, be expressed in 
terms of a requirement for a maximum level of relative agency costs (see section [a] of 
Exhibit 5.10). In other words, the shareholders should always maintain their financial 
contribution (equity stake) so that their effort to supervise the bank's management is 
adequately compensated. The thick, thin and dotted lines represent possible risk- 
weighted assets values for 100%, 50% and 150% average risk weight respectively. 
165 
PSIAU to TA [%] 
(1f{i\PIER 5 THE CONCEPT OF CAPITAL 
Exhibit 5.10 
(b) On the relationship between the proportion of OC to PSIA' and PSIAU to TA 
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Data source: Exhibit 5. D. 1 in Appendix 5. D 
Avg. risk weight of 150% 
Avg. risk weight of 100% 
Avg. risk weight of 50% 
0.06 
Exhibit 5.10 (c) shows the impact of applying the new capital framework proposed (see 
Exhibit 5. D. 1 in Appendix 5. D for data simulations). 
Exhibit 5.10 
(c) On the relationship between the proportion of OC to TA and the PSIAU to TA ratio 
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Data source: Exhibit 5. D. 1 in Appendix 5. D 
Avg. risk weight of 150% 
Avg. risk weight of 100% 
Avg. risk weight of 50% 
* The point where the minimum 
capital required by the CAR 
and minimum financial 
participation are the same 
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The analysis shows that there are two constraints for a minimum level of capital 
adequacy for Islamic banks. Capital adequacy should be determined by: 
[1] the capital adequacy ratio (to assure the repayment capability) if the bank's 
liabilities are dominated by debt-based contracts (hybrid products)(to the left of 
the star on Exhibit 5.10(c)); and 
[2] the minimum proportion of financial contribution [_OCR if the bank's PSIA 
liabilities are dominated by investment deposits (i. e. PSIA")(to the right of the 
star on Exhibit 5.10(c)). 
5.3.4. Other aspects supporting sound capital adequacy regulation (Pillars 2 and 3 of 
the new Basel Committee) 
The risk management process 
Islamic banks, as financial institutions, face uncertainties of outcomes in providing 
financial services. The uncertainties of the outcomes will ultimately affect the asset 
values of the banks, subsequently affecting the sustainability of business activities in the 
long run. The investors and capital users of Islamic banks react in the same way to such 
concerns as everyone else. They are concerned about liquidity risk, credit (income risk) 
risk, market risk, legal risk (built-in protection in financial contracts) and overall 
economic risk (Vogel and Hayes, 1996). Risk management should, therefore, be in 
place to build awareness about their exposures to financial risks and to develop systems 
for their identification, control, management and measurement. Conceptually, the risk 
management process can be illustrated in a closed-loop control system, as in Exhibit 
5.11. 
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Exhibit 5.11 
Risk management process in a closed loop control system 
Preferred Deviation Actions by 
financial the management Bank 
conditions 
(fP-fa) 
(fr) 
Asset valuation and 
risk assessment 
Actual 
fmancial 
conditions 
(fa) 
Risk management in a bank, in fact, is a continuous process that minimizes the 
difference between the actual financial condition (fa) and the preferred financial 
condition (fr). The preferred financial condition is set by the regulator to ensure stability 
in operations. Asset valuation and risk assessment processes play very important roles 
in supplying information about the actual financial conditions. The asset valuation 
process in an Islamic bank needs sound accounting standards that also accommodate 
some operational differences. The risk assessment process needs to include every aspect 
that potentially causes financial losses. Therefore, all the operating functions in the 
banks should be aware of financial risks. Moreover, the banks should be well equipped 
with adequate technical skill in order to produce reliable information about risks. The 
result of the asset valuation and risk assessment processes can be considered as 
feedback to the management. The difference between the actual and the preferred 
financial condition (fp-fa) reflects the managerial achievement in the past and becomes 
the informational supplant for future operational policy by the management. Inaccurate 
information could lead to false perceptions and result in poor operational policy by the 
management. 
The supervisors of Islamic banks also need to understand about the nature of risk in the 
Islamic banks and promote efficient risk management in an Islamic-banking 
environment. Therefore, a set of prudential regulations for Islamic banks, which is 
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supported by appropriate tools to support sound risk assessment and asset valuation 
processes, is needed to fairly measure their financial performances. The result of the 
risk assessment and asset valuation processes should reflect the risk-taking capacity of 
the evaluated banks. 
Banking supervision is a continuous analytical assessment of the financial conditions of 
the banks in order to maintain stability and confidence in the banking system. Through 
the on-going process, the banking supervisory and regulatory authorities will always 
seek to minimise the risks in the banking system16. The banking supervisory and 
regulatory authorities, as a matter of fact, should be fully equipped with skilled staff, 
and adequate financial backup and technology so that they will be able to always deal 
with recent developments in the financial system. The financial risks faced by the banks 
will be different from time to time, depending on the rapid development of the financial 
system. Although bank supervisors cannot (nor should they) guarantee that banks will 
not fail, the potential for banking failure is an inherent part of the risk-taking process. 
The main objective of the supervisory and regulatory process is to maintain stability and 
confidence in the banking system by facilitating the exit of problem banks without 
causing contagion to the other banks i. e. minimising disruption to the system. The 
supervisors as well as the banks should be able to recognise, monitor and control the 
risks inherent in banking operations. To address this issue, and through the prudential 
guidelines, most banking regulators regulate some financial risks resulting from 
particular types of banking risk exposure. Sophisticated statistical models have even 
been implemented by banking supervisors to fairly assess the assets quality in a 
dynamic approach. Ultimately, effective financial risk management, close monitoring of 
risk exposures, and compliance with prudential guidelines set by effective banking 
regulations, are essential ingredients of an effective banking supervision process. 
16 The supervisory process is usually conducted via particular actions: the issuance and withdrawal of 
banking licenses; the issuance and enforcement of prudential regulations and standards; prescribing 
covenant reports, such as establishing off-site and on-site inspections; assessing penalties and initiating 
emergency actions; and, liquidations. 
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Transparency in banking supervision 
Bank supervision should be conducted transparently to assure that all substantial 
information is adequately disclosed. The banking supervisory and regulatory authorities 
use information disclosure to increase systemic stability in the banking system. 
Adequate information disclosure enables market participants to comprehensively 
evaluate banks' financial risks, especially in the increasingly volatile financial markets 
of today. Any misleading (inaccurate) information may possibly damage public 
confidence and even cause systemic instability in the banking system. A proper 
disclosure process may moderate the responses of market participants to bad news by 
helping market participants assess negative information and mitigate panic; hence, 
improved transparency through better disclosure may reduce the chance of systemic 
banking crises. 
The information disclosed usually involves qualitative and quantitative information in 
annual financial reports, supplemented by biannual or quarterly financial statements and 
other important information. Through the high quality of information provided, banks 
will be able to always improve their reputation. Information disclosure involves not 
only providing the financial information, but also reporting the decision-making process 
through a timely reporting system. Information disclosure, as a matter of fact, would 
improve accountability in conducting fiduciary roles. Market participants, including 
banking supervisory and regulatory authorities, have wider opportunities to assess 
actions taken by the banks and apportion responsibility for both decisions and results. 
Information disclosure would improve the predictability and subsequently the efficiency 
of policy decisions. Moreover, it would improve internal discipline and promote better 
governance. According to Greuning and Bratanovic (1999), transparency and 
accountability are mutually reinforcing. Transparency emphasizes proper monitoring a 
process that will enhance accountability. Contrariwise, accountability that is represented 
in a reporting process will give an incentive to other market participants, ensuring that 
their actions are properly disclosed and understood. 
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One important aspect in the information disclosure process is a realistic asset valuation 
process, including sensitivities to future events and adverse developments. This issue 
addresses the importance of the evaluation of a bank's entire risk profile, including 
future solvency risk, since all regulatory requirements are normally prepared under the 
assumption that the banks will continue to operate as a going concern. Insufficient 
information provided will potentially mislead other key players in the banking system 
and, more importantly, banks may not be aware of the true financial conditions. 
The higher level of transparency (providing comprehensive financial reporting to the 
investment depositors describing the actual financial condition of their investments) can 
also enhance agency roles. Holmstrom (1979) proves, analytically, that a higher level of 
information shared will improve the quality of the contract. This informational 
requirement, as a matter of fact, has been outlined in the third pillar of the new capital 
accord of the Basel Committee. The regulators of Islamic banks can benefit from this 
established concept. 
5.4. Safety net arrangements and systemic stability 
Islamic banks and safety net arrangement 
As has been acknowledged, the stability of Islamic banking systems is very important 
for the Islamic society. The regulatory authority for Islamic banks is in a position to 
ensure a sustainable savings/investment process; therefore, the implementation of 
deposit insurance arrangements seems to be unavoidable. Indeed, some deposit 
insurance arrangements have been implemented within Islamic banking systems in 
order to enhance the banks' repayment capabilities to non-investment committed 
depositors (current and savings accounts). The existence of deposit insurance 
arrangement may create moral hazard problems. Islamic banking regulators also face a 
dilemma in dealing with ailing banks. In order to ensure the banks conduct fiduciary 
roles properly, the Islamic banking authorities should be able to design an optimal 
`closure' rule, either to close down ailing banks early (as has been adopted by the U. S 
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banking authority under a prompt corrective approach (PCA)) or to subsidise them in 
order to give them a chance for self recovery. This analysis is, in fact, a modification of 
the model developed by Fries et. al (1997) seeking for a optimal rules for bank 
reorganisation process. 
The model 
Let us assume that Islamic bank equity holders receive total net cash flow which is a 
function of the proportional profit share (aegt) minus the deposit insurance premiums 
paid (KS Dt ). 
ae g, - KS Dt (5.6) 
where ae , gt , KS and Dt represent the profit share ratio for shareholders 
OC 
, the income arising from the bank's portfolio, the deposit insurance OC + PSIA 
ratio for debt-based deposits, and the bank's total deposits (PSIA" + SA) respectively. It 
is assumed that the bank regulator levies a constant rate of deposit insurance premium 
as a proportion of insured deposits (KS = yks where y and ks represent the deposit 
insurance premium per dollar and the ratio of debt-based deposits to total deposits 
SA 
). The PSIA" depositors are not covered in a deposit insurance scheme 
SA+PSIA" 
because their investments are equity based (they already understand that the result of the 
investment can be either positive of negative). 
Suppose that gr and Dt are correlated and follow geometric Brownian motions as 
expressed below". 
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dgt = pggrdt + 6ggtdw, r 
dDt = /JDDtdt +O DDtdw2t 
(5.7) 
where pi, uj `di = g, D are constant parameters, and üvgt , COD, are standard Brownian 
motion with pdt = dwgtdüüDt *If 
it is assumed that the rate of return to shareholders 
consists of the flow of income to share holders plus expected capital gains, the market 
value for the bank's equity (rUe) will be: 
rUr = aegt - KSD1 + 
d 
dA 
Er Ur+o Ioý (5.8) 
where U(k,, D, ) =V (gt /D, )Dt . By applying some mathematical manipulations (proof 
is given in Appendix 5. E), we can find the expression that satisfies a second order 
differential equation. Variable gt /Dr is defined as kt . 
(r-IUD)V(kt) = (aekt -KS)+(, ug -, JD)ktV'(kt)+ 
The solution for equation (5.9) is given below: 
V (kt) = 
ae k` 
(r -pg) 
KS aek 
(Y 
, ID) 
(r - fug) 
6K2 k2V"(kt) 
2 
KS kt 
(r-, uD) k 
(5.9) 
(5.10) 
The first operator of equation (5.10) can be interpreted as the discounted per-dollar of 
deposit value of the equity holders' cash flow under unlimited liability. The second 
17 It is assumed that the banks have an average rate of deposit growth and average rate of income. 
Standard Brownian motion expresses the level of uncertainties in both banks' deposit growth and rate of 
mcome. 
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----- . -. 
operator of equation (5.10) can be interpreted as an option value for equity holders if 
they want to abandon the bank in the event of failure. Assuming that closure procedures 
entails a lump-sum bankruptcy cost c(k*) and the banking regulator expends 
monitoring cost of ým per dollar of insured deposits18, the total claims of deposit 
insurance on the insurer will be M (kt 5 D1) = L(kt )Dt , where 
L kl = 
KS -m 
_ 
ae k* 
_ 
Ks -m 
-c k`l 
kt a 
`l k" tJ 
[(r 
-PD) 
[(r 
-pS) (r - JID) 
(5.11) 
The second operator shows the option value for the regulators if the shareholders of the 
banks abandon the bank in the event of failure. 
Optimal stopping time 
Optimal stopping rules can be reviewed from two different points of views. The 
banking regulators will have their own agenda that involves minimising bankruptcy 
costs as a result of an appropriate bank closure process and effective monitoring. The 
bank regulators' objectives can be formulated as in equation (5.12). The first and the 
second operators express the option value to continue the monitoring and the option 
value of having bankruptcy cost. If the banking regulator is not ready for an expensive 
monitoring cost (late closure approach), they tend to choose PCA and vice versa. 
k** = arg min c(k) 
kt 
+ 
kr 
k (r - , JD) 
k 
(5.12) 
On the other hand, the shareholders also have their own optimisation process for 
determining the closure point that is beneficial for them. The optimisation process can 
18 These assumptions are the same as those adopted by Fries et. al. (1997). 
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be obtained by optimising the shareholder value as expressed in equation (5.10) with 
respect to k. (Mathematical derivation is given in the Appendix 5. E) 
k* = max{V(k)} 
k` 
Ks (r-, ug) 
ae (r-jo)(1-ý) 
(5.13) 
The equation (5.13) shows how the optimal value of k* is determined by the capital 
structure. The higher the proportion of PSIA", the lower the option value to the 
shareholders. 
Exhibit 5.12 
Shareholder value and the regulator's liability 
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The optimal trigger points derived from the two optimisations approaches will be 
different, as intuitively, we appreciate that the shareholders will only be willing to inject 
new capital if the insolvency level is not extremely low. Therefore, the optimal trigger 
point for closure will be: 
kmaxk*, k** 
Exhibit 5.12 illustrates the value of the bank's equity, which is expressed in equation 
(5.10), and the deposit insurance claims, which are expressed in equation (5.11). Exhibit 
5.12 implies the following conclusions. First, the existence of debt-based liabilities 
(savings deposits) may create potential systemic liabilities when a safety net 
arrangement (deposit insurance) is introduced in an Islamic banking system (L(kr )) . 
Second, the option value (to either continue or abandon the bank) to the shareholders 
(V (k)) exists as a natural phenomenon as a result of financial uncertainty. Third, there 
is a need to determine an optimal closing rule for ailing banks that maximises social 
welfare. 
5.5. Summary 
Islamic banking needs proper capital regulations that take account of the nature of 
contracts engaged in. The existence of hybrid-based liabilities (a combination of sharing 
and fixed return contract) requires Islamic banks to enhance their repayment 
capabilities. The typical Islamic bank's capital structure may also create systemic 
liabilities for the banking regulators in the case of financial distress. Such potential 
systemic liabilities may also have an adverse impact on the whole economic (financial) 
system. 
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In this chapter, I have reviewed possible approaches (using financial ratios) that can be 
adopted to enhance the banks' fiduciary and agency roles. In order to enhance their 
fiduciary role, I propose that prudent capital structure ratio be important along side a 
western-style capital adequacy ratio. The prudent capital structure ratio emphasises the 
importance of maintaining a balance of fixed claims on both the assets and liabilities 
sides. In order to enhance their agency role, I propose the use of a ratio to ensure a 
minimum level of financial participation by shareholders (as a proportion of the total 
equity-based financial sources of the bank). Analytically, I show that a higher level of 
financial participation by the bank's shareholders can be used to improve the quality of 
contracts entered into by investment depositors and shareholders. Sound risk assessment 
and asset valuation processes may also improve the quality of banking supervision. 
The coverage of capital regulation should also include other supporting aspects, such as 
the supervisory review process and market discipline (i. e. Pillars 2 and 3) recommended 
in the new Basel Capital Accord. The main features that are believed to support an 
effective supervisory review process are: a sound risk management process; sound 
capital assessment; a comprehensive assessment of risks; an adequate system for 
monitoring and reporting risk; and adequate internal control review. The quest for better 
market discipline involves the imposition of `core' disclosure requirements, which are 
designed to convey vital information to all the institutions crucial to the basic operation 
of market discipline. 
Systemically, the existence of hybrid-based deposits may create potential liabilities to 
the banking regulator (government). The business uncertainty may create option value 
(to either continue with the bank or abandon) to the shareholders. The capital regulation 
should also provide efficient exit rules that optimise social welfare since inefficient 
closure policy may create an expensive bankruptcy costs. 
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Appendix 5. A 
Mathematical simulation of capital adequacy using the AAOIFI's standards 
In simulating equation (3.1), we assume that WOC+L and WPSIAU are equal to 100 percent 
(all the capital sources are used in the assets side). Under the AAOIFI's approach, 
CAR = 
oc 
WOC+L(OC+L)+WPSIAU (0.5 *PSIA? ) 
Exhibit 5. A. 1 
Simulation process of capital regulation set by the AAOIFI 
SA/total PSIAu / OC/total TA/total PSIAU/TA Rel. agency 
dep. total dep. dep. SA/PSIAU OC/PSIAý dep. [%] 
L 
cost 
0.99 0.01 0.0865 99.00 8.6522 1.0865 0.9 1.1 
0.95 0.05 0.0848 19.00 1.6957 1.0848 4.6 1.6 
0.90 0.10 0.0826 9.00 0.8261 1.0826 9.2 2.2 
0.85 0.15 0.0804 5.67 0.5362 1.0804 13.9 2.8 
0.80 0.20 0.0783 4.00 0.3913 1.0783 18.5 3.4 
0.75 0.25 0.0761 3.00 0.3043 1.0761 23.2 4.1 
0.70 0.30 0.0739 2.33 0.2464 1.0739 27.9 4.8 
0.65 0.35 0.0717 1.86 0.2050 1.0717 32.7 5.6 
0.60 0.40 0.0696 1.50 0.1739 1.0696 37.4 6.3 
0.55 0.45 0.0674 1.22 0.1498 1.0674 42.2 7.1 
0.50 0.50 0.0652 1.00 0.1304 1.0652 46.9 8.0 
0.45 0.55 0.0630 0.82 0.1146 1.0630 51.7 8.9 
0.40 0.60 0.0609 0.67 0.1014 1.0609 56.6 9.8 
0.35 0.65 0.0587 0.54 0.0903 1.0587 61.4 10.8 
0.30 0.70 0.0565 0.43 0.0807 1.0565 66.3 11.8 
0.25 0.75 0.0543 0.33 0.0725 1.0543 71.1 12.9 
0.20 0.80 0.0522 0.25 0.0652 1.0522 76.0 14.0 
0.15 0.85 0.0500 0.18 0.0588 1.0500 81.0 15.3 
0.10 0.90 0.0478 0.11 0.0531 1.0478 85.9 16.5 
0.05 0.95 0.0457 0.05 0.0481 1.0457 90.9 17.9 
0.00 1.00 0.0435 0.00 0.0435 1.0435 95.8 19.4 
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By using a minimum CAR of 8% and simulating for different values of PSIA" and SA, 
we find OC. In the simulations, we keep the sum of PSIA" and SA (i. e. equal to total 
deposits) equal to 1. 
Relative agency cost is defined as the ratio of opportunity cost (expressed in a 
multiplicative factor) to the proportion of monetary surplus for the shareholders or 
OC -1 
OC + PSIA 
For example, agency cost in a bank, which has PSIA" equal to OC, 
will have agency cost twice as high as that of a bank, which has no PSIA". The 
shareholders in the latter bank will receive half of monetary surplus while they perform 
the same supervising function to the bank's management (the multiplicative factor is 
1 -ý 
- or 2. 2 
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Appendix 5. B 
Stochastic effect in the analysis of shareholder value 
In order to conduct a dynamic analysis of shareholder value within an Islamic bank, let 
us assume that the net worth of an Islamic bank is determined by a perpetual and certain 
cash flow generated at a constant expected rate by the assets. The bank faces business 
uncertainty, which is expressed in variance (a), and is able to make choices over 
6E [a1 62 ]. Mathematically, the net worth can be modeled in a geometric Brownian 
motion with drift, with time (t) being a continuous variable. 
dN=(aE-d)dt+aadz 
The bank is assumed to have a constant expected monetary surplus of E per unit of 
time with a variance of monetary surplus of 
1 
62 ; hence, the shareholders may expect 2 
monetary surplus of aE per unit of time with a variance of 
1 
a262 . The shareholder 2 
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(B. 1 
value (which also represents the net worth of the bank) satisfies the ordinary differential 
equation' : 
(p + q)V = max[d + (aE -d )VN +1 a262VNN ] d, a 2 
for N<0, and (B. 2) 
pV = max[d + (aE - 
d)VN +1 a2a2VNN ] 
d, a 2 
for N >_ 0 
I The differential equation adopts the Bellman equation for non-finite time horizon problem solving 
where there is no final value function from which we can work backwards. This problem solving equation 
applied for analyzing the moral hazard in the banking industry is also analyzed in Milne and Whalley 
(2001), and in Milne and Robertson (1996). 
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where p represents the discount factor in the time horizon and q represents a 
stochastic `jump process'. 
Applying proposition 1 of Milne and Robertson (1996), the optimal dividend policy 
takes the form that 3N * subject to d(N) =0 for N< N* and barrier control at 
N=N*, where 0<N<oo. 
The argument for proposition 1; assuming that r<p implies that a policy of never 
paying a dividend would result in V=0. 
T 
lim e-PT JdeT_dr <0 T-3ao 
0 
Optimal dividend policy is to retain all earnings in order to increase the survivability of 
the company, thus V(N*) =E/p. 
Some assumptions for pasting conditions at N=0 and smoothing at N* are given by: 
i. The sample path for N=0 (liquidation threshold) is continuous. 
ii. VN =1 at N*. For N >_ N*, the shareholder value is given by 
V(N) = V(N*)+N-N*. 
iii. Therefore VNN =0 at N*. 
Applying proposition 2 of Milne and Robertson (1996) that for all values of N, 
0<N<N*, the boundary condition (i), (ii), (iii) and VNNN >0, VNN <_ 0, and VN >_ 1, 
the general solution satisfies the ordinary differential equations with boundary 
conditions: 
V(N) =A exp(m, N) +B exp(m2N) 
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.......... 
where m, and m2 are the roots of 
1 
a2a2m2 + aEm -p=0. The roots of the ordinary 2 
+ 262p differential equation will be 
1 -E± Ez 
2 a6 
Let us assume the general solution for N<_ 0 is given by: 
V=A exp(m, N) +B exp(m2 N) (i) 
The solution for 0< _ 
N<_ N* is given by: 
V=A exp(m, N) +B exp(m2 N) (ii) 
There are six boundary conditions to estimate the unknown parameters A, B, A, B and 
N*. 
AtN* 
VN = m, Aexp(m1N* )+m2Bexp(m2N*)=1 (iii) 
VNN = m; A exp(m1 N*) + m2 B exp(m2 N*) =0 (iv) 
At No 
V- = V+: A exp(m1N°)+B exp(m2N°) = Aexp(m, N°)+Bexp(m2N°) (v) 
VN =V; +: Aml exp(m, N°)+Bm2 exp(m2N°)=Am, exp(m, N°)+Bm2 exp(m2N°) (vi) 
At N-°° 
V=A exp(m, N-°°) +B exp(m2 N-') =0 
(vii) 
Using the boundary conditions, we obtain the value of the unknown parameters of the 
general solutions. Applying No =0 at the boundary condition, we find the pasting 
condition between two general solution. 
A+B =A+B 
Am, +Bm2 =Am, +Bm2 
(viii) 
(1X) 
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A m, -m2 
B m, - m, 
(X) 
Combining two smoothing conditions between No and N* we find the magnitude of 
the model, 
2 
A =_M2 exp((m2 - m, )N*)B ml 
z 
-m2 exp((m2 - m, )N*)Bm, exp(m, N*) + Bm2 exp(m2 N*) =1 
m, 
B= exp(-m2 N*) 
m' (m, - m2) ' (xi) m2 
Similarly for another parameter, we find, 
2 
B= -exp((m, - m2)N*)A 
2M 
-M zz exp((m, - m2 )N*)Am2 exp(m2 N*) + Bm, exp(m, N*) =1 
m2 
,) A= exp(-m, N*)' (m2 -M m, 
The critical value for zero-dividend threshold is given by: 
A mz , ý--m, -m2 _ Bmz 
exp(m2 - m, )N m-ml > 
N* =(M2- m1)-' In 
m2 ml - m2 (xiii) 
m2 m, -ml 
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Exhibit 5. B. 1 
Simulation result 
THE CONCEPT OF CAPITAL 
N V V,, Vx,, -(VX)VX) 
-0.5 24.77 10.78 4.69 -0.44 
-0.4 25.87 11.26 4.90 -0.44 
-0.3 27.02 11.76 5.12 -0.44 
-0.2 28.23 12.29 5.35 -0.44 
-0.1 29.48 12.83 5.59 -0.44 
0 30.79 13.40 -99.84 7.45 
0.1 31.74 6.54 -44.71 6.84 
0.2 32.22 3.47 -20.01 5.77 
0.3 32.49 2.09 -8.95 4.27 
0.4 32.67 1.48 -3.99 2.70 
0.5 32.80 1.21 -1.77 1.47 
0.6 32.91 1.08 -0.78 0.72 
0.7 33.02 1.03 -0.33 0.32 
0.8 33.12 1.01 -0.13 0.13 
0.9 33.22 1.00 -0.04 0.04 
1 33.32 1.00 0.00 0.00 
The shareholder value as a solution to the ordinary differential equations is illustrated in 
Exhibit 5. B. 22. 
Exhibit 5. B. 2 
Shareholder value as a function of the equity ratio 
35 
30 
E 
m 25 
0 
0 
d 20 
ýa 
15 
10 
5 
I? ^ Oý Oý Oý Oý Off' 
Net Asset Value 
2 Parameter values are the same with those of Milne and Whalley (1998), setting E=1, p=0.03, N and V 
are expressed as multiple annual earnings, a1=0.5 and 62=1, and shareholder participation a1=1 and 
a2=0.5 and Poisson ratio q=0.5. 
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- (Vxx /V expresses the portfolio decision impacts on both expected returns and 
variance of the returns; thus, - (Vý,, /V) determines the mean-variance trade-off (Milne 
and Robertson, 1996). 
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Appendix 5. C 
Financial participation in a sharing contract 
The analysis explores the effect of financial participation by the bank's shareholders on 
the quality of contracts. The analysis starts with the following assumptions: 
i. The shareholders and the investment depositors share the monetary surplus in 
proportion to their financial shares E: f (OC, a(OC)) . 
ii. The investment depositors and the shareholders have strictly concave utility 
functions. 
iii. The shareholders suffer from opportunity loss for any effort given to monitor the 
bank performance V(e) , and 
if they invest the money somewhere else Ooc (OC). 
iv. The investment depositors suffer from opportunity loss if they invest the money 
somewhere else 
0 
PSIAU (EC - OC) . [when EC equals to total equity-based capital) 
Hence, we have the shareholders' utility function Uoc :f (OC, a(OC), e(OC, a(OC))) 
and the PSIA" holders' utility function 
UPSIAU 
:f (OC, a(OC), e(OC, a(OC))) . This 
analysis is inspired by Baldwin (2000). Let us assume that Uoc is determined by the 
E 
shared monetary surplus [ 
Ja(OC)Ef (E, e)dE ] minus agency cost V (e) and the 
E 
opportunity cost of funds Ooc (OC) , which 
is expressed in equation (C. 1). 
E 
fEf (E, e)dE 
E 
expresses the expected outcome as a function of e and the density 
function of production uncertainty EE [E, E]. 
E 
Uoc = 
Ja(OC)Ef(E, e)dE -V (e) - Ooc (OC) 
E 
(C. 1) 
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Similarly, for the PSIAU , UPSIAU is determined by the shared monetary surplus and the 
opportunity cost of funds OPSIAU (PSIA"), which is expressed in equation (C. 2). 
E 
UPSIAU = 
j(1- a(OC))Ef (E, e)dE - OPSIAU (EC - OC) 
E 
(C. 2) 
According to Harris and Raviv (1978), Pareto improvement can be achieved if the 
agent's expected utility can be increased without decreasing the expected utility of the 
other party. Assuming that the investment depositors are invariant to compensating 
changes in a(OC) and OC, the total differentiation gives: 
ýUPSIAý 
dOC + 
aUPSIAU 
aOC öa 
as 
dOC =O 
aoc 
(C. 3) 
Differentiating Uoc and UPSfAU with respect to a(OC) we have: 
aU°C 
= a' (OC)Ef (E, e)de öa(OC) 
0UPSIAU 
= -a' (OC)Ef (E, e)de aa(OC) 
Hence, 
au0C auPSJAU 
aa(OC) aa(OC) 
Differentiating totally the shareholders utility function gives: 
d Uoc = 
aUýý 
dOC + 
aU°C as 
dOC + 
aU0ý [ae öa 
+ 
ae 
dOC 
aoc as a0C ae 
[aa 
ÖOC aoc 
(C. 4) 
(C. 5) 
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Combining the agent compensating condition (C. 3) and (C. 4) into the 
shareholders'/depositors' utility for compensating changes in a(OC) and OC gives: 
av _ 
av°C 
+ 
(UPSJAU 
°ý - aoc aoc 
+ 
aUoC äe as 
+ äe öa 3OC 
ae 
ao 
dOC (C. 6) 
The quality of the contract will be improved if dU0C >0 (if the UPSIAU utility function 
at least the same while the OC improves (the changes is higher than 0), the contract is 
said to be improved). Substituting equation (C. 3) and (C. 4) into (C. 6), we have: 
aUPSIAý 
aoc + 
aU 
aoc 
oý = (o PSIA U (oc) - ooc (0c» (C. 7) 
Therefore, 
[Ooc (OC) -OU (OC)] < 
au0 ae öa 
+ 
öe (C. 8) PSIA ae as aOC ÖOC 
This means that the necessary condition for higher quality of contracts are: 
[1] the utility must be positively correlated with effort, 
[2] effort is positively correlated with profit share, 
[3] profit share is positively correlated with financial participation, and 
[4] marginal opportunity cost should be lower than the monetary surplus. 
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Appendix 5. D 
Simulation of the proposed capital regulation 
In the simulation, we use a minimum CAR of 8% (equation 5.5) and a rOCR ratio PSIA 
of 6% to find the overall capital ratio requirement (i. e. the higher of the two). In the 
simulation, we keep the total value of PSIA" and SA equal to 1. 
Exhibit 5. D. 1 
Simulation of proposed capital regulation 
CAR' FP The higher req. of Rel. Agency 
SA PSIAu Sc1 Sc2 Sc3 Sc1 CAR and FP OCITA OC/PSIAu Cost 
100% 50% 150% 0.06 100% 50% 150% 100% 50% 150% 100% 50% 150% 100% 50% 150% 
0.99 0.01 0.079 0.040 0.119 0.001 0.079 0.040 0.119 0.073 0.038 0.106 7.92 3.96 11.88 1.1 1.2 1.1 
0.95 0.05 0.076 0.038 0,114 0.003 0.076 0.038 0.114 0.071 0.037 0.102 1.52 0.76 2.28 1.6 2.3 1.4 
0.90 0.10 0.072 0.036 0.108 0.006 0.072 0.036 0.108 0.067 0.035 0.097 0.72 0.36 1.08 2.3 3.6 1.9 
0.85 0.15 0.068 0.034 0.102 0.009 0.068 0.034 0.102 0.064 0.033 0.093 0.45 0.23 0.68 3.1 5.1 2.4 
0.80 0.20 0.064 0.032 0.096 0.012 0.064 0.032 0.096 0.060 0.031 0.088 0.32 0.16 0.48 4.0 6.8 3.0 
0.75 0.25 0.060 0.030 0.090 0.015 0.060 0.030 0.090 0.057 0.029 0.083 0.24 0.12 0.36 4.9 8.5 3.6 
0.70 0.30 0.056 0.028 0.084 0.018 0.056 0.028 0.084 0.053 0.027 0.077 0.19 0.09 0.28 6.0 10.5 4.4 
0.65 0.35 0.052 0.026 0.078 0.021 0.052 0.026 0.078 0.049 0.025 0.072 0.15 0.07 0.22 7.2 12.6 5.2 
0.60 0.40 0.048 0.024 0.072 0.024 0.048 0.024 0.072 0.046 0.023 0.067 0.12 0.06 0.18 8.5 15.0 6.2 
0.55 0.45 0.044 0.022 0.066 0.027 0.044 0.027 0.066 0.042 0.026 0.062 0.10 0.06 0.15 10.1 15.0 7.3 
0.50 0.50 0.040 0.020 0.060 0.030 0.040 0.030 0.060 0.038 0.029 0.057 0.08 0.06 0.12 11.9 15.0 8.5 
0.45 0.55 0.036 0.018 0.054 0.033 0.036 0.033 0.054 0.035 0.032 0.051 0.07 0.06 0.10 14.0 15.0 10.1 
0.40 0.60 0.032 0.016 0.048 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.048 0.035 0.035 0.046 0.06 0.06 0.08 15.0 15.0 11.9 
0.35 0.65 0.028 0.014 0.042 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.042 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.06 0.06 0.06 15.0 15.0 14.1 
0.30 0.70 0.024 0.012 0.036 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.06 0.06 0.06 15.0 15.0 15.0 
0.25 0.75 0.020 0.010 0.030 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.06 0.06 0.06 15.0 15.0 15.0 
0.20 0.80 0.016 0.008 0.024 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.06 0.06 0.06 15.0 15.0 15.0 
0.15 0.85 0.012 0.006 0.018 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.06 0.06 0.06 15.0 15.0 15.0 
0.10 0.90 0.008 0.004 0.012 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.06 0.06 0.06 15.0 15.0 15.0 
0.05 0.95 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.06 0.06 0.06 15.0 15.0 15.0 
0.00 1.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.06 0.06 0.06 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Sc1: Scenario 1 for average risk weight of 100% 
Sc2: Scenario 1 for average risk weight of 50% 
Sc3: Scenario 1 for average risk weight of 150% 
The higher requirement of CAR and FP: 
If the requirement set by the CAR is higher than the minimum requirement for financial participation, then the CAR is binding and 
vice versa. 
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Appendix 5. E 
Stochastic effect in shareholder value under safety net arrangement 
Applying Ito's lemma to shareholder value in order to find the stochastic effect, partial 
differential equation will be as follow: 
YUt = aegt - KsDt + gtpDtPD 
avt 
g 
aUt + 
agt aDt 
2 6g a2Ur z 6D a2Ut a2Ut +g 2ag2+ D` 2 aDt + gt 
Dt P6g 6D agt aDt 
(E. 1) 
Manipulation the solution of the form U(gt, Dt) =V (gt / Dt )Dt , we can 
find the 
homogenous differential equation as follow: 
(r - ýD )V skr) _ (aek, - KS) + (fig -, uD )k, V' (kt) + 
6K kr V, 'Akt ) 
2 
(E. 2) 
The homogenous and unique solution of the differential equation (D. 2) is represented as 
follow: 
V(k, ) = m(k, )+n(kt) 
m (k, ) = A(k, ) "+ B(k, )", 
n(kt) = C+Dk, 
D= 
aekt 
(r - , ug 
) 
KS 
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The complete solution of differential equation (D. 2) is given by: 
V (kt) = 
aekt 
- [(r_iug) 
KS aek 
(r IUD) (r - , ug 
) 
KS kt 
(r - PD)k 
The liability of the government is given by: 
* kf L(k) = 
KS -m 
_ 
ae k* 
_ 
Ks -m 
-c(k) PD) g 
The minimum threshold for closing that maximise shareholder value is given by: 
k* = max{V(k)} 
a(V (k)) a aekt 
ak ak (r - jug 
KS aek 
(r IUD) (r - 1ug 
) 
KS kt 
(r-pD) k 
(E. 3) 
(E. 4) 
(E. 5) 
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ISLAMIC BANKING OPERATIONS 
AS EXAMPLIFIED BY ONE INDONESIAN ISLAMIC BANK 
6.1. Introduction 
As explained in chapter 3, there has only been one Islamic bank in operation in 
Indonesia since 1992 until the government officially recognised Islamic banking at the 
end of 1998. The bank is one of the commercial banks which survived the severe 
economic turbulence during the period 1997 to 1999. This chapter analyses the financial 
characteristics of the bank on both the assets and liabilities sides (including the 
identification of the types of depositors existing with the bank), and assesses its 
operations from a prudential point of views. The analysis also includes an analysis of 
asset quality (i. e. assessing the expected losses of the fixed assets and modelling the 
variable returns), leading to capital adequacy assessment of the bank. This empirical 
analysis shows the practical relevance of the international standards to Islamic banking 
operations. 
Most of the financial data used in the analysis is secondary data, which is collected from 
several sources. The first data source is the annual reports of the bank during the period 
1993 to 2000. The second data source is the finance department of PT. BMI, which has 
provided information about commercial loans covering the period 1994 to 20002. The 
third data source is the savings department of PT. BMI, which has provided information 
about the bank's savings (including rates of return paid). Other supplementary 
information was obtained through interviews with different layers of bank officers, 
including officers of the treasury and marketing departments. Secondary data, 
concerning indexes of the macro economy (including historical bank lending and 
' The data used comes courtesy of PT. Bank Muamalat Indonesia Thk (PT. BMI). 
2 The companies are not identified. 
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deposit rates, GDP per sector) was collected from the monetary and economic research 
directorate (UREM), Bank Indonesia. 
6.2. The building blocks 
6.2.1. The surplus allocation scheme 
The bank offers hybrid revenue-sharing contracts to give monetary incentives to the 
savings depositors. Exhibit 6.1 shows the investment cash-flow process (and revenue 
allocation) in the Islamic bank. 
Exhibit 6.1 
Investment cash-flow process for the Islamic bank 
SAFC +EC 
(1) 
FC FC VC SAFC Rr The bank's SAt = SA t_, + 
SAt_1 
(3) (2) assets 
A(Rt -SAFC) >_ 0 vc SA, (4) 
(1- A)(Rr - SAFCr )- Mr Mr The bank's 
-ý 
:y 
ECr (6) (ý management 
Sources: Interviews with officers in the accounting department of PT. BMI 
All sources of funds (SA[ c and EC) (1) are allocated into earning assets by the 
management to produce returns (R) (2). The returns from the individual earning assets 
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--- -- ------ -- -- 
are reduced by the principal values (SAF c) of the assets (3). The reduced (positive) 
monetary surplus becomes the share base for the depositors (A(Rt - SAr c)) (4)3. The 
share base for the share-holders is also reduced to cover managerial expenses (i. e. 
overheads (Me)) (5) before, finally, becoming monetary surplus for the shareholders 
((1- A)(Rt - SAt C) - Mr) . On the liabilities side, the financial structure resembles the 
structure of western banks, except for the sharing of monetary surplus. This surplus 
allocation scheme shows clearly the adoption of hybrid contracts by the bank and risk- 
averse depositors. And, the monetary surplus is allocated before taking managerial and 
operational costs into account; therefore, it is unlikely that depositors receive zero 
returns. The priority of the revenue is to assure the repayment of the loan principal. 
Finally, the analysis above shows the dominance of fiduciary roles that should be 
conducted by the bank. 
6.2.2. The liabilities side of the bank 
Bank's liabilities structure 
The bank has been dominated by hybrid-type financial sources in its liabilities structure 
since mid-1995. The fixed claim liabilities (SAFc) include `wadiah' current accounts 
(CA), savings deposits (SD) and time deposits (TD). The variable claim liabilities 
consist of profit share (SAc) of CA, SD, and TD. As mentioned earlier, SAVc will be 
transformed into SAFc in every calculating period. Since the interval period is short 
(every month), operationally, SAVc is not significant and does not appear in the bank's 
financial position. Since neither restricted nor unrestricted investment deposits (PSIAR 
or PSIA") exist, the bank is effectively financed only by EC and SAFc. Exhibit 6.2 
provides a further breakdown of the liabilities side of the bank. 
3 The monetary surplus paid to the depositors will be added to the principal amount at the end of every 
calculating period. For example, one has saving deposits of amount 100. The monetary surplus paid by 
the bank is 10 (shared monetary surplus). In the next period, the total amount of the principal will be 110. 
Therefore, by the end of every calculating period, SAVC will be reset to zero. 
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Exhibit 6.2 
The bank's liabilities structure: a further breakdown 
ErVTPIR1C.: AL ANALYSIS 
Products Fixed claims Variable claims 
SAFC Fixed - 
SAvc , EC - 
Sharing index is 
fixed 
Exhibit 6.3 shows the ratio between equity capital (EC) and total liabilities (TL) of the 
bank during the period 1992 to 2000 (see Appendix 6. A for further details). The 
domination of equity based capital (EC) during the period 1992 to mid-1994 is because 
it had just started operations, hence the bank was in the `expansion' period (the 
operations had not reached the `steady-state' period). 
Exhibit 6.3 
The EC to TL ratio 
100% 
'tea' 75% 
0 
O 
ca 
50% 
J 
H 
O 
25% 
o% 
Cl, ýD , 'A ýFo ý: 6c (>J IC 
§' 
ION ýJ' N(: b' Noj 
Source: Annual reports of PT. BMI during period 1992 to 2000 
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Types of investors 
As reviewed earlier, there are a number of possible types of investor who place their 
funds in an Islamic bank. There are investors who are concerned about the sharia rules 
and some who are not. There are also investors who are risk-takers and some who are 
risk-averse. All these possible types of investor are described in Exhibit 6.4. 
Type I investors are common depositors that are risk-averse and are not religiously 
driven. They expect the highest deposit return possible without considering whether the 
monetary rewards come from Islamic banks or western banks. Type II investors are 
risk-takers and do not have any preference for sharia-based suppliers. They are willing 
to accept higher expected rates of return and even financial losses. Type III investors are 
religiously-driven depositors and risk averse, who are concerned about the sharia 
compliance of their income and their capital safety. Type IV investors are risk-takers 
but are still concerned about compliance with sharia rules. 
Exhibit 6.4 
Possible types of investor in Islamic banks 
Sharia Risk The need for financial certainty Types of 
orientation preference depositors 
Risk averse Principal and return are fixed. They will choose the Type I 
Non-sharia highest return possible, either from Islamic banks or 
minded western banks. 
Risk taking Principal and return are not guaranteed. They will Type II 
choose any possible investment that can give them the 
highest expected return possible. 
Risk averse Principal is guaranteed, return is not guaranteed. They Type III 
Sharia will stay in an Islamic bank as long as they don't face 
minded losses. 
Risk taking Principal and return are not guaranteed. They will Type IV 
choose only the sharia-approved investments. 
The analysis aims to identify the types of investor who are likely to have stayed with the 
Islamic bank, although some characteristics, like the risk preference of the depositors, 
can be recognised by just looking at the details of the liabilities structure. Let us start by 
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analysing the returns paid by the Islamic bank. Since its establishment in 1992, the rates 
of return paid to depositors have never been higher than the rate of return paid by a 
western bank. Exhibit 6.5 shows how the rates of return differ, especially within the 
period 1998 to 19994. The full line indicates the rate of return for a 1-month savings 
deposit in the Islamic bank and the dashed line indicates the average rate of return on 1- 
month savings deposits in western banks. 
Based on the historical returns paid to the investors of the Islamic banks, it is unlikely 
that the Type I investors remained with the Islamic bank. Although providing the 
investors with fixed rates of return, the return paid was always lower than that paid by 
the western banks. Hence, the Islamic bank could not fulfil the needs of the Type I 
investors. 
Exhibit 6.5 
Rates of return given by Islamic banks and conventional banks 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
------------- 
"'C ec, 
Deposit 1 mo ....... Conv R1 mo 
Source: Bank Indonesia and PT. BMI, compiled 
4 The huge differential occurred as a result of the economic crisis in Indonesia. The government was 
trying to maintain the value of foreign exchange (preventing further capital flight) at a `reasonable' rate, 
at the cost of a very high interest rate. At the same time, the fundamentals of the Indonesian economy 
were badly hit because of its dependency on imported capital goods. Most Indonesian firms were 
adversely effected, which was reflected in the general quality of the Indonesian banks' assets. 
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As mentioned earlier, a second set of evidence shows that investment depositors did not 
exist in the bank. The depositors were not prepared to face uncertainty side by side with 
the bank. It was found that all depositors placed their funds in savings/current accounts5. 
Therefore, type II and type IV investors did not exist in the Islamic bank. This leaves 
only type III investors as possible long-term customers. However, in order to check if 
this was the case, there is a need to test the significance of the evidence. We have two 
hypotheses to fulfil: 
Hypothesis 1: The investors do not care about the returns as long as they are still 
positive. Hence, the deposit growth would not be correlated with the 
interest rate differential, which reflects the opportunity loss for the 
depositors. 
Hypothesis 2: The investors will withdraw their funds if there is a possibility of the 
return becoming negative. Hence, there will be a negative correlation 
between the deposit growth and the probability of financial losses 
accruing to the depositors. 
Exhibit 6.6 shows the depositors' attitude towards the opportunity loss of saving in the 
Islamic bank. The full line indicates the deposit growth in the Islamic bank and the 
dashed line indicates the return differential between the Islamic bank and the western 
banks. The negative value of the return differential indicates the opportunity loss facing 
the depositors in the Islamic banks. The statistical test (in Exhibit 6. B. 1, Appendix 6. B) 
shows that the investors who put their funds in savings deposits do not really care about 
opportunity loss. 
S The rewards for depositors are represented by revenue share indexes that are typical for each different 
term of deposit. The longer the term, the higher the revenue share index for depositors as a representation 
of higher risk premium. 
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Exhibit 6.6 
Growth of depositors' funds and differential rates of return 
30 
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0 y (1Q 
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Savings deposit growth 
Return differential 
Source: Bank Indonesia (2000) and PT. BMI, compiled 
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They could have got higher returns if they had put their funds in the western banks, 
especially within the period of 1998 to 1999 when the return differential between the 
Islamic bank and western banks was extremely high. The coefficient of correlation 
between opportunity loss and growth of savings deposits is 0.095 (because it is near to 
zero, it means very weak correlation). 
Exhibit 6.7 
Probability of loss and level of deposit growth 
2 
1 
0 
1c cb C, 41 
Savi ngs deposit growth ---" Probability of loss 
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The following analysis identifies the depositors' preference towards possible financial 
loss by the depositors as a result of possible bank closure without protection from a 
deposit insurance scheme. Deposit growth (Gd) is classified into three level of growth: 
`high' (denoted as 2, Gd > 10%); `normal' (denoted as 1,0% < Gd < 10%); and 
negative (denoted as 0, Gd < 0%). The probability of loss is distinguished in three 
regions. It is defined as `high' (denoted as 2, when there was an incidence of financial 
panic due to the closure of 16 commercial banks without deposit insurance protection); 
`moderate' (denoted as 1, when most of the commercial banks' assets were deteriorating 
significantly); and `low' (denoted as 0, when the government announced a blanket 
guarantee scheme so that there was no possibility of depositors losing money). Exhibit 
6.7 shows the relationship between the probability of incurring financial losses and the 
deposit growth of the bank. The statistical tests (see Exhibit 6. B. 2,6. B. 3 and 6. B. 4 in 
Appendix 6. B) show how the depositors were worried about their funds in the short 
period between end-1997 and early 1998. This is indicated by a high value of the 
Pearson Chi-Square that shows the significance of the probability of losses on deposit 
growth (with a negative correlation coefficient (-. 713)). This confirms the second 
hypothesis for the whole period of the bank's operations. 
6.2.2. The assets side of the bank 
Assets structure 
The Islamic bank operates in a traditional way. Most of the operations involve giving 
loans and facilitating short-term trade-financing activities. The bank relies heavily on 
mark-up products. The general asset composition of the bank is described in Exhibit 6.8. 
This shows how the Islamic bank is not confident enough to apply pure PLS schemes6. 
The borrowers are required to guarantee the repayment of the principal amount in full. 
Technically, the Islamic bank holds collateral to enhance the principal repayment. The 
6 Karim (2000), reports that the bank is still in the phase of implementing small-scale pilot projects to 
observe how a pure PLS concept works in the Indonesian community. 
So far, he reports that the pilot 
projects are quite promising (i. e. delivering a high rate of return). 
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Islamic bank has also been conducting other financial activities, like currency trading 
and facilitating export/import activities. However, the volume of these activities has not 
been significant. 
Exhibit 6.8 
General asset composition of the bank 
Types Contract Share Items 
of asset base base 
Non productive 
assets - - - Cash 
Fixed return - - Bank current account 
- Sharia based Treasury Bills 
- Sharia based Commercial Papers 
- Trade financing 
Productive assets - Leasing 
Hybrid types of Revenue - Financing 
contract - Placements 
Profit - 
Full sharing Revenue - 
contracts Profit and loss - 
Source: The annual financial reports of PT. BMI, compiled 
6.3. Prudential operations 
6.3.1. Asset and liabilities structure 
As reviewed in chapter 5, a prudent assets and liabilities structure is very important for 
the operational sustainability of the Islamic bank. Exhibit 6.9 shows the ratio of fixed 
claim assets to fixed claim liabilities. The period between 1992 and mid-1994 indicates 
a transient condition (ratio of fixed claim assets to fixed claim liabilities was declining 
rapidly) before reaching a steady-state condition. The variable claim assets include 
financial participation in other banks and a very limited (e. g. in terms of pilot projects) 
amount of PLS-based projects. On the liabilities side, the variable claim part includes 
only equity-based capital. The analysis shows that the bank has never excessively used 
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pure-sharing types of contract on its assets side to balance the increasing existence of 
fixed claim liabilities; therefore, the interests of risk-averse depositors in the Islamic 
bank are always well served. 
Exhibit 6.9 
Ratio of fixed claim assets to fixed claim liabilities 
600% 
500% 
400% 
300% 
200% 
100% 
0% 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Sources: Annual financial reports of PT. BMI, compiled 
6.3.2. Fixed claim asset quality assessment and capital adequacy 
In conducting lending activities, all banks, including the Islamic bank studied here, are 
required to comply with sound lending practices to minimise credit risk. First, the 
Islamic bank is restricted to a legal lending limit regulation. The regulation is aimed at 
minimising concentration risk. Second, the bank is also required to assess the repayment 
capacity of the borrowers. This includes a continuous assessment of the borrowers' 
financial conditions and the value of the collateral taken. In this section, I would like to 
demonstrate how current statistical techniques are useful for evaluating the asset quality 
of the Islamic bank. The analysis of risk assessment emphasises the role of loans as the 
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dominant financial activity of the bank (see Exhibit 6.10 for the historical general asset 
composition of the bank and Appendix 6. C for more details). 
Exhibit 6.10 
Historical general asset composition of the bank 
100% 
Ö 75% 
O- 
E4' 
50% 
yO 
25% 
0% 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Sources: Annual financial reports of PT. BMI, compiled 
The fixed-claim type of assets of the Islamic bank comprises the mark-up based assets 
and the fixed-part of the hybrid type assets. The lending process for this type of asset is 
similar to the lending process of western banks. In order to quantify the financial risk 
inherent in the process, it is possible to adopt the approaches developed by the BIS 
(Basel Committee, 2001). 
Standardised (i. e. simple) Approach 
Adjusted (eligible) capital base (ACB) 
The components of capital available -The bank has two elements of Tier-1 capital; 
ordinary paid up share capital and disclosed reserves. The bank has also only one 
element of Tier-2 capital; general loan loss reserves. During the period 1998 to 1999, 
the ACB of the bank eroded significantly. Illustration of the part played by equity 
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capital (paid up capital and profit/loss) in absorbing financial loss during the period 
mid-1997 to 1999 is provided in Exhibit 6.11. The financial losses resulted from the 
write-off of non-performing earning assets. The shareholders injected more paid-up 
capital to maintain a sound level of capital adequacy (the analysis of capital adequacy is 
conducted in the next section). 
Exhibit 6.11 
Capital structure and profit and loss 
200000 
p 
150000 
100000 
co 
cl- 50000 
00 
-5000G 
-100000 
-150000 
Paid-up Capital 
-- Profit/loss 
Total Equity 
Sources: Annual financial reports of PT. BMI, compiled 
Exhibit 6.12 shows the relationship between industrial production (service industry) and 
the performance of earning assets during the period 1992 to 2000. Industrial production 
is represented by the real GDP level, and the performance of earning assets is 
represented by the ratio of non-performing assets/loans to total assets. The non- 
performing loans are defined to include three loan categories: `non-current'; `doubtful'; 
and 'loss'. The NPLs are expressed in nominal terms. The dramatic economic recession 
(shown by the fall in the GDP level to minus 20 percent by end-1998) caused a major 
deterioration in the asset quality of the bank. This is explained as follows: 
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Exhibit 6.12 
Percentage of non performing loans and the level of industrial production 
inn 
. -. 
0 ... 
Industrial production growth rate 
Source: Bank Indonesia and PT. BMI, compiled 
The GDP level (in a particular industry area) shows the aggregate volume of business 
activities; the downturn in the GDP level indicates a lower level of business activity 
(and intuitively, profitability); and a lower level of profit earned may result in a higher 
level of credit problems (a higher percentage of NPLs). 
Allowance for earning asset losses - The bank is required to establish allowance for 
earning asset losses in the forms of general provision and special provision to cover 
risks of losses7. The general provision can be included as a component of Tier-2 ACB 
(subject to maximum amount of 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. The special provision is 
calculated from the loss probability of the loan classifications, which should be reported 
regularly by the banks. The trend for the allowance for earning asset looses is illustrated 
7 Decree of the Board of Managing Directors of Bank Indonesia No. 31/148/KEP/DIR concerning 
Allowance for Earning Asset Losses. 
8 The allowance is subject to standard provisions of 0%, 15%, 50% and 100% for the loan classifications 
current, non-current, doubtful and loss respectively. 
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in Exhibit 6.13. The increase in NPLs during the period mid-1997 to 2000 has required 
the bank to allocate a high level of reserves, as shown in Exhibit 6.13. 
Exhibit 6.13 
Allowance for earning asset losses 
40,000 
r 30,000 
20,000 
U) c 0 
2 10,000 
0 
1 
Risk weights and risk weighted assets 
The treatment of the debt-based liabilities in an Islamic bank is the same as that of the 
conventional banks. The risk weight on (acceptably) collateralised exposures will be 
subject to a floor of 20%. All the exposures (including the fixed claim part of the hybrid 
asset products) that are fully collateralised, will be subject to this floor. The loans that 
are guaranteed by unrecognised collateral will be subject to a 100% risk weight. The 
classification of the eligibility of the collateral is heavily related to the level of 
marketability necessary to allow a bank to meet its liquidity needs. Exhibit 6.14 shows 
the weighting value of each type of asset and the total RWAs of the bank in the period 
1992 to 1999. 
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The sharp decrease of RWAs, between period mid-1997 to mid-1998, is a result of two 
aspects. First, an adverse economic condition has resulted in deterioration of asset 
quality and subsequently a high level of loan write-offs. Second, in such economic 
condition, the bank seemed to be quite reluctant to make new lending. Instead, the bank 
allocated more of its funding to buy central bank's securities (i. e. similar with treasury 
bills (TBs) in the U. S. ). 
Exhibit 6.14 
(a) Risk weights 
Types 
of asset 
RW 
Cash 0 
Bank C/A 0 
Treasury bills 0 
CP 20 
Trade 
financing 
100 
Leasing 100 
Other 
financing 
100 
Placements 100 
60 0 
v, 50 0 
CL 40 0 
0 
- 30 0 
20 0 
100 
0 
(b) Risk weighted assets of the banks 
Capital adequacy 
Based on the calculations for the ACB and RWAs above, it is possible to calculate the 
bank's capital adequacy ratio during the period 1992 to 1999. The amount of equity 
capital paid in by the shareholders is subject to the BIS minimum requirement of 8% of 
the total of risk weighted assets. Exhibit 6.15 shows how the capital adequacy ratio fell 
below the minimum requirement of 8% in mid-1998, as a result of financial losses, but 
has since recovered. 
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Exhibit 6.15 
Capital adequacy ratio 
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60 
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The CAR of the bank was high in the early 90's because the bank started its operation 
with a high paid-up capital. Along with the increase in fixed-claim deposits (SA), the 
proportion of its equity capital (EC) to risk-weighted assets (RWAs) decreased. In 
other words, the bank was in an expansion period. 
A possible use of an Internal Ratings Based (IRB) Approach in the future 
As an alternative to the standardised approach and subject to supervisory approval 
among other things, the bank may also adopt the IRB approach to calculate the capital 
adequacy ratio, which incorporates some significant internal as well as external 
variables in the calculation. The bank is required to fulfil a set of minimum 
preconditions before being able to use the IRB approach. Those requirements are 
outlined in the new Basel Capital Accord (BIS, 2001). This analysis is conducted to 
assess the feasibility of the bank adopting the IRB approach as an alternative to the 
standardised approach in assessing capital adequacy in the future. If the bank has not 
met the minimum requirements, this analysis can help in indicating what further steps 
the bank needs to take. 
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Preconditions for adoption of the IRB approach 
In terms of exposures, the bank can still be categorised as a retail bank. Most of the 
exposures represent loans to individuals or small businesses, which are guaranteed by 
individuals. The bank has never made a loan to a corporate or been involved in large 
scale project-financing. In this analysis, I draw on minimum requirements applicable to 
retail exposures outlined in the new Basel Capital Accord (paragraphs 422 to 478). 
Exhibit 6.16 shows the variability of loan size of the bank's exposures in 1999. 
Exhibit 6.16 
Distribution of loan size during 1999 
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400 
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Range of loan size 
(Millions of Rupiahs) 
Source: Financing department of PT. BMI 
Segmentation - The bank has three 
dominant product types: instalment loans, 
residential mortgages, and small business loans. The bank also segments 
its exposures 
by delinquency status. 
Completeness and integrity of rating assessment - The bank has a dedicated team 
that, specifically, conduct monitoring activities on an ongoing 
basis to review the 
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performance of each individual loan. The performance of the loans is measured only by 
identifying the delinquency periods. For further improvement (i. e. to deliver a more 
accurate rating process), the bank could also complete the supporting information with 
other related information, such as external economic indicators and individual credit 
ratings. 
Oversight over the rating system and processes - The bank has a procedure to 
approve the rating process on a monthly basis. The rating process is also reviewed 
annually by an external auditor as an integrated part of the annual reporting process. 
Criteria on orientation of the rating system - The bank has a sufficient 
documentation system, although it is conducted on a paper basis (not electronically). 
Information about loans made, collateral and the borrowers is already available. 
However, in order to help senior management make business decisions more efficiently, 
the introduction of an electronic-data-base seems to be unavoidable. As mentioned 
earlier, the data coverage should also extend to a complete set of internal as well as 
external data. 
Requirements for estimation of EAD, and either (a) PD/LGD or (b) EL - The bank 
has already recognised the probability of default for individual loan, in terms of loan 
classifications (based on delinquency periods). The new Basel Accord has also 
mentioned the possibility of using external data or statistical models for quantification 
providing a strong link between a bank's basis of segmentation and its risk profile. 
The analysis above shows that the bank is in a position to use the IRB approach as an 
alternative to the standardised methodology to calculate its capital adequacy ratio. 
Notwithstanding this, further improvements are still needed to secure a higher level of 
accuracy. 
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Collateral and Loss Given Default 
In the calculation of LGD, all exposure will be charged at 100% on the residual risks. 
The level of charge is chosen because all exposures are backed-up by non-liquid types 
of collateral/non-marketable fixed assets (i. e. the collateral value is not taken into 
account). 
Probability of Default (PD) 
An accurate assessment of the bank's financial condition is very useful to the bank as 
well as the supervisor as a measure of the bank's soundness. According to the new 
Basel accord, the bank should regard internal data as the primary source of information 
for estimating loss characteristics. In addition to that, the bank is also permitted to use 
external data or statistical models that provide strong links between the bank's basis of 
segmentation and its risk profile. The external data available is the industrial 
performances of the related sectors. 
However, this data, which should be properly managed and monitored, is limited. It 
covers loan size, terms of contracts, industry performance, and the performance of the 
individual loan. Nevertheless, based on these variables, it is possible to conduct 
statistical tests to measure the significance of the variables in affecting the performance 
of the loans. 
The hypothesis : The variables identified (terms of contracts, loan size and 
performance indexes of the related industries) have a significant 
statistical correlation with loan quality (credit migration)9. 
Credit migration expresses the probability of the loan quality of an asset moving from 
one status to another or otherwise remaining in the same status, within a certain period. 
As mentioned in the hypothesis, the migration process can be influenced by both 
internal and external factors. The first statistical test is conducted to find a possible 
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correlation between industrial performance indexes and credit migration. The results of 
the statistical test are given in Exhibit 6. D. 1, Appendix 6. D. They show a significant 
correlation between industrial performance and credit migrations. A second statistical 
test is conducted to find any possible correlation between the terms of contracts and 
credit migration. The results of the statistical test are given in Exhibit 6. D. 2, Appendix 
6. D. They show an insignificant correlation between the terms of contracts and credit 
migration. A third statistical test is conducted to find possible correlation between loan 
size and credit migration. The results of the statistical test are given in Exhibit 6. D. 3, 
Appendix 6. D. They show insignificant correlation between loan size and credit 
migration. 
From these statistical tests, one is able to conclude that only the external variables 
(industrial performance indexes) are statistically related to loan quality (credit 
migration). The economic conditions, which are indicated by the economic variables, 
are a reflection of the actual economic activities. Intuitively, it can be understood that in 
an economic recession period, most economic activities are slowing down. The logical 
consequence is a downgrading of loan quality in the whole banking system. This 
statistical finding has consequences for the statistical modelling. The internal data, 
which should be the primary source of information for estimating loss characteristics 
according to the estimation requirements of the new Basel Accord, is no longer relevant. 
Therefore, there is less possibility of the bank using an IRB-approach for the calculation 
of capital adequacy. 
In the absence of relevant internal data, the following analysis tries to construct a 
statistical model that explains the probability of credit migration as a function of 
industry performance. In this case, I use a logistic function (logit). The methodology for 
the statistical model is illustrated in Exhibit 6.17. 
91 use credit migration to represent the probability of deterioration or up-grade of the individual loan 
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Exhibit 6.17 
Methodology of probability calculation 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Loan 
quality 
Step 1 
logit 
analysis 
Step 2 
logit 
analysis 
Step 3 
logit 
analysis 
Probability 
1 
1 P 4 1 P 3 
1 -P(2) P(1) _ (1 - P(2))(1- P(3))(1- P(4)) 
2 - 
( ) - ( ) P(2) P(2) = (1- P(3))(1- P(4))P(3) 
3 P(3) P(3) _ (1 - P(4))P(3) 
4 P(4) P(4) = P(4) 
Loans are classified into 4 categories. They are: `current' (coil-1); `non-current' (coll- 
2); `doubtful' (coll-3); and `loss' (coll-4). The credit migration expresses the probability 
of a loan migrating from one classification to another during a given period of time. 
Step 1 of the logit analysis calculates the probability of loan quality migrating to/ 
remaining in the loan classification `loss' (coll-4). Step 2 of the logit analysis calculates 
the probability of loan quality migrating to/ remaining in the loan classification 
`doubtful' (coll-3). Step 3 of the logit analysis calculates the probability of loan quality 
migrating to/ remaining in the loan classification `current' (coll-1) or `non-current' 
(coll-2). 
The regression analysis, showing the probabilities of credit migration, is illustrated in 
Exhibit 6.1810. Exhibit 6.18, section (a) shows the probability of coil-1 loans remaining 
in coil-1 (dpi), or migrating to coll-2 (c 1 p2), or migrating to coll-3 (c 1 p3 ), or 
migrating to coll-4 (clp4). Migration probabilities for coll-2, coll-3, and coll-4 are given 
in sections (b), (c), and (d) respectively. The credit migration probabilities provide 
estimates of the future composition of asset quality using the external data (industry 
performance). From the simulations, it can be seen that the poorer the industry 
performance, the higher the probability of the loan quality falling within the particular 
periods. 
quality as a function of the external and internal variables. 
10 The regression process is conducted through E-View software package. For 
details, see Appendix 6. E. 
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Probability of credit migration as a function of industry performance 
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This credit migration probability matrix may be useful for both the banks and their 
supervisors in predicting future loan quality by observing not only the historical default 
events but also other ex-ante market signals. For the bank, this analysis may provide 
additional guidance for better portfolio diversification. For the bank supervisors, this 
analysis may provide additional guidance for assessing the risk-taking capacity of the 
banks in the future. Notwithstanding this, the analysis could be even more accurate if 
the bank could also provide more complete internal information and the statistical 
model was more comprehensive. 
Bench mark Risk Weight (BR W) and Risk Weighted Assets (R WAs) 
A BRW is the factor used to convert the probability of default into a risk weight. The 
probabilities of default are represented by clp4, c2p4 and c3p4. Based on the PD, which 
is calculated from the simulation of the credit migration, then the BRW can be 
calculated as follows. " 
BRW(PD) = 976.5*N(1.118*G(PD)+1.288)*(1+0.047*(1-PD)/PD°44) 
Exhibit 6.19 
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.. ------------ ....... 
N(. ) denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random 
variable and G(. ) denotes the inverse cumulative distribution function for a normal 
random variable. 
The result of the calculation is given in Appendix 6. F and is illustrated in Exhibit 6.19 
(a). The RWAs can also be calculated by using the formula below. 
RWA = (LGD / 50) * BRW(PD) or 12.5 * LGD , whichever is smaller12 
The RWAs are given in Appendix 6. F and shown graphically in Exhibit 6.19 (b). Based 
on the calculation for RWAs and the bank's eligible capital within the period 1995 to 
1999, the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) is illustrated in Exhibit 6.20. From the 
calculations, it can be concluded that during the economic recession, the risk weighted 
assets increased. This increase resulted in a lower CAR. 
Exhibit 6.20 
Capital Adequacy Ratio - IRB Approach 
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6.3.3. Variable-claim types of asset and expected returns 
In practice, there exist different types of projects, which are associated with different 
expected cash inflows and levels of uncertainty. Generally, Islamic banks may find 
three different types of projects to finance in sharing contracts, as illustrated in Exhibit 
6.21. Scheduled-based project financing produces a lower level of risk since the 
monetary income is directly distributed from scheduled revenues (for example, 
construction projects which are financed by the government budget). Once the revenue 
shares are determined, the return will not be affected by external factors since the 
revenue shares are distributed prior to the realisation of profit. In determining the 
sharing ratio, the Islamic bank will determine a preferred level of expected income. 
Entrepreneurial investment projects produce a higher level of financial risk since 
monetary incomes distributed are still uncertain. The bank and the entrepreneur are only 
able to predict the expected revenue, which depends on many factors like market 
conditions and entrepreneurial skill. Deterioration in business conditions will reduce the 
expected cash inflow from the business activities. Islamic banks, as the capital 
providers, must have a minimum target for monetary surplus. This monetary target may 
be achieved by increasing its revenue share when the expected gross revenue is low, or 
by decreasing its revenue share when the expected gross revenue is high. 
Exhibit 6.21 
Three different types of sharing based financing 
T es of project to finance 
Scheduled payment Non-scheduled payments 
Non-company Company 
Factors to be concerned Capability to finish the Industrial analysis and Industrial and financial 
with project, validity of qualitative individual skill analysis 
contract analysis 
Purpose of financing Project accomplishment Business initiation Working capital 
enhancement 
Sources of uncertainty Legal aspects and track Industrial performance Industrial and individual 
record of the entrepreneur and unobserved individual performance 
skill 
Source: Interviews with the officers in marketing department, rt . BMI 
12 Basle Committee, 2001, paragraph 425. 
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The correlation pattern among gross revenue (nominal return) earned by the business 
(revenue) as a percentage of business revenue to the total loan, the sharing ratio and 
realised income for the bank (revenue share) as a percentage of the bank's income to the 
total loan is illustrated in Exhibit 6.22. It shows the rate of gross revenue gained by the 
entrepreneurs (the dotted line), the average sharing ratio (the dashed line) and the rate of 
realised income for Islamic banks (the full line). Empirically, the correlation coefficient 
between the revenue share ratio and gross revenue is - 0.7393. This coefficient shows 
the tendency of Islamic banks to adjust their revenue share contrariwise to business 
conditions. 
Exhibit 6.22 
Relationship between revenue, the sharing ratio and the revenue share 
25 
20 
15 
C 
4) 
L 10 
CL 
5 
0 
A Ro 0 
sclp NCO Naj 'I re Share ratio ------ Re\enue Revenue share 
Source: PT. BMI 
Model estimation of the expected return 
The model estimation is constructed using the following assumptions. Firstly, historical 
individual performance determines the average return by the entrepreneur. Let AD be 
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the average difference between revenue (REV) and the industry performance index 
(GDP, ); thus AD = REV - GDP, . After subtracting by GDP, we conduct statistical 
analysis to find possible statistical correlations between the variables. 
The first statistical analysis shows a negative correlation (as shown in Exhibit 6. G. 1, 
Appendix 6. G) between the share ratio and individual financial performance. This 
means that the more capable the individual, the higher the expected return will be. If the 
bank has a relatively constant expected return, it will require a lower sharing ratio. 
Contrariwise, if the projects generate a lower rate of returns, the bank will require a 
higher sharing ratio. The second statistical test also shows a negative correlation (as 
shown in Exhibit 6. G. 2, Appendix 6. G) between the share ratio and industrial 
performance. It means that during a recession (a lower level of expected return), the 
bank will require its share ratio to increase in order to gain the same expected return as 
under normal economic conditions. 
Based on the statistical analysis above, I conclude that the share ratio can be a function 
of both industry and individual performance. Secondly, the financial performance of 
every entrepreneur changes in accordance with the changes in industrial performance. 
Hence, 
A REV :f (AD, GDP) 
The results of a regression process looking for a possible relationship between expected 
revenue and individual performance or industrial performance are given in Exhibit 
6. G. 3, Appendix 6. G. The statistical results are significant as indicated by the high R2 
level. Based on these statistical results, it can be concluded that the expected return of 
the bank is a function of industrial performance, individual performance and the share 
ratio (R :f (AD, GDP, A(AD, GDP)) ). 
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Exhibit 6.23 
Real and estimated revenue of the bank 
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Exhibit 6.23 shows the return and the estimated revenue of the bank as a function of 
individual performance, industry performance and the share ratio. 
6.4. Summary 
The types of depositors who are attached to the bank are religious and risk averse. They 
are not really worried about opportunity loss as a result of rate differentials between the 
western and the Islamic banking systems as long as the expected returns do not become 
negative. In the absence of competition in the Islamic banking system, the bank was 
obviously not afraid of displacement risk since there were no Islamic competitors with 
which to compare the returns given to the depositors. 
The Islamic bank can, however, benefit from the current development of statistical 
techniques in the assessment of asset quality. The bank can apply either a standardised 
approach or an IRB approach (if the quality of the operations meet the minimum 
requirements for the IRB approach) to assess its capital adequacy. From the analysis 
undertaken, it is clear that one of the factors that influenced 
its ability to survive the 
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economic down-turn was its financial cushion. The important role played by capital in 
absorbing shocks during a financial crisis has been clearly demonstrated. 
In addition, it has been shown how further statistical innovation can also be 
implemented to help predict the expected return of the hybrid-based assets. 
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Appendix 6. A 
Composition of the Islamic bank's liabilities (%) 
Wad iah C/A 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.12 
Saving Account 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.23 
De p. Account 0.09 0.15 0.32 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.45 
Others 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 
Tot al Fixed Claims 0.20 0.26 0.57 0.73 0.79 0.81 0.89 0.86 
Paid-up capital 0.78 0.72 0.41 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.31 0.25 
G. Prov - - - 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 
Retained earning 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 (0.22) (0.14) 
Total Variable Claims 0.80 0.74 0.43 0.27 0.21 0.19 0.11 0.14 
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Appendix 6. B 
Statistical test to identify the types of depositors attracted to the Islamic bank 
Exhibit 6. B. 1 
Correlation between deposit growth and opportunity loss 
Correlations 
DGROWTH OPPLOSS 
DGROWTH Pearson Correlation 1.000 
. 095 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 667 
Sum of Squares and 
Cross-products 1532.164 236.943 
Covariance 69.644 10.770 
N 23 23 
OPPLOSS Pearson Correlation 
. 095 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 667 
Sum of Squares and 
Cross-products 236.943 4084.117 
Covariance 10.770 185.642 
N 23 23 
Exhibit 6. B. 2 
Correlation between level of deposit growth and expectation of loss 
LEVDGROW * PROBLOSS Crosstabulation 
(`niin4 
PROBLOSS 
1.00 2.00 3.00 Total 
LEVDGROW . 00 
1 2 3 
1.00 9 1 10 
2.00 10 10 
Total 19 2 2 23 
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Exhibit 6. B. 3 
Chi-Square Tests 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
2-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.227a 4 
. 001 
Likelihood Ratio 16.478 4 
. 002 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 11.181 1 . 001 
N of Valid Cases 23 
a. 7 cells (77.8%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is. 26. 
Exhibit 6. B. 4 
Symmetric Measures 
Asymp. 
Value Std. Error Approx. 1' Approx. Sig. 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R -. 713 . 089 -4.659 . 000c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation -. 642 . 124 -3.835 . 001c 
N of Valid Cases 23 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
C. Based on normal approximation. 
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Appendix 6. C 
General asset composition of the bank 
Financing 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.91 0.85 0.59 
Cash 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 
Cent. Bank Securities 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.35 
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Appendix 6. D 
Correlation test between relevant factors to credit migration 
Exhibit 6. D. 1 
Cross-tabulation and X2 test of credit migration and industry performance index 
Credit Migration * Ind. Performance Crosstabulation 
Count 
Ind. Performance 
Slow down Growth High growth Total 
Credit Deteriorated 44 54 96 194 
Migration Remain 96 155 580 831 
Upgraded 10 9 24 43 
Total 150 218 700 1068 
Chi-Squ are Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
2-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 33.62 4a 4 . 000 
Likelihood Ratio 31.993 4 . 000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Ass ociatio n 
13.802 1 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 1068 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 6.04. 
Exhibit 6. D. 2 
Cross-tabulation and X2 test for credit migration and terms of contracts 
Credit M igration * Terms of Loan Crosstabulation 
('n i int 
Terms of Loan 
Short Medium-long Total 
Cred it Deteriorated 178 16 194 
Migration Remain 786 45 831 
Upgraded 38 5 43 
Total 1002 66 1068 
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Chi-Squ are Tests 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
2 sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.4703 2 
. 107 
Lkelihood Ratio 3.949 2 
. 139 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association . 222 1 . 637 
N of Valid Cases 1068 
a- 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 2.66. 
Exhibit 6. D. 3 
Cross-tabulation and , Z2 test for credit migration and loan value 
Credit Migrati on * Outstanding Loan Crosstabul at ion 
Co u, t 
Outstandn Loan 
Sma II Big Total 
Credo Deteriorated 93 101 194 
Migration Finain 393 438 831 
Lagraded 16 27 43 
Total 502 566 1068 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.47 Oa 2 . 107 
Likelihood Ratio 3.949 2 . 139 
Linear-by-Linear 
. 222 
1 . 637 Associatio n 
N of Valid Cases 1068 
a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 2.66. 
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Appendix 6. E 
Logistic Regression Results 
CMl 
123-4 
LOGIT // Dependent Variable is NCOLL 
Date: 11/11/00 Time: 21: 48 
Sample: 1 764 
Included observations: 764 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
C -4.548600 0.355388 
Log likelihood -44.43098 
Obs with Dep=1 8 
Obs with Dep=O 756 
Variable Mean All Mean D=1 
C 1.000000 1.000000 
12-3 
LOGIT // Dependent Variable is NCOLL 
Date: 11/11/00 Time: 21: 59 
Sample: 1 756 
Included observations: 756 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
C -3.119055 0.180641 
Log likelihood -132.5068 
Obs with Dep=l 32 
Obs with Dep=O 724 
Variable Mean All Mean D=1 
C 1.000000 1.000000 
1-2 
LOGIT // Dependent Variable is NCOLL 
Date: 11/11/00 Time: 22: 04 
Sample: 1 724 
Included observations: 724 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
t-Statistic Prob. 
-12.79898 0.0000 
Mean D=0 
1.000000 
t-Statistic Prob. 
-17.26663 0.0000 
Mean D=0 
1.000000 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
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C -1.821809 0.131865 -13.81568 0.0000 
INDUSTRY -0.063886 0.014716 -4.341340 0.0000 
Log likelihood -239.1804 
Obs with Dep=1 78 
Obs with Dep=O 646 
Variable Mean All Mean D=1 Mean D=O 
C 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
INDUSTRY 5.654972 2.617949 6.021672 
CM2 
123-4 
LOGIT // Dependent Variable is NCOLL 
Date: 11/12/00 Time: 01: 35 
Sample: 1 112 
Included observations: 112 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -1.774090 0.274923 -6.453037 0.0000 
INDUSTRY -0.045604 0.027343 -1.667853 0.0982 
Log likelihood -44.60844 
Obs with Dep=1 16 
Obs with Dep=O 96 
Variable Mean All Mean D=1 Mean D=0 
C 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
INDUSTRY 1.719643 -1.787500 2.304167 
12-3 
LOGIT // Dependent Variable is NCOLL 
Date: 11/12/00 Time: 01: 42 
Sample: 1 96 
Included observations: 96 
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.974394 0.237616 -4.100706 
0.0001 
INDUSTRY -0.043322 0.025503 -1.698664 
0.0927 
Log likelihood -53.64330 
Obs with Dep=1 25 
Obs with Dep=O 71 
Variable Mean All Mean D=1 Mean D=0 
C 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
INDUSTRY 2.304167 -0.252000 3.204225 
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1-2 
LOGIT // Dependent Variable is NCOLL 
Date: 11/12/00 Time: 01: 48 
Sample: 1 71 
Included observations: 71 
Convergence achieved after 2 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.735707 0.253590 2.901169 0.0050 
Log likelihood -44.71626 
Obs with Dep=1 48 
Obs with Dep=O 23 
Variable Mean All Mean D=1 Mean D=O 
C 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
CM3 
123-4 
LOGIT // Dependent Variable is NCOLL 
Date: 11/12/00 Time: 01: 59 
Sample: 1 93 
Included observations: 93 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
INDUSTRY -0.101144 0.028721 -3.521616 
Log likelihood -57.32033 
Obs with Dep=1 35 
Obs with Dep=O 58 
Variable Mean All Mean D=1 Mean D=0 
INDUSTRY 3.788172 0.791429 5.596552 
12-3 
LOGIT // Dependent Variable is NCOLL 
Date: 11/12/00 Time: 02: 04 
Sample: 1 58 
Included observations: 58 
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
C 1.452252 0.334936 4.335904 
Log likelihood -28.17191 
Obs with Dep=1 47 
Obs With Dep=O 11 
Variable Mean All Mean D=1 Mean D=0 
C 1.0000 1.000000 1.000000 
Prob. 
0.0001 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
0.0007 
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1-2 
LOGIT // Dependent Variable is NCOLL 
Date: 11/12/00 Time: 02: 08 
Sample: 1 11 
Included observations: 11 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
C -2.302585 1.048799 -2.195449 
Log likelihood -3.350997 
Obs with Dep=1 1 
Obs with Dep=O 10 
Variable Mean All Mean D=1 Mean D=0 
C 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
CM4 
123-4 
LOGIT // Dependent Variable is NCOLL 
Date: 11/12/00 Time: 02: 14 
Sample: 1 100 
Included observations: 100 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
C 2.313635 0.349425 6.621267 
Log likelihood -30.25378 
Obs with Dep=1 91 
Obs with Dep=O 9 
Variable Mean All Mean D=1 Mean D=0 
C 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
12-3 
LOGIT // Dependent Variable is NCOLL 
Date: 11/12/00 Time: 08: 20 
Sample: 19 
Included observations: 9 
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Prob. 
0.0528 
Prob. 
0.0000 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
INDUSTRY -0.072588 0.132714 -0.546949 
0.5993 
Log likelihood 
Obs with Dep=1 
Obs with Dep=O 
Variable Mean All 
-6.083913 
5 
4 
Mean D=1 Mean D=0 
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INDUSTRY 0.777778 -0.160000 1.950000 
1-2 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
LOGIT // Dependent Variable is NCOLL 
Date: 11/12/00 Time: 08: 25 
Sample: 14 
Included observations: 4 
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -1.098612 1.154700 -0.951426 0.4116 
Log likelihood -2.249341 
Obs with Dep=1 1 
Obs with Dep=O 3 
Variable Mean All Mean D=1 
C 1.000000 1.000000 
Mean D=0 
1.000000 
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Appendix 6. F 
The Calculation of Risk Weighted Assets using an IRB Approach 
I1X Probability BRW Adjusted RW 
12341 to 412 to 413 to 41231234 
1 241,640 700 685 1,700 0.01 0.10 0.28 64.0 309.6 583.2 309.157 4,335 7.989 21.2 50 342_. 731 
2 255.500 767 1,022 1,789 0.01 0.11 0.32 64.9 326.1 629.2 331,420 4,999 12.775 22 356 371.550 
3 297.068 855 1,559 1,823 0.01 0.11 0.31 65.7 321.8 617.5 390,576 5.501 19.254 22,79_ 438,1 24 
1995 4 270.5 61 8,603 4,460 2,1 85 0.01 0.10 0.28 66.6 307.6 577.2 360.464 52.920 51,488 27.3 14 492,1 86 
1 262,026 19,120 6,347 1,830 0.01 0.12 0.39 67.5 350.1 691.3 353.662 133.880 79.335 22.876 589.752 
2 237,310 13.921 7,827 6.982 0.01 0.11 0.34 68.4 331.9 644.8 324.421 92,399 97.838 87.272 601.930 
3 259,200 540 7,468 5.400 0.01 0.10 0.30 69.2 317.0 604.1 358.806 3,423 90,227 67,500 519.957 
1996 4 305,269 544 44 5,031 0.01 0.10 0.26 70.1 301.6 559.8 427,818 3,281 487 62.888 494.474 
1 321.1 72 58.450 59 6.771 0.01 0.11 0.32 70.9 324.3 624.4 455,599 379.1 53 731 84,638 920,1 20 
2 524,1 60 60.480 343 7,056 0.01 0.12 0.37 71.8 344.8 678.2 752,421 417,088 4,284 88,200 1.261,993 
3 772,276 17,183 889 178 0.01 0 12 0.37 72.6 343.9 675.9 1.121.650 118,183 11,109 2,222 1.253.165 
1997 4 881,449 43,163 0 0 0.01 0.14 0 47 73.5 382.7 764.0 I. 295.053 330.331 0 0 I. 625,384 
1 529,6 34 147,7 97 217.3 76 1 52,5 55 001 0.17 0.60 74.3 432.1 847.6 786,9 97 1.277,2 31 2,717.2 03 1,906,9 39 6.688,3 70 
2 612.000 97.920 122.400 195,840 001 0.25 0.81 75.1 543.6 941.7 919,582 1,064,653 1.530,000 2,448,000 5,962.235 
3 155.600 42.700 65.5 80 201.060 0.01 0.26 0.84 76.0 559.8 948.2 236,379 478,078 819.750 2,513.250 4,047.456 
1998 4 126,914 63,779 7,3 83 257,899 0.01 0.28 0.86 76.8 577. I 953.9 194,896 736,074 92,2 88 3,223,738 4,246,995 
1 24,000 0 23.3 76 122,080 0.01 0.20 0.69 77.6 472.3 894.0 37,249 0 292,2 00 1.526,000 1.855,449 
2 49,475 31,250 7,825 30,075 0.01 0.13 04 78.4 362.0 719.5 77,596 226,262 97,813 375,938 777.608 
3 2,8 10 220 17,980 102,720 0.01 0.14 0.48 79.2 386.4 771.5 4,453 1,700 224,750 I, 284,000 I. 514,903 
1999 4 18,530 2.570 19,210 94,2 30 0.01 0.12 0.36 80.0 339.9 665.6 29,664 17,469 240,1 25 I. 177,875 1.465.1 33 
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Appendix 6. G 
Statistical model for estimating returns of variable return types of assets 
Exhibit 6. G. 1 
Sharing ratio and individual performance 
Correlations 
SHARERA INDIVIDU 
SHARERA Pearson Correlation 1.000 -. 488 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 108 N 12 12 
INDIVIDU Pearson Correlation -. 488 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 108 
N 12 12 
Exhibit 6. G. 2 
Share ratio and industry performance 
Correlations 
INDUSTRI SHARERA 
INDUSTRI Pearson Correlation 1.000 -. 607* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 036 
N 12 12 
SHARERA Pearson Correlation -. 607* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 036 
N 12 12 
Correlation is significantatthe 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Exhibit 6. G. 3 
Model estimation 
Model Summarp 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
. 9775 . 
955 . 945 
1.6984 
a. Predictors: (Constant), INDIVIDU, INDUSTRI 
b" Dependent Variable: RETURN 
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Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 555.125 2 277.562 96.220 
. 000a 
Residual 25.962 9 2.885 
Total 581.087 11 
a. Predictors: (Constant), INDIVIDU, INDUSTRI 
b. Dependent Variable: RETURN 
Coefficients' 
Standardi 
zed 
Unstandardized Coefficien 
Coefficients is Collineari Statistics 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 2.080 
. 
856 2.430 . 
038 
INDUSTRI 
. 
481 . 
180 
. 
207 2.663 . 026 . 
818 1.222 
IN D IVI DU 
. 
864 
. 
077 . 
871 11.177 . 000 . 
818 1.222 
a. Dependent Variable: RETURN 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. Summary of the Research and the Empirical Results 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this thesis was to devise a regime of capital regulations that takes account of 
the characteristics of Islamic banks. One of the most distinguishing characteristics of 
Islamic banking operations is the prohibition of usury, and, consequently, the emphasis 
on sharing contracts (profit-and-loss (PLS)-sharing contracts). Therefore, the western 
system (and more established capital regulation, which is outlined by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision - BIS, 2001) needs to be modified to reflect Islamic 
banking operations. To address this issue, the recently established institutions for 
Islamic banking regulations (e. g. the AAOIFI) have tried to propose a new capital 
standard that is appropriate for Islamic banks. 
Before developing this new approach to capital regulation, the research was aimed at 
identifying the nature of sharing contracts and its applicability. This analysis is 
important to help explain the current reluctance of the players in Muslim society 
(including the Islamic banks) to apply pure PLS-based contracts in daily transactions. 
Practically, sharing contracts do not currently dominate either the assets or the liabilities 
side of Islamic banks. 
Chapter 4 discusses the contract choices in terms of two objective functions: minimising 
risk (depending upon the risk aversion level) and maximising religious utility. The 
contracting parties will always try to maximise their utility subject to the 
level of 
certainty of the outcomes. The risk-averse player tends to choose a project with a 
higher 
level of certainty. In practice (especially in developing countries), 
information 
asymmetry may become very significant. There are 
four possible contractual problems 
identified. They are: unobservable effort (leading to moral hazard problems); 
hidden 
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productivity (leading to adverse selection problems); poor accounting standards; and 
price disparities (especially in the countries which allow two different types of banking 
system to operate). For the moral hazard and adverse selection problems, information 
and monitoring processes play important roles in reducing the intensity of the problems. 
Poor accounting standards may also create wrong incentives for the agent in 
maximising his own utility. This may lead to potential disputes among contracting 
parties, especially concerning the recognition of costs/expenses and revenues. The 
ability of entrepreneurs to choose the cheapest cost of capital may also create a 
possibility of the Islamic bank being crowded by marginally profitable projects. The 
Islamic banks, therefore, have to be equipped with skilled staff that are capable of 
choosing the `best' prospective projects to be financed. 
These potential problems are possible reasons for lower expected returns in share 
contracts. From the analysis, it is shown that the investor expecting a higher expected 
return from a project (stochastically dominant) may accept a wider range of possible 
incomes than if he expects a lower expected return. Finally, each individual (Muslim) 
shall optimise his utility subject to the expected monetary returns and religious 
compliance. In the absence of a sound economic environment, the religious and risk- 
averse customers will optimise the choice (for example, the religious depositors of 
Islamic banks expect the principal amount of their deposits to be guaranteed but they 
share the monetary surplus as a result of business activities). This analysis may explain 
the domination of hybrid-contracts (a combination between sharing and debt contracts) 
in Islamic banking operations. 
In chapter 5, a more appropriate capital regulation for Islamic 
banks is developed. The 
analysis starts with the building blocks of the banking products, which can 
be classified 
into two general types: fixed claims; and variable claims. 
On the liabilities side, the 
existence of saving deposits that represent 
hybrid-contracts shows the need for 
enhancing repayment capacity by the Islamic 
banks since the principal amount of 
deposits is guaranteed. However, the composition of sharing-based and 
debt-based 
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deposits may vary among Islamic banks. The capital regulation should be able to 
enhance both the fiduciary as well as the agency role of the banks. The capital 
regulation outlined by the AAOIFI is flawed in two areas. First, there is a possibility 
that a bank will be allowed to operate with a high proportion of the PLS-based products 
on the assets side without being sufficiently backed by PLS-based products on the 
liabilities side. Second, the formula proposed for calculating the capital ratio may create 
a potential moral hazard problem when PLS-based depositors dominate the banks' 
liabilities. 
The analysis also provides a discussion of systemic stability when an Islamic banking 
system applies similar safety-net arrangements to maintain public confidence. The 
analysis adopts a stochastic methodology to represent uncertainty in the model. The 
analysis shows that the more dominant the debt-based deposits on the liabilities side of 
an Islamic bank, the higher the option value (to levy a higher systemic cost on the 
system) to the shareholders. The regulators of Islamic banks, like the regulators of 
western banks, should also be equipped with skilled staff to ensure an acceptable level 
of risk-taking is assumed by the banks. 
The proposed capital regulation demonstrates how to enhance both the fiduciary as well 
as the agency roles of banks. The fiduciary role can be enhanced by requiring the 
Islamic banks: (1) to have prudent asset-liabilities (capital) structures; and (2) to have 
adequate financial cushions. The agency role can be enhanced by requiring: (1) the 
shareholders of Islamic banks to observe a minimum level of financial participation; 
and (2) the banks to disclose crucial financial information to investors. Theoretically, a 
higher level of financial participation and a higher quality of information will both 
improve the quality of the contracts entered into by the banks and their customers. 
In chapter 6, the discussion is focused on an analysis of the financial characteristics and 
soundness of one Indonesian Islamic bank that survived the recent economic crisis in 
Indonesia. The analysis starts with a discussion of the bank's capital and liabilities 
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structure. This includes an identification of the depositor types that are likely to stay 
loyal to the Islamic bank. From the analysis, it is found that only religious and risk- 
averse types of depositors are likely to stay loyal to the bank. They do not really care 
about opportunity loss (higher returns are available from interest-based banks) as long 
as their principal is guaranteed. The analysis shows the need for an adequate financial 
cushion to help absorb temporary financial shocks. The analysis also shows the 
relevance of the banking standards recently outlined by the Basel Committee in 
maintaining the soundness of the bank's operations; and, the possible use of supporting 
statistical techniques in assessing asset quality is explored. 
7.2. Recommendations for Future Research 
This thesis emphasises the pivotal position of capital regulation of Islamic banks to help 
them to maintain their operational soundness. A more intensive discussion of other 
banking risks, such as market risk and liquidity risk, which Islamic banks face, and the 
methodologies available for identifying, measuring and controlling them, would be 
beneficial. This would improve our understanding of Islamic banking operations and 
shed light on the additional supervisory tools and regulations necessary to ensure the 
long run sustainability of the Islamic bank sector. 
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